MANAGING POSSIBLE DPRK REFUGEES IN VIENTIANE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENTIANE 000006 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CHANGED QUOTATION MARKS AND DASHES IN PARA 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, AND 15 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS, EAP/K, DRL/SENK, PRM, DRL, IO E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017 TAGS: LA PHUM PREF PREL SMIG TH SUBJECT: MANAGING POSSIBLE DPRK REFUGEES IN VIENTIANE REF: 06 STATE 203879 VIENTIANE 00000006 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA M. HASLACH FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND ( D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Following receipt of reftel, which outlines steps Embassy Vientiane should take if approached by a North Korean asylum seeker, DCM and Pol/Econ Chief met with Republic of Korea (ROK) Embassy Counsellor Miyon Lee. Ms. Lee provided updates on recent cases of North Korean asylum seekers in Laos as follows: 1) there is no news on three girls who are reportedly being detained in Laos, 2) the five people who were arrested and facing deportation to China are still in Laos, and 3) a total of ten people, including the two children reported in the press to have sought refuge in the South Korean embassy, are all in Thailand now. Ms. Lee expects that more North Koreans will surface in Laos soon. She said that her embassy is able to handle the current volume of asylum seekers by dealing discreetly with private individuals who are assisting them but will face problems if the numbers increase. The Ambassador plans to follow up with a meeting with the ROK ambassador to enhance cooperation between the two embassies. ¶2. (C) In a subsequent meeting, the Ambassador briefed newly-arrived UN Resrep Rana, the UNDP representative in Laos, on the recent North Korean cases as well as on a January 2005 incident in which a North Korean who had sought asylum at the U.S. Embassy was eventually allowed - on a one-time basis - by the Lao and Thai governments to depart Laos for Thailand where UNHCR met him and facilitiated his travel to Seoul with the ROK Embassy in Bangkok. Both the Ambassador and Ms. Rana agreed the new Thai government was less likely to offer such support. Ms. Rana, who serves as the UNHCR representative in Laos, is planning to meet with the UNHCR/Bangkok to discuss how the UN would handle a North Korean asylum case in Vientiane. At present she sees working discreetly with the ROK Embassy in Vientiane as the best option. End Summary. ROK Embassy Official Updates on Recent Cases -------------- ¶3. (C) The DCM and P/E Chief met January 3 with ROK Embassy Counsellor Miyon Lee to discuss handling DPRK refugees. Ms. Lee complained at the outset about the burden placed on the small staff of the ROK Embassy because of DPRK refugees. She expects the flow of DPRK refugees to increase, noting that some "activists" had moved to Vientiane from Bangkok after having been expelled from Thailand. ¶4. (C) Reviewing recent cases of North Korean asylum seekers in Laos, Ms. Lee said that a total of ten DPRK refugees, including two who had entered the ROK Embassy last month, had now made their way to Bangkok. There was no new information on the three teenagers who have been detained for an extended period, reportedly at Vientiane Municipality headquarters. The five who have been formally arrested remain "on hold;" she added it remains unclear whether the five in this group are really North Koreans or Chinese. ROK Embassy Official Urges Discretion -------------- ¶5. (C) Ms. Lee indicated that press reports about the group of five who have been arrested (or about any refugee group) would be not helpful. Nor did she believe that a demarche by the ROK or another country such as Australia on behalf of the imprisoned individuals threatened with deportation to China would be helpful. She said that only low-key approaches had the potential for being effective. She commented that, once an issue moves to a formal level such as a demarche, the efforts of Lao officials who want to be helpful (such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials) are inevitably thwarted by hard-liners within the government. ¶6. (C) Although Ms. Lee indicated that a group which is formally arrested is almost inevitably returned to China, in this case she still saw a small possibility that relatives or others might be able to persuade the GOL against sending the group members back to China. If they really wanted to go to South Korea, they would just try another way. On the other hand, Ms. Lee told the DCM that the DPRK has asked the GOL to follow its own rules and return this group of five to China. VIENTIANE 00000006 002.2 OF 003 If the formal process to return them begins, it will require consultations and other legal steps which may take a long time. During this time, the case may become public, she opined. ¶7. (C) When asked about the use of publicity by activists to support the refugee process, Ms. Lee suggested that over-use of the media had caused journalists to lose interest in the story. She also noted that the ROK Embassy in Vientiane had persuaded MFA Seoul that publicity about any refugee case would not be beneficial (suggesting that MFA had passed that message on to South Korea,s media organizations). Nonetheless, Ms. Lee noted that ROK journalists had visited northern Laos (to see trafficking routes) and Vientiane (to look at "hideaways") and had written stories about the process in South Korean newspapers (which had apparently never come to the attention of the Lao Embassy in Seoul). Procedural Issues Related to Asylum Seekers -------------- ¶8. (C) In response to a question from the DCM, Ms. Lee indicated that, if a possible DRPK refugee were to enter the U.S. Embassy, someone from the ROK Embassy such as herself could be invited to come to the U.S. Embassy to "informally chat with the person." She added that, if a DRPK citizen really wants to go to the ROK, the ROK Government would not refuse. As long as refugees are not arrested, there are ways to move them eventually to Seoul, she said. ¶9. (C) Ms. Lee said that she does not believe UNDP has a useful role to play with regard to asylum seekers (even in its role as UN Resrep). The ROK experience is that any negotiations with the GOL regarding DPRK refugees have to be done informally, and "the UNDP does not have an informal level." She noted that the ROK embassy had asked UNICEF for assistance regarding the three detained girls. UNICEF tried to help, suggesting that the girls be moved to a children,s center supported by UNICEF, but its intervention was unsuccessful. The GOL apparently denied having any information about the three. Asked what UNDP could do to help, Ms. Lee said that it might be good if UNDP were able to issue transit passes on behalf of UNHCR to allow refugees to travel to the UNHCR Bangkok office. (Comment: we doubt the Lao Government would actually accept "transit passes" from UNHCR for travel.) ¶10. (C) Ms. Lee expressed some frustration with UNHCR Bangkok, noting that when the ROK Embassy called for assistance with the two children who had entered the ROK Embassy last month, UNHCR was not willing to pick up the children in the Thai city of Nong Khai, directly across the Mekong River from Vientiane. The ROK Embassy had to find another way to get them to Bangkok. This involved using activists or handlers, but Ms. Lee made clear the ROK Embassy did not pay the activist or handlers directly for their assistance. She indicated, though, that the families of the refugees wound up paying. Discussion on Asylum Seekers with UN Resrep -------------- ¶11. (C) On January 4, the Ambassador and DCM met with UN Resrep Sonam Yangchen Rana, who heads the UNDP office here. Ms. Rana arrived in Vientiane in November 2006. The Ambassador briefed Ms. Rana on the recent North Korean cases. Ms. Rana said that the UN had tried to track the three detained girls through the UN trafficking project and the Lao Women,s Union but was not successful. ¶12. (C) The Ambassador also described the January 2005 incident in which a North Korean citizen named Mr. Anh jumped over the wall of the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane and sought asylum. That case, she said, was eventually resolved when a World Food Program employee in Vientiane (the UN Resrep was not in country at that time) interviewed Mr. Anh on behalf of UNHCR and determined he was a legitimate asylum seeker. ROK officials from Seoul also interviewed Mr. Anh to verify that he was a legitimate refugee and that he wanted to go to South Korea. In the end, the Lao and Thai governments agreed to allow him to depart Laos for Thailand, and UNHCR met him at the border with South Korean documents. However, both the Lao and Thai governments said that they would not agree to this type of arrangement in future cases. The Ambassador VIENTIANE 00000006 003.2 OF 003 said that coordinating with the Thais might be particularly challenging under the new government, which has taken a hard-line stance on refugee issues. Ms. Rana agreed, saying that the Thai government has been "very heavy-handed" with UNHCR. ¶13. (C) The Ambassador asked Ms. Rana for confirmation of the USG's understanding that, in her capacity as UN Resrep, she serves as the UNHCR representative in Laos. Ms. Rana confirmed this and told the Ambassador that she was planning to meet with the UNHCR representative in Bangkok in a few days. She would discuss with him how the UN would handle a North Korean asylum case in Vientiane. Ms. Rana said that the UN attaches particular importance to the coordinating role of the Resrep under the current "one UN" policy. However, she added, UNHCR's mandate is quite distinct. "My jobs is to liaise closely" with UNHCR officials and be guided by them. "I don't take decisions on their behalf." ¶14. (C) The Ambassador asked Ms. Rana what, in practical terms, the UN saw as the modalities for dealing with a North Korean asylum seeker in Laos. Ms. Rana responded that "there should be ways to do it discreetly." She commented that the South Korean embassy would not close its doors to a North Korean. "That's the only way I see it (managing a North Korean refugee) happening." Her interest as UN Resrep, she told the Ambassador, is to see that the person,s rights are not being violated. "It will be hard to come up with a strategy in advance - it will have to be handled on a case by case basis." (Note: During the conversation, the Ambassador pointed out to Ms. Rana that the United States has legislation -- the North Korea Human Rights Act (NKHRA) -- which requires the State Department to facilitate applications from North Koreans for entrance to the United States as refugees. Ms. Rana continued, however, to focus only on South Korea as a final destination when discussing this issue.) COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) Neither the South Koreans nor the UN Resrep believe North Korean refugees in Vientiane can be managed other than via the good offices of the ROK Embassy here (and its shadowy group of handlers). The ROK Embassy appears to be willing to continue to help with this ongoing refugee flow - as long as the numbers do not overwhelm its limited staff. The only major requirement is that the process remain discreet. Any formal intervention by the U.S. Embassy here - or by any of the other like-minded Embassies such as Australia - is seen as only locking the Lao Government into a corner from which its only option is to return the refugee(s) to China as required by GOL rules. The Ambassador plans to follow up with UN Resrep Rana, after her Bangkok meeting, and then meet with the ROK Ambassador to increase coordination between our two embassies on dealing with this issue. We will continue to emphasize, in these conversations, the requirements of the NKHRA that the United States be available as a destination for North Korean refugees. Nonetheless, given the ROK's informal system for moving refugees to Bangkok, UN officials are most likely to look to South Korea first if they are asked to help with North Korean refugees here. HASLACH