Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07WARSAW937
2007-04-23 13:30:00
SECRET
Embassy Warsaw
Cable title:  

POLAND-IRAQ: GOP REAFFIRMS MND-CS COMMITMENT

Tags:  MARR PGOV PREL PL 
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VZCZCXRO4623
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHWR #0937/01 1131330
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 231330Z APR 07 ZDS CCY
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4023
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 000937 

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY - CLASSIFICATION UPGRADED -

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL PL
SUBJECT: POLAND-IRAQ: GOP REAFFIRMS MND-CS COMMITMENT
THROUGH 2007, LEAVES DOOR OPEN FOR 2008


WARSAW 00000937 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Political Counselor Mary T. Curtin for reasons 1.4(b) an
d (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 000937 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D COPY - CLASSIFICATION UPGRADED - SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017 TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL PL SUBJECT: POLAND-IRAQ: GOP REAFFIRMS MND-CS COMMITMENT THROUGH 2007, LEAVES DOOR OPEN FOR 2008 WARSAW 00000937 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Political Counselor Mary T. Curtin for reasons 1.4(b) an d (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On March 30, an interagency delegation met with GOP officials to press for a GOP commitment to maintain Polish troops and bases in Iraq through the end of 2007 (del list in para 2). The common Polish position was a commitment to keep Polish troops in Iraq throughout 2007 with a possibility for deployment in 2008, but there was not yet full commitment to keeping open both camps in the Polish sector (Camp Delta in Wasit Province and Camp Echo in Qadisiyah Province). The U.S. delegation made clear the new urgency for continued Polish leadership: the fact that a collateral effect of the Baghdad-Anbar centric surge is pushing some terrorists/insurgents out of Baghdad into the Polish sector, and the need for Polish self-sufficiency so that no U.S. troops need to be redeployed to assist. END SUMMARY. ¶2. State-DOD Delegation consisted of: Amb. Lawrence Butler, NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary State for Iraq Debra Cagan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Coalition and Multilateral Operations (Acting) RADM John Miller, Deputy Director, CCJ5, CENTCOM Peter Evans, Deputy Director Iraq Political-Military Affairs. State David Glancy, Senior Advisor Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, State Matthew Minatelli OSD Coalitions, DOD LTC Vince O'Connor, OSD Poland Desk, DOD LTC Brian Pearl, Joint Staff Coalitions -------------- NSA Stasiak -------------- ¶3. (S) During a meeting with Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Mr. Wladyslaw Stasiak, the Ambassador, PolMil Counselor, and Defense Attach joined the delegation wherein Amb. Butler provided an overview of the most recent political developments in Iraq, RADM Miller provided a security update, and DASD(A) Cagan provided a detailed rationale for the need for an ongoing deployment of Polish troops in the two camps, Delta and Echo. Specifically, Ms. Cagan noted that in light of early success of the Baghdad-Anbar centric surge, terrorist and insurgent elements were being forced out of Baghdad into outlying areas including the Polish sector (Wasit and Qadisiyah Provinces). As suc
h, Ms. Cagan noted that General Petraeus assesses the Polish sector as a critical chokepoint that cannot be downgraded or left unmanned. ¶4. (C) NSA Stasiak replied cautiously, and was non-committal, down-playing the value of the Polish "Division" and questioned whether one camp might not be more efficient than two. He emphasized the importance Poland assigns its relationship with the U.S., but flagged that Poland wanted to make its decision in a larger Iraq context. During a follow-on discussion with just the Ambassador, Butler, Cagan, Nowak and Miller, Stasiak was more direct in communicating a political need for Poland to have a more concrete deliverable for continuing its deployment in Iraq in both camps at current troop levels. -------------- MFA U/S Witold Waszczykowski -------------- ¶5. (C) MFA U/S Witold Waszczykowski reaffirmed the Polish commitment to Iraq until the end of the year without addressing the issue of the two camps. He provided his own assessment of the problems in Iraq and the challenges for Poland: attacks on the Polish sector have risen as a result of the surge, the police are sub-par and infiltrated by militia; Waszczykowski asserted that politicians see no political/economic benefit from Poland's engagement in Iraq other than selling arms. He also questioned why Poland's troop deployments and national sacrifice earn it less than countries like Iran and France, who seem to get a seat at the table simply by making trouble. Waszczykowski asked that Poland be invited to the upcoming expanded neighbors conference, more than once drawing contrasts between Poland's contributions to Iraq and other less Iraq-staunch G-8 contributors such as Germany, France, and recent ex-Coalition member Italy. WARSAW 00000937 002.2 OF 003 ¶6. (C) Amb. Butler conveyed the USG request for Poland to keep both camps open at current troop levels until the end of the year. He provided an extensive outline of the Iraqi political landscape, and more recent actions that USG sees as reinforcing national reconciliation such as Iraqi progress on the foreign investment law, hydrocarbon law, deba'thification law, stand-by agreement on fuel subsidies, and the new resistance to Al-Qaida in Iraq by Anbar sheikhs. President Talabani plays a crucial role in the reconciliation effort. In terms of USG efforts to assist Iraq, recent noteworthy efforts include the D/USD effort on State Owned Enterprises, and the joint State-DOD surge of ten new Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). ¶7. (S) Admiral Miller noted in the course of his security overview that Poland's deployment frees the U.S. for the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP),an Iraqi-led operation. He outlined the Iraqi command structure for the BSP, and noted that once U.S. troops reach full force in July there will be a two to one ratio of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to Coalition Forces (CF). Iraq's effort is an integrated one involving CF-ISF synergy and Iraqi army-police cooperation. Ms. Cagan emphasized the frequency of POTUS-Maliki consultations to underscore the improved cooperation between Iraq and the U.S. on the New Way Forward, and offered the assessment that Poland's role in Iraq is of more importance now than at any other time since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom. -------------- MOD U/S Boguslaw Winid -------------- ¶8. (C) Following the USG presentation on Iraqi politics and security, MOD Undersecretary of State Boguslaw Winid was pointed in his interventions, beginning with the observation that he has been receiving similar U.S. delegations on Iraq since Jay Garner in 2003. He noted Poland is in a difficult and unpredictable political environment and faces a hostile parliament coupled with low public opinion. Winid asked what he could show to the Polish people his country is deriving from working with the U.S. in the war on terror beyond coffins from Kabul. He wove in Poland's equities on other issues with Iraq, ranging from Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to missile defense and Poland's "top priority" of deploying to Afghanistan. ¶9. (C) The DCM clarified the limiting factor for proceeding with FMS involved paperwork needed from the Polish General Staff and had no basis in any perceived lack of rewards for service in Iraq. Amb. Butler offered Winid USG resources in assisting Poland with a legislative strategy, including copies of reports sent to the U.S. Congress (DOD's 9010 and State's 1227 and 2207 reports),noting that Poland's history demonstrates all too well the value of a nation's struggle for freedom. ¶10. (C) Winid noted that a continued Mongolian deployment is an important and necessary but not sufficient condition in keeping both camps open. He also cited the deployments of Romania, and possible departures of El Salvador and Slovakia as affecting Poland's decisions. Winid committed to seeing if there was a floor in the number of Polish troops needed to keep both camps open. -------------- General Staff -------------- ¶11. (C) Butler, Cagan, and Miller met with Deputy Chief of the General Staff Vice Admiral Tomasz Mathea separately from the rest of the delegation. Mathea flagged Poland's need for intelligence -gathering Unmanned Aerial Vehicles should Romania depart and take that platform with them. Butler and Cagan reaffirmed points on need to keep both Delta and Echo opened, while Nowak explained the delay in getting GOP/MOD formal request in order to begin the lengthy order process. DASD Cagan noted the unlikelihood of UAVs slated for U.S. forces in combat zones being redirected to non-U.S. partners at this point. ¶12. (C) Polish Joint Staff working level communicated great enthusiasm for maintaining both camps in the Polish sector and affirmed to the other members of the U.S. delegation their intent to recommend as much to their superiors. COMMENT -------------- WARSAW 00000937 003.2 OF 003 ¶13. (C) The delegation effectively reinforced with Polish leaders the new urgency and rational that the New Way Forward and civil-military surge provides for a continued Polish presence in both camps through the end of the year. If we can continue to assist Poland in maintaining the other countries' troop levels in its sector, combined with a consistent and strong message about the value of the Polish deployment in Iraq, there is a good chance GOP will make the right decision for 2007 and even possibly 2008. In this regard, it will be important that Poland receive an invitation to the May 4 neighbors ministerial in Sharm el-Sheikh. END COMMENT ¶14. (U) This message was cleared by Amb. Butler, DASD(A) Cagan and RADM Miller. ASHE

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