Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07WARSAW1265
2007-05-31 14:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Warsaw
Cable title:
POLES ADVISED AGAINST MANPADS TO GEORGIA
VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHWR #1265/01 1511431 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 311431Z MAY 07 FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4424 INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2676 RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0322 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0119 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 001265
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/PRA ANITA FRIEDT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2017
TAGS: PARM MASS ETTC PGOV PREL GG PL
SUBJECT: POLES ADVISED AGAINST MANPADS TO GEORGIA
REF: SECSTATE 72899
Classified By: DCM Kenneth Hillas for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 001265
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/PRA ANITA FRIEDT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2017
TAGS: PARM MASS ETTC PGOV PREL GG PL
SUBJECT: POLES ADVISED AGAINST MANPADS TO GEORGIA
REF: SECSTATE 72899
Classified By: DCM Kenneth Hillas for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Polcouns delivered reftel demarche, advising
that Poland not sell MANPADS to Georgia, to Ambassador
Tadeusz Chomicki on May 29. Chomicki appreciated hearing the
U.S. position, but politely cautioned that, "This decision
rests with the highest authorities in Poland." As if to
prepare us for bad news, he segued into a positive assessment
of Georgia's readiness to responsibly manage MANPADS. He
also clarified that, while Poland has not previously exported
MANPADS, it never had a formal policy banning the export of
MANPADS. If it should export them to Georgia, it would
observe all "appropriate procedures," for any such export.
MANPADS exported from Poland would not contain any Russian
origin parts, Chomicki asserted. Chomicki was very
interested in our offer to work with Georgia and NATO to
improve Georgia's air defense, and noted that the GROM
missile can also be mounted on a track-based platform. END
SUMMARY.
2. (C) PolCouns delivered reftel demarche, emphasizing that
our opposition was based on the nature of the weapon, and
that we are prepared to work together with Georgia and NATO
allies to improve Georgia's air defense capabilities.
According to Chomicki, Georgia had, at the highest level,
asked Poland for this assistance explicitly. He made clear
that the subject had been discussed by Presidents Kaczynski
and Saakashvili during their several meetings in the past
year, and said the decision was based on Poland's policy of
supporting Georgia's independence, ability to defend itself,
and its NATO aspirations. In response, Poland had evaluated
Georgia's physical security and export controls for MANPADS.
Georgia's physical security impressed the Poles; Chomicki
reported that it exceeded Wassenaar standards. On export
controls, Georgia had offered a reassuring presentation, but
had yet to provide actual working documents that would verify
the truth of that presentation. Chomicki said that Poland
would require clear documentation before any export would
take place. Chomicki also expressed interest in working with
us to strengthen Georgia's export controls systems.
3. (C) Chomicki reported that Poland's consideration of
exporting MANPADS to Georgia was not a change in overall
policy. He asserted that, while Poland had never exported
MANPADS before--because of its concerns about the unique
character of the weapon system--it did not have a formal
policy banning such export altogether. He asserted Poland
would observe all appropriate procedures in any transaction,
including formal assurances for the secure storage of the
MANPADS and prohibitions against the re-export of the system.
Moreover, said Chomicki, any exported MANPADS would be 100%
Polish products. Chomicki explained that Poland had asked
Russia for relevant licenses, but Russia refused. So, Poland
hired Russian scientists and thereby developed the necessary
technologies to produce indigenous MANPADS. "It's not full
production, but it's working," commented Chomicki.
4. (C) Chomicki evinced great interest in our statement
that we are prepared to work together with Georgia, NATO and
NATO member states to improve Georgia's air defense
capabilities in ways that would be in line with its NATO
aspirations and IPAP objectives. He noted that the Grom
missile which is in the MANPAD system can be mounted on a
different platform. He said that Grom missiles produced for
the track system, for example, cannot be reconfigured into a
man-portable system. PolCouns undertook to get back to
Chomicki with further details on what we are prepared to
discuss.
5. (C) COMMENT: Despite our recommendation, the Poles may
export MANPADS to Georgia. But, this is not certain. From
Chomicki's remarks, it seems the President and Prime Minister
themselves will decide this issue. Their pro-American
perspective insures that our recommendation will be carefully
considered. However, Chomicki made the case for a decision
contrary to our recommendation, just in case. There has been
some discussion on alternative ways to improve Georgia's air
defense capabilities. In the past, Poland has considered
exporting POPRADS, vehicle mounted Grom missiles, to
Indonesia. Although POPRAD and MANPAD both use the Grom
missile, in the past, Poland has asserted (as Chomicki did)
that the POPRAD can not be reverse engineered to a MANPAD.
So, it is possible that this option might surface as a
compromise solution in this case.
6. (C) Comment Continued: President Kaczynski may raise
this issue in his meeting with POTUS June 8, and the
presidential party should be prepared to discuss it. END
COMMENT.
ASHE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/PRA ANITA FRIEDT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2017
TAGS: PARM MASS ETTC PGOV PREL GG PL
SUBJECT: POLES ADVISED AGAINST MANPADS TO GEORGIA
REF: SECSTATE 72899
Classified By: DCM Kenneth Hillas for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Polcouns delivered reftel demarche, advising
that Poland not sell MANPADS to Georgia, to Ambassador
Tadeusz Chomicki on May 29. Chomicki appreciated hearing the
U.S. position, but politely cautioned that, "This decision
rests with the highest authorities in Poland." As if to
prepare us for bad news, he segued into a positive assessment
of Georgia's readiness to responsibly manage MANPADS. He
also clarified that, while Poland has not previously exported
MANPADS, it never had a formal policy banning the export of
MANPADS. If it should export them to Georgia, it would
observe all "appropriate procedures," for any such export.
MANPADS exported from Poland would not contain any Russian
origin parts, Chomicki asserted. Chomicki was very
interested in our offer to work with Georgia and NATO to
improve Georgia's air defense, and noted that the GROM
missile can also be mounted on a track-based platform. END
SUMMARY.
2. (C) PolCouns delivered reftel demarche, emphasizing that
our opposition was based on the nature of the weapon, and
that we are prepared to work together with Georgia and NATO
allies to improve Georgia's air defense capabilities.
According to Chomicki, Georgia had, at the highest level,
asked Poland for this assistance explicitly. He made clear
that the subject had been discussed by Presidents Kaczynski
and Saakashvili during their several meetings in the past
year, and said the decision was based on Poland's policy of
supporting Georgia's independence, ability to defend itself,
and its NATO aspirations. In response, Poland had evaluated
Georgia's physical security and export controls for MANPADS.
Georgia's physical security impressed the Poles; Chomicki
reported that it exceeded Wassenaar standards. On export
controls, Georgia had offered a reassuring presentation, but
had yet to provide actual working documents that would verify
the truth of that presentation. Chomicki said that Poland
would require clear documentation before any export would
take place. Chomicki also expressed interest in working with
us to strengthen Georgia's export controls systems.
3. (C) Chomicki reported that Poland's consideration of
exporting MANPADS to Georgia was not a change in overall
policy. He asserted that, while Poland had never exported
MANPADS before--because of its concerns about the unique
character of the weapon system--it did not have a formal
policy banning such export altogether. He asserted Poland
would observe all appropriate procedures in any transaction,
including formal assurances for the secure storage of the
MANPADS and prohibitions against the re-export of the system.
Moreover, said Chomicki, any exported MANPADS would be 100%
Polish products. Chomicki explained that Poland had asked
Russia for relevant licenses, but Russia refused. So, Poland
hired Russian scientists and thereby developed the necessary
technologies to produce indigenous MANPADS. "It's not full
production, but it's working," commented Chomicki.
4. (C) Chomicki evinced great interest in our statement
that we are prepared to work together with Georgia, NATO and
NATO member states to improve Georgia's air defense
capabilities in ways that would be in line with its NATO
aspirations and IPAP objectives. He noted that the Grom
missile which is in the MANPAD system can be mounted on a
different platform. He said that Grom missiles produced for
the track system, for example, cannot be reconfigured into a
man-portable system. PolCouns undertook to get back to
Chomicki with further details on what we are prepared to
discuss.
5. (C) COMMENT: Despite our recommendation, the Poles may
export MANPADS to Georgia. But, this is not certain. From
Chomicki's remarks, it seems the President and Prime Minister
themselves will decide this issue. Their pro-American
perspective insures that our recommendation will be carefully
considered. However, Chomicki made the case for a decision
contrary to our recommendation, just in case. There has been
some discussion on alternative ways to improve Georgia's air
defense capabilities. In the past, Poland has considered
exporting POPRADS, vehicle mounted Grom missiles, to
Indonesia. Although POPRAD and MANPAD both use the Grom
missile, in the past, Poland has asserted (as Chomicki did)
that the POPRAD can not be reverse engineered to a MANPAD.
So, it is possible that this option might surface as a
compromise solution in this case.
6. (C) Comment Continued: President Kaczynski may raise
this issue in his meeting with POTUS June 8, and the
presidential party should be prepared to discuss it. END
COMMENT.
ASHE