POTENTIAL POLISH MANPADS SALE TO GEORGIA

S E C R E T WARSAW 001748 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/NCE BART PUTNEY STATE FOR EUR/CARC ELIZABETH ROOD STATE FOR EUR/PRA LISA BENTHIEN AND T TIM KATSAPIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2017 TAGS: PARM MASS ETTC PGOV PREL GG PL SUBJECT: POTENTIAL POLISH MANPADS SALE TO GEORGIA REF: SECSTATE 112014 Classified By: DCM Kenneth M. Hillas for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: In three separate meetings August 10, Charge and Polcouns conveyed reftel demarche to Robert Draba, the President's acting Chief of Staff, who oversees the presidential-level Polish-Georgian commission; Adam Lipinski, Chief of the Prime Minister's Political Cabinet and advisor on regional issues; and Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga. Draba, who is most closely involved in the matter, said the sale had been approved but "can be stopped," and, after receiving assurances that the U.S. would not oppose a vehicle mounted version, undertook to raise the matter with the president. Fotyga was less forthcoming, defending the lengths to which Poland had gone to guard against the proliferation problem, but then leaving the door open, saying she would raise the matter with the president. Lipinski, who is likely not closely involved in the sale, promised to raise the issue with the prime minister. End Summary ¶2. (S) Charge opened the meeting with Draba, who is closely involved in the matter, by noting President Kaczynski,s close relationship to Georgian President Saakashvili ("VERY close," Draba said). He emphasized the USG,s appreciation for what Poland has done for Georgia and its NATO aspirations, and emphasized that we support efforts to improve Georgia,s air defenses. Charge said that we oppose the sale of the shoulder-held GROM missiles because of our broader concern about MANPADS, because of the potential for proliferation to terrorist groups and the difficulty in controlling stocks. He said that the USG would not oppose the sale of GROM missiles in a vehicle-mounted configuration provided they could not be converted into MANPADS. Charge closed by asking how far along the decision-making process had gone. ¶3. (S) Draba said that the decision had already been made to sell. "We are at the point of delivery, but it hasn,t happened. It can be stopped," he said. He then pointedly asked if vehicle mounted GROMs would be acceptable. "I want to make clear (to President Kaczynski) that you will not oppose the vehicle mounted version," he said. When Charge reaffirmed that we would not oppose such a sale, Draba responded very positively, saying he would present the idea to the President the next day (August 11). He said he knew the President "will talk with his brother (the prime minister)" and said he thought there was a chance the President would respond positively. ¶4. (S) Draba was far more forward leaning than Foreign Minister Fotyga, with whom Charge also met later the evening of August 10. Fotyga, who was accompanied by Security Policy Director Robert Kupiecki and Americas Division Director Andrzej Jaroszynski, depicted the matter as essentially closed. "The process is already completed," she said, noting the Minister of Economy had signed the export approval documents. She added that Poland was very meticulous, "particularly my ministry," in ensuring that the export would be secure. Georgia had been required to sign end-user certificates and had agreed to inspections, and arrangements were made for the "most secure way possible" to handle the shipment. She said that Georgia was an important partner of Poland, that it was "fully capable of cooperating with NATO," and had proven itself in difficult places like Iraq. Poland has confidence, she said, in the Georgian government's ability to secure the GROM missiles. ¶5. (S) Charge expressed our agreement in the advances Georgia has made and in our desire to support Georgia's NATO aspirations, and reiterated our opposition in principle to the export of MANPADS. He repeated that we would support the sale of a vehicle mounted version, and asked the Minister to do what she could to pursue this option. She made no promises, but said she would take the matter up with the President. ¶6. (S) The PM,s Chief of Political Cabinet Adam Lipinski was also a bit less forthcoming than Draba, perhaps because he is less involved in the issue. Lipinski indicated knowledge of the issue, said he would raise it with the Prime Minister, but gave no other indication of a possible response. ¶7. (S) Comment: We had heard earlier from Robert Kupiecki the issue was being decided at the presidency. Draba made clear that he was the key address in this series of meetings and he was quite responsive to our support for Poland,s efforts to help Georgia in general and our statement that we would not oppose the sale in some other configuration, but the process is quite far along and it will take a concerted decision to change it. We will revisit this issue in the coming days if we do not receive word from the Polish authorities. End Comment. ASHE