POLAND:MISSILE DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS, ROUND THREE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 001938

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM/SNA AMBASSADOR JACKSON MCDONALD
SECDEF FOR DASD BRIAN GREEN AND DASD DANIEL FATA
EUCOM FOR J-5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2017
TAGS: MARR PREL PL
SUBJECT: POLAND:MISSILE DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS, ROUND THREE
VERY PRODUCTIVE

REF: A. WARSAW 01218


B. SECSTATE 91571

Classified By: DCM Kenneth M. Hillas for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: A/S John C. Rood's U.S. delegation conducted a
productive third round of negotiations on Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) with Poland's team headed by Deputy Foreign Minister
Witold Waszczykowski on September 6-7 in Warsaw. The two sides
exchanged views on the strategic context of BMD before delving
into an article by article review of Poland's BMD site text.
The Poles accepted the U.S. concept of a U.S. BMD site "base
within a Polish base." Both sides found broad agreement on
principles despite differences in terminology and translation.
The Poles agreed to drop some language calling for the U.S. to
compensate Poland for costs incurred related to the site, but argued
that for political reasons the agreement needs to reflect some
form of compensation for carrying the cost of maintaining and
protecting the Polish base that would surround the U.S. site.
Waszczykowski, however, understood U.S. concerns about a
"bookkeeping" approach to bilateral cooperation. He also agreed to
drop Poland's proposal for a mechanism to prevent operation of the
U.S. system and other command and control provisions. The U.S. and
Poland agreed to address Polish situational awareness requirements
and input into the concept of operations in separate bilateral
discussions. Negotiations ended with a brief but productive
overview of Poland's proposed Security Cooperation Agreement
(SCA) and its annexes. END SUMMARY.

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Strategic Interests: Rogue States, Russia, NATO
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2. (C) Waszczykowski noted that only days before the talks he and
the Prime Minister had discussed our shared perception of the missile
threat from rogue states. He asked for an update on Congressional
funding and U.S.-Russia consultations. Thinking ahead, he urged
us to work toward a positive statement on MD at NATO's 2008 summit
in Bucharest to ensure MD meshed with NATO. To protect the site, he
called for enhanced counter-intelligence cooperation and he suggested
presenting MD as a new element of NATO's infrastructure.


3. (C) The U.S. noted significant congressional support for BMD but
concern at the lack of negotiated agreements. A/S Rood reported that
we had made clear to the Russians that we would not stop or in any way
delay MD negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic as we explored
Russian proposals. A/S Rood suggested USEUCOM as the appropriate point
of contact for B MD-related counter-intelligence cooperation. On NATO,
DASD Fata explained that the plan for Bucharest was three-fold: build
allied support, accelerate Active Layered Theater (ALT) BMD and gain
Heads of State support for the complimentarity of BMD and ALT BMD.

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Article By Article Review of BMD Site Agreement
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4. (C) Andrzej Kremer, MFA's Director of the Legal and Treaty
Department, opened by explaining that Poland would probably submit
the final BMD agreement to the full Sejm for ratification, a process
called "Big Ratification." (Note: There has been debate in the Sejm
and the press over whether or not such ratification would be necessary
or desirable. End Note)


5. (C) The parties agreed that the "base within a base" concept, with
an American and a Polish commander for each, was familiar in NATO and
feasible, but would require redrafting the current text to clearly
define separate areas of control and responsibility. The U.S. team
stressed the concept of "respect" for, vice compliance with, Polish
law. While acknowledging Poland's right of access to our site on
their base, the U.S. team underscored our need to control access to
it for safety and security reasons.


6. (C) On burden sharing, Rood took issue with the numerous provisions
in the Polish draft calling for compensation to offset any costs and
as an apparent quid pro quo for Poland hosting the BMD site. Rood
stressed that the U.S., Poland, and NATO would derive substantial
benefits from the BMD site. Poland and the U.S. would also bear
certain burdens. He urged the Poles to avoid a "bookkeeping" or
"fee for service" approach to the U.S.-Poland relationship on missile
defense as implied in the Polish draft basing agreement. Instead,
Rood argued for an approach more befitting allies and partners. The
U.S. reminded that "compensation" already included: strengthening

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NATO, closer U.S.-Polish ties and the economic benefits to Poland
resulting from construction contracts and ongoing operation of the
site. The U.S. team agreed to add language indicating our willingness
to provide Polish firms with training and information on U.S.
contracting procedures to ensure equal access to competitive bidding.
Waszczykowski noted that for "political reasons" Poland had to find a
way to balance its costs.


7. (C) On site operations, Waszczykowski agreed to drop the Polish
provision to provide Poland with the means to prevent operation of the
U.S. system. Both sides agreed to move discussion on other command and
control and concept of operations issues to another forum outside of
the BMD site agreement.

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The Security Cooperation Agreement (SCA)
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8. (C) In the discussion of the proposed SCA, Poland voiced a
preference for something between a political declaration and a
legally binding agreement. The Poles wanted it signed at the highest
level possible, preferably by our respective Presidents. Their draft
included numerous provisions for the U.S. to "provide" various
military equipment, including Patriot missiles, at Poland's request.
They explained that their frequent use of the word, "provide"
included all means of provision from "free of charge" to "make
available for purchase under reasonable commercial conditions."

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Atmospherics and Polish Interagency Dynamics
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9. (C) COMMENT: More than ever before, Waszczykowski tactfully and
firmly asserted MFA's leadership of this process on the Polish side.
He took the lead on finding common ground when his MOD colleague,
Piotr Pacholski, championed the most difficult Polish provisions
such as burden sharing and the proposal to give Poland the ability
to block launch of a missile defense interceptor. Several times
during the discussion on these topics, Waszczykowski directed
Pacholski to address his concerns about U.S. positions in expert
forums outside of the BMD negotiations. At one point, Waszczykowski
even asked the U.S. delegation, "What's the greatest source of delay
in our negotiations: lack of funding, lack of a Polish decision,
or lack of a completed site survey?" When the U.S. team indicated that
they were working with MOD on obtaining permits to proceed with the
site survey, Waszczykowski was quick to call on Pacholski for a status
update. Hence, MFA seems to have developed a sense that MOD's approach
to Polish provisions may be needlessly consuming time along the
critical path to project completion. END COMMENT.


10. (U) This cable was cleared by A/S Rood.
ASHE