CIVIC PLATFORM GOVERNMENT LIKELY TO LEAVE IRAQ,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 002142 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2022 TAGS: PGOV PREL EFIN ECON MARR PL SUBJECT: CIVIC PLATFORM GOVERNMENT LIKELY TO LEAVE IRAQ, IMPROVE EU TIES, AND PURSUE ECONOMIC REFORMS REF: WARSAW 2137 AND PREVIOUS WARSAW 00002142 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Political Counselor Mary T. Curtin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: With their victory clear, Civic Platform (PO) leaders are making public statements on a wide range of foreign policy objectives, including their party's position on Polish deployment in Iraq. Reflecting widespread popular dissatisfaction with the Iraq war, PO consistently has called for ending Polish deployments once the current mandate expires on December 31, 2007. There is no concrete plan in place to withdraw Polish troops immediately, but it is likely to occur in 2008, as reported previously. PO leader Donald Tusk announced last week that Poland will not move precipitously, and will honor its international agreements. On missile defense, PO will want to put its stamp on any agreement, and leaders have made public announcements that they will review carefully progress already made in negotiations. We can expect the new government to seek to reinvigorate Poland's standing within the EU, including by repairing its relationship with Germany. On Russia, while PO's style and tone will contrast with that of the outgoing Law and Justice (PiS) government, we do not expect any significant difference on issues such as energy, the meat ban, and support for governments in Ukraine and Georgia. On economic policies, PO has a detailed agenda of reforms that are business friendly, but its ambitions may be tempered by political constraints posed by threats of vetoes from President Kaczynski and potential differences with probable coalition partner, Waldemar Pawlak of the Polish Peasants Party (PSL). End Summary. Ending Iraq Deployment a Consistent Campaign Pledge -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) PO leadership for some time consistently has called for an end to Poland's deployment in Iraq (reftel and previous),reflecting the widespread unpopularity of the war in Poland. PO deputy leader (and possible candidate for Marshall of the Sejm--the equivalent of our Speaker of the House) Bronislaw Komorowski repeated this campaign pledge on October 22 after PO's unexpectedly strong victory. International press seized upon the story, but there is nothing new to it. PO leaders, including Komorowski, Bogdan Zdrojewski (likely to become the next Minister of Defense) and Donald Tusk, the probable next prime minister, began saying this year that they thought Poland had done enough in Iraq and should withdraw after the current mandate expires on December 31,2007. They have equally promised to honor Poland's international commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. After Polish Ambassador to Iraq Edward Pietrzyk was seriously injured in a car bomb attack in Baghdad, Tusk said Poland should not bow to pressure from terrorists, reiterated that his party had been calling for withdrawal from Iraq, but promised not to act rashly in terms of ending the Polish deployment. Poles have told us repeatedly they will have a phased withdrawal, nothing akin to what the Spanish government did when it removed its troops from Iraq, and Polish military planners were working on possible phase outs even before the elections. ¶3. (C) Interviewed with Komorowski on October 22, MOD Aleksander Szczyglo said that he fully believed that Polish troops would still be in Iraq in a year's time, owing to "obligations that Poland had made to the United States that PO leaders may not be aware of." While the timing of a withdrawal may be an issue, there is little question that a withdrawal will occur. Komorowski's statements that "Poland has fulfilled its obligations to the United States in Iraq 400 percent...and I don't believe it serves our policy to raise that to 500 percent" added emphasis to what has been PO's consistent policy. There will be an opportunity to discuss the timing of a withdrawal, but it is hard to think that PO will walk away from this campaign pledge entirely. ¶4. (C) PO has not made similar statements about its Afghanistan deployment, which it sees as more acceptable because of its NATO character. PO leaders have publicly and privately said they would like to see a greater civilian character to Poland's Afghanistan presence, but have not elaborated on those thoughts. PO will keep Poland's other deployments to international missions, including in Lebanon. With its recent agreement to send troops to an EU mission to Chad, Poland participates in more peacekeeping and other military missions abroad than any other EU member, and is likely to continue to do so. Putting a PO Stamp on Missile Defense -------------- WARSAW 00002142 002.2 OF 003 ¶5. (C) PO leadership has consistently supported in principle our missile defense initiative and the placement of ten interceptors at a site on Polish soil. We are not concerned that a new PO-led government would reverse this policy. However, we do believe that PO will seek to put its stamp on the missile defense negotiations, just as it will with other foreign policy initiatives. This may delay negotiations as PO gets up to speed on the initiative, but our extensive briefings have prepared the ground. Personalities may also play into negotiations, particularly if Radek Sikorski is named Minister of Foreign Affairs, as is rumored. Sikorski's strong views that Poland should receive a laundry list of items, including Patriot Missiles, in exchange for its participation in the missile defense initiative could slow negotiations. Sikorski is not the only candidate rumored for the job (and today's press say President Kaczynski would intervene to try to stop Sikorski's appointment),but any new Minister would want to show he or she struck a hard bargain. EU Ties Likely to Improve -------------- ¶6. (C) EU officials were quick to praise the "European spirit" of Polish voters, and we wholly expect a new, more conciliatory approach to the European Union and notably to Berlin. The poor image of Poland generated by the Kaczynskis' combative approach to the EU and especially to Germany certainly figured in to the election outcome. We have long advocated a strong relationship with Berlin in order for Warsaw to punch at its weight within EU institutions. While pundits here and across Europe are wondering how this will impact U.S. ties, PO promises to reorient policy back towards Europe should not be taken in a zero-sum spirit that they are backing away from the United States. PO leaders, like most Poles, are genuinely pro-American in their reflexes, see the U.S. relationship as critical, and will seek to improve Poland's standing in Brussels while still advocating for a strong trans-Atlantic relationship. ¶7. (C) We do not expect much change, other than in style, with respect to Poland's difficult relationship with Moscow. PO will not want to open itself to likely criticism from PiS that it is somehow soft on Russia, and there is widespread consensus here politically that the EU should help Poland end Russia's meat ban, even if it means blocking Russia's WTO application. Energy security will figure equally prominently in a new PO government. We should also expect Poland to continue to be an advocate for Ukraine's and Georgia's western orientation and a supporter of democracy in Belarus, which will not help relations with Russia. In short, we can expect greater finesse from a PO-led government, but on Russia the substance will be largely the same. It's the Economy, Stupid -------------- ¶8. (U) On economic policy, PO brings extensive experience and a business friendly disposition to government, in marked contrast to its predecessors. Fear that PiS would damage Poland's strong economy may have been a motivator for the young, better educated, urban voters who flocked to the polls to support PO. Fiscal reform is a top PO priority, and simplifying the fiscal regime and reducing bureaucracy will be warmly welcomed by the business community. PO is nonetheless pragmatic that certain reforms will be too difficult in the current political climate. For example, while PO recognizes that reform of the social benefit and health care systems are critical to true economic reform, most observers do not believe PO will be able to implement significant reform with PSL as a partner and President Kaczynski threatening vetoes of legislation affecting the social infrastructure. ¶9. (U) One potential change is that "Belka,s Tax" on savings accounts and stock market capital gains will be on the chopping block, according to PO MPs Zbigniew Chlebowski and Adam Szejnfeld. (The tax was named for SLD's 2004-2005 Prime Minister.) Chlebowski, a serious candidate for Finance or Economy Minister, reaffirmed PO,s plans to introduce a 15 percent flat tax for individuals and corporations, but noted that while a flat tax is one of the fundamental priorities, it will not become a barrier to a coalition. He also confirmed PO's intention to meet Euro Maastricht criteria as soon as possible, emphasizing that the impact of its introduction will have to be studied carefully. Chlebowski added that PO is against the policy of using mergers to create national champions, including the proposed mergers of WARSAW 00002142 003.2 OF 003 oil company PKN Orlen and Lotos Refinery and financial service companies PKO BP and PZU. Also in PO,s sight are over 200 "special taxes" that are levied on businesses and individuals. ¶10. (C) PSL's Pawlak is publicly supportive of many of PO,s reform initiatives although the party has not finalized all of its economic positions. For example, Marek Sawicki, a PSL leader confirmed the party has yet to finalize its policy on abolishing "Belka,s Tax." However, Pawlak stated that the flat tax is worth considering and that it is time the GOP looks seriously at the issue of adopting the Euro. He also proposed introducing modern technology to the government, especially in the areas of tax payments and communications with government authorities. Pawlak,s public statements indicate that he has matured since his previous time in government and achieved a level of sophistication on economic policy. So far, the majority of the PSL,s economic agenda is in synch with PO and Pawlak,s statements indicate the parties may be able to work together on economic policy. However, there has been little public discussion of agricultural policies, where the two parties, interests do not coincide, and we can not be certain that all of PSL,s members will support Pawlak on issues they do not understand or that contradict their rural constituents' interests. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) PO's position on ending Polish deployments in Iraq after the current mandate expires is clear. We have not heard of any intention by the outgoing PiS government to rush through an extension so that it can be blessed by President Kaczynski before PiS leaves office. In any case, such a move would create conflict between the President and the new government, and not serve us well in the long run. We are convinced that PO will continue the established tradition of working closely as a stalwart ally to the United States, but they will do it with a different style, one that will at times be more difficult, but will bring some benefits. PO's expected effort to emphasize improved ties within European institutions and to operate more effectively within the EU is to be expected, is needed, and generally should be good for broad U.S. interests. On economic policy, we will see a more sophisticated government approach, showing a willingness to work to attract investment. PO's depth of field on economic issues may be at odds with President Kaczynski, who has threatened to make liberal use of his veto rights. Moreover, there may be heavy lifting to establish a common front with PSL on agriculture policies where PO's views differ markedly. End Comment. ASHE