POLAND-EU: POLISH FM FOTYGA'S VIEWS ON JANUARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 000181 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/NCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ENRG EUN PL SUBJECT: POLAND-EU: POLISH FM FOTYGA'S VIEWS ON JANUARY 22-23 GAERC AND OVERALL EU ENGAGEMENT REF: A. STATE 5652 ¶B. STATE 5640 ¶C. STATE 5256 Classified By: Ambassador Victor Ashe, reasons 1.4(b) & (d) ¶1. (C) PolExt Chief delivered Ref B and C pre-GAERC demarches January 17 to Pawel Herczynski, Deputy Director of the MFA EU Department. Herczynski was unable to coordinate a response within the MFA before the January 22 GAERC. However, Post provides below post-GAERC comments by FM Fotyga at a January 25 meeting with Ambassador, as well as a separate discussion with the Chief of the MFA Balkans office. EU Neighborhood Policy -------------- ¶2. (C) At the end of an unrelated meeting January 25, FM Anna Fotyga offered Ambassador her views on Poland's active EU engagement, particularly in the context of the priorities of the current German EU presidency. Fotyga said the GOP was especially concerned over the approach the Germans were taking to adding an Eastern dimension to the Neighborhood Policy. Rather than focusing on key countries at risk, such as Ukraine, Belarus and the South Caucasus, the Germans were tying this Eastern Dimension to the Black Sea Cooperation Council. Such a focus on the Black Sea would unavoidably be dominated by the Russian Federation. Poland did not wish to diminish cooperation in the Black Sea context, as it would increase attention to Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. However, this format completely excluded Belarus, Moldova and the Caucasus, and diminished attention to Ukraine. EU Commission Energy Package Proposal -------------- ¶3. (C) Fotyga reiterated Poland's keen interest in the EU establishing a coherent common energy policy. However, the GOP was disappointed that the January 10 report issued by the Commission had focused too much on internal energy policy and technical issues, which meant the GAERC discussion had given very little attention to external policy and energy security. She noted Poland's continuing discussions with the EU Presidency on lifting its veto of the negotiating mandate for a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia. Discussions with both the EU and with Russia were yielding some results, but there were still issues left to resolve. Energy security continued to be at the top of Poland's EU agenda. European Constitution Treaty -------------- ¶4. (C) Fotyga said that Poland would engage actively in renewed negotiations on a European Constitution, under the lead of the German EU Presidency. She expected that President Lech Kaczynski would announce publicly the GOP position on the future of the Constitution. (N.B. The Polish media have been reporting favorably this week on Chancellor Merkel's comments regarding including reference to "Europe's Christian heritage" in the draft constitution, and have reported that Polish leaders have engaged Czech and Slovakian counterparts on the EU Constitution.) Western Balkans -------------- ¶5. (C) Kosovo: Separately, in a January 22 meeting with PolExt Chief to discuss Ref A demarche on the Kosovo status timeline, MFA Balkans Chief Piotr Siebeneichen said that the GOP shared the U.S. position almost entirely. He noted, however, that U.S. papers he had seen so far made little if any reference to the continued violence in Kosovo, while the GOP was making a point of stressing the need to address this problem. Siebeneichen allowed Poloff to read a draft intervention for FM Fotyga to deliver at the January 26 NATO informal ministerial in Brussels, which did indeed mirror the U.S. position. ¶6. (C) Serbia: Siebeneichen noted that Poland was part of a "like-minded group" with the Netherlands, UK, and Denmark which was advising a cautious approach to beginning talks on a Cooperation and Association Agreement (CAA) with Serbia. Unfortunately, the U.S. initiative to extend a PfP invitation to Serbia at the NATO Riga Summit had complicated the EU debate over a CAA with Serbia. The like-minded group was concerned that some EU member states had taken the PfP decision as a precedent for CAA negotiations, even though Serbia had still not complied its ICTY obligations. Siebeneichen showed poloff a copy of a UK non-paper, apparently distributed to all EU member states several days after the Riga Summit, which laid out the case for compelling Serbian compliance with ICTY in advance of CAA negotiations. ASHE