YUSHCHENKO AND KACZYNSKI DISCUSS ENERGY, EU: TALK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000583 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON SENV EINV ETRD EAGR PL SUBJECT: YUSHCHENKO AND KACZYNSKI DISCUSS ENERGY, EU: TALK OF BELARUS FOLLOWS Classified By: DCM Kenneth Hillas for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and Polish President Lech Kaczynski focused on the Odessa-Brody pipeline project as well as Ukrainian aspirations for greater engagement with the EU during their March 7 meetings in Plock, Poland. Yushchenko's subsequent call for dialogue with Belarusian President Lukashenko was met with noncommittal statements, and a reminder from the Sejm Foreign Relations Commission Chairman and the Presidential Chancellery that Lukashenko must take positive actions, including releasing political prisoners, before that could happen. The Polish Presidential Chancellery also offered the DCM a readout that described Lukashenko's deepening isolation. End Summary. -------------- The Odessa-Brody Pipeline -------------- ¶2. (U) While meeting in the Plock offices of the Polish oil company PKN Orlen the presidents' discussion focused mainly on energy security, particularly the Odessa-Brody pipeline and its possible extension to Plock, in central Poland. The GOP would eventually like to extend the pipeline further to serve refineries in Gdansk. Although interested in the project, Poland has requested EU funding for the extension of the pipeline, both sides admit there are problems in securing oil supplies for the pipeline. After the meeting, Lech Kaczynski announced his intent to host a presidential summit in May involving oil suppliers Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, as well as Georgia and Ukraine, nations through which the pipeline would transit. Kaczynski outlined his vision of oil from the Caspian and the Caucuses flowing around Russia, into Poland and on to Europe via Plock and Gdansk. ¶3. (C) The Ukrainian DCM told the DCM that the Ukrainians were very pleased with the meeting. The discussions on Odessa-Brody-Plock were particularly fruitful, with Deputy Minister of Energy Naimski laying out some options for moving forward. Both sides viewed a plan to do most of the construction on the Ukrainian side, principally from Adamov to Utsk on the border, as the most practicable. This would cost less and minimize overall EU environmental regulation. The Poles would then only need to build a connector of about 100km to link into an existing, mostly unused, pipeline that feeds Plock. ¶4. (C) Mariusz Handzlik, International Department Director, Polish Presidential Chancellery, offered the DCM a readout from the Polish perspective. Handzlik faulted Naimski for not bringing multinational oil companies into the discussions earlier. There is still a lot of work to be done on the Odessa-Brody pipeline, he said, and getting a commitment from Kazakhstan to supply oil for the Odessa-Brody pipeline will be at the top of Kaczynski,s agenda when he travels to Astana at the end of March. -------------- --- Poland as Ukraine's Bridge to the EU -------------- --- ¶5. (U) The two presidents also discussed Ukraine's EU aspirations. Yushchenko said that Ukraine was counting on Polish support to get a "green light" from Brussels for enhanced EU-Ukrainian cooperation, calling Poland "essential" to Ukrainian aspirations for greater engagement in the EU. Poland has been one of the strongest advocates of Ukraine's eventual integration into the EU. -------------- -------------- Conditions for Ending Lukashenko's Isolation -------------- -------------- ¶6. (U) At a follow-on press conference in Czerniowce, Ukraine, Yushchenko proposed a meeting of presidents from Belarus, Romania, Slovakia, and Poland to discuss border controls. (It is not clear whether this was discussed during the meeting with Kaczynski.) In response, Pawel Zalewski, Chairman of the Polish Sejm,s Foreign Affairs Committee, underscored Poland,s boycott of Lukashenko. Zalewski acknowledged Ukraine,s effort to bridge differences between Belarus and the EU and said a meeting was possible. However, he noted that Lukashenko,s actions had brought about a boycott that only he could end. According to Zalewski, Lukashenko had to release all political prisoners first, and even then, much would depend on the topics and conditions of the meeting. President Kaczynski's Chief of Staff and acting foreign policy advisor said Poland had no information about such a meeting. WARSAW 00000583 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) According to Handzlik Yushchenko made clear to Kaczynski his concern that the Russians would replace Lukashenko, who he said was increasingly depressed and cut off from information. The Ukrainians apparently have doubts whether Lukashenko, who Yushchenko's Deputy Chief of Staff Chaliy the week before had described as being in a deep depression, is still running the government. Chaliy had suggested that some Belarus officials, at Moscow,s prompting, were isolating Lukashenko in preparation for his removal. ¶8. (C) According to Handzlik, Kaczynski told Yushchenko that he would not meet Lukashenko unless he released all political prisoners and held free elections. The Belarus Ambassador had cornered Handzlik just days before Yushchenko's visit to press Lukashenko,s case, noting that now was a time for Poland to help change Belarus for the better while ending Lukashenko,s isolation. The Belarusian Ambassador stressed that other Europeans, especially the Germans, were actively engaging the Lukashenko regime and that Poland was missing an opportunity. The Presidential Chancellery had the impression that Yushchenko did not want to be the only regional leader to meet with Lukashenko, but they were not sure what Yushchenko would do. ASHE