POLAND:MISSILE DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS, ROUND THREE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 001938 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR PM/SNA AMBASSADOR JACKSON MCDONALD SECDEF FOR DASD BRIAN GREEN AND DASD DANIEL FATA EUCOM FOR J-5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2017 TAGS: MARR PREL PL SUBJECT: POLAND:MISSILE DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS, ROUND THREE VERY PRODUCTIVE REF: A. WARSAW 01218 ¶B. SECSTATE 91571 Classified By: DCM Kenneth M. Hillas for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A/S John C. Rood's U.S. delegation conducted a productive third round of negotiations on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) with Poland's team headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski on September 6-7 in Warsaw. The two sides exchanged views on the strategic context of BMD before delving into an article by article review of Poland's BMD site text. The Poles accepted the U.S. concept of a U.S. BMD site "base within a Polish base." Both sides found broad agreement on principles despite differences in terminology and translation. The Poles agreed to drop some language calling for the U.S. to compensate Poland for costs incurred related to the site, but argued that for political reasons the agreement needs to reflect some form of compensation for carrying the cost of maintaining and protecting the Polish base that would surround the U.S. site. Waszczykowski, however, understood U.S. concerns about a "bookkeeping" approach to bilateral cooperation. He also agreed to drop Poland's proposal for a mechanism to prevent operation of the U.S. system and other command and control provisions. The U.S. and Poland agreed to address Polish situational awareness requirements and input into the concept of operations in separate bilateral discussions. Negotiations ended with a brief but productive overview of Poland's proposed Security Cooperation Agreement (SCA) and its annexes. END SUMMARY. -------------- --- Strategic Interests: Rogue States, Russia, NATO -------------- --- ¶2. (C) Waszczykowski noted that only days before the talks he and the Prime Minister had discussed our shared perception of the missile threat from rogue states. He asked for an update on Congressional funding and U.S.-Russia consultations. Thinking ahead, he urged us to work toward a positive statement on MD at NATO's 2008 summit in Bucharest to ensure MD meshed with NATO. To protect the site, he called for enhanced counter-intelligence cooperation and he suggested presenting MD as a new element of NATO's infrastructure. ¶3. (C) The U.S. noted significant congressional support for BMD but concern at the lack of negotiated agreements. A/S Rood reported that we had made clear to the Russians that we would not stop or in any way delay MD negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic as we explored Russian proposals. A/S Rood suggested USEUCOM as the appropriate point of contact for B MD-related counter-intelligence cooperation. On NATO, DASD Fata explained that the plan for Bucharest was three-fold: build allied support, accelerate Active Layered Theater (ALT) BMD and gain Heads of State support for the complimentarity of BMD and ALT BMD. -------------- -- Article By Article Review of BMD Site Agreement -------------- -- ¶4. (C) Andrzej Kremer, MFA's Director of the Legal and Treaty Department, opened by explaining that Poland would probably submit the final BMD agreement to the full Sejm for ratification, a process called "Big Ratification." (Note: There has been debate in the Sejm and the press over whether or not such ratification would be necessary or desirable. End Note) ¶5. (C) The parties agreed that the "base within a base" concept, with an American and a Polish commander for each, was familiar in NATO and feasible, but would require redrafting the current text to clearly define separate areas of control and responsibility. The U.S. team stressed the concept of "respect" for, vice compliance with, Polish law. While acknowledging Poland's right of access to our site on their base, the U.S. team underscored our need to control access to it for safety and security reasons. ¶6. (C) On burden sharing, Rood took issue with the numerous provisions in the Polish draft calling for compensation to offset any costs and as an apparent quid pro quo for Poland hosting the BMD site. Rood stressed that the U.S., Poland, and NATO would derive substantial benefits from the BMD site. Poland and the U.S. would also bear certain burdens. He urged the Poles to avoid a "bookkeeping" or "fee for service" approach to the U.S.-Poland relationship on missile defense as implied in the Polish draft basing agreement. Instead, Rood argued for an approach more befitting allies and partners. The U.S. reminded that "compensation" already included: strengthening WARSAW 00001938 002 OF 002 NATO, closer U.S.-Polish ties and the economic benefits to Poland resulting from construction contracts and ongoing operation of the site. The U.S. team agreed to add language indicating our willingness to provide Polish firms with training and information on U.S. contracting procedures to ensure equal access to competitive bidding. Waszczykowski noted that for "political reasons" Poland had to find a way to balance its costs. ¶7. (C) On site operations, Waszczykowski agreed to drop the Polish provision to provide Poland with the means to prevent operation of the U.S. system. Both sides agreed to move discussion on other command and control and concept of operations issues to another forum outside of the BMD site agreement. -------------- The Security Cooperation Agreement (SCA) -------------- ¶8. (C) In the discussion of the proposed SCA, Poland voiced a preference for something between a political declaration and a legally binding agreement. The Poles wanted it signed at the highest level possible, preferably by our respective Presidents. Their draft included numerous provisions for the U.S. to "provide" various military equipment, including Patriot missiles, at Poland's request. They explained that their frequent use of the word, "provide" included all means of provision from "free of charge" to "make available for purchase under reasonable commercial conditions." -------------- Atmospherics and Polish Interagency Dynamics -------------- ¶9. (C) COMMENT: More than ever before, Waszczykowski tactfully and firmly asserted MFA's leadership of this process on the Polish side. He took the lead on finding common ground when his MOD colleague, Piotr Pacholski, championed the most difficult Polish provisions such as burden sharing and the proposal to give Poland the ability to block launch of a missile defense interceptor. Several times during the discussion on these topics, Waszczykowski directed Pacholski to address his concerns about U.S. positions in expert forums outside of the BMD negotiations. At one point, Waszczykowski even asked the U.S. delegation, "What's the greatest source of delay in our negotiations: lack of funding, lack of a Polish decision, or lack of a completed site survey?" When the U.S. team indicated that they were working with MOD on obtaining permits to proceed with the site survey, Waszczykowski was quick to call on Pacholski for a status update. Hence, MFA seems to have developed a sense that MOD's approach to Polish provisions may be needlessly consuming time along the critical path to project completion. END COMMENT. ¶10. (U) This cable was cleared by A/S Rood. ASHE