VIENTIANE DIPLOMATS DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 VIENTIANE 000288 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS (BESTIC) DEPARTMENT FOR PRM/ANE DEPARTMENT FOR IO/UNP DEPARTMENT FOR DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2017 TAGS: KJUS LA PGOV PHUM PINR PREF PREL TH SUBJECT: VIENTIANE DIPLOMATS DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES INCLUDING 26 HMONG CHILDREN, NONG KHAI DETAINEES, AND RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS REF: A. VIENTIANE 0205 ¶B. VIENTIANE 0110 ¶C. BANGKOK 0816 ¶D. BANGKOK 0596 ¶E. VIENTIANE 0085 ¶F. 2006 VIENTIANE 1205 ¶G. 2006 VIENTIANE 1141 Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA M. HASLACH FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND ( D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Representatives of "like-minded" countries and international organizations in Vientiane, including the United States, EU, France, Australia, UNICEF, UNDP, and others, met to review recent events on the human rights front, including the recent visit by EU Parliamentarians to Laos. Other topics included the status of the detained 26 Hmong children, the stalemate over the 152 ( 3) Hmong refugees being held in Nong Khai, the 9th Sweden-Laos human rights workshop, and some recent prison releases. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Vientiane-based representatives of "like-minded" countries and international organizations, including the United States, EU, France, Sweden, Poland, Australia, UNICEF and UNDP, met at the German Ambassador's residence March 30 for a stocktaking of recent developments on the human rights front. The group discussed the recent visit to Laos by EU Parliamentarians, reviewed the status of the detained 26 Hmong children, reviewed the ongoing stalemate over the 152 ( 3) Hmong refugees being held in Nong Khai, Thailand, and took note of reports of some recent releases of political prisoners. The Swedish Political Chief reported on the 9th Sweden-Laos human rights workshop which included a visit to the prison in Pakse Laos. The 26 Hmong Children -------------- ¶3. (C) Those attending the meeting agreed that the official declaration in early March that the Government of Laos (GOL) had "identified" the 21 girls out of the 26 Hmong children and one adult "missing" since December 2005 and the GOL's promise to reunite the girls with their parents, currently in the Petchabun holding camp in Thailand, were major and positive developments (ref A). Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials told EU country representatives that the families of the 21 girls will be coming to Laos from the Petchabun to reunite with the girls. However, concern was expressed over the fate of the 5 boys, especially since two are no longer minors -- having reached age 18 in the sixteen months since originally detained. There was also concern about the status of the one female adult. ¶4. (C) Comment: We have continued to refer to these 26 as "children" although that is changing with the passage of time since the group was detained in late 2005. We tend to use age 18 as the threshold for adulthood; the Lao tend to use age 16. Of the five boys, two are already at least 18; another is 16. Because of greater GOL suspicion about the boys, their reaching adulthood may result in greater difficulties about their being released. For the 21 girls, however, there is no indication reaching adulthood is an issue. One of the girls is at least 18, four are 17, and three are 16. End comment. ¶5. (C) The German Ambassador reported that, unprompted, Lao Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Thongloun Sisoulith had told the German Foreign Minister, at the ASEAN-EU meetings in Nuremberg, Germany, March 14-15, "we know human rights concerns are high on the agenda; we are in the process of resolving the case of the Hmong children." Thongloun repeated the same line to the Italian and Luxembourg FMs. The Italian FM pressed the Lao to also "find" the 5 boys and not to take adverse action against the 152 Hmong (now with VIENTIANE 00000288 002 OF 006 three babies = 152 3) being held in Nong Khai. Thongloun responded that the fate of this group is a bilateral issue being negotiated by the GOL with the Thai Government (despite the fact that all in this group have UNHCR status as refugees and third-country resettlement referrals -- refs C and D). ¶6. (C) The Lao Prime Minister also told the new Czech Ambassador to Laos (based in Bangkok),who presented his credentials to the Lao President this week, that "all" the children had been identified. At a separate diplomatic event, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) representative told the Ambassador that GOL drug chief Minister Soubanh, during a trip to Vienna, had similarly told UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa that "all" the children had been located. However, the French Ambassador, who is the best informed of Vientiane-based Ambassadors on this issue, confirmed reports we have heard that the boys are still being held in Phongsali prison and that their release will be more complicated than that of the girls. ¶7. (C) All of this appears to confirm what MFA Spokesman Yong Chanthalangsy told Pol/Econ Chief at lunch on March 13: that the situation of the 21 girls will be resolved "quite soon." Yong added that some, perhaps even a majority, will elect to stay in Laos because they were "traumatized" or even "extremely traumatized" by the Thai police in Petchabun. According to Yong, the ones whose parents are in Petchabun will be reunited with them, even if only for a short time before the repatriation of the Petchabun group to Laos. (Comment: both the GOL and the Thai Government would like to resolve the Petchabun situation and the decades-long flow of Hmong from Laos into Thailand. End comment.) Although perhaps more complicated, Yong told the P/E Chief there is "no barrier" to the situation of the 5 boys being resolved. However, it will have to be done step-by-step (apparently in sequence following the resolution of the situation of the 21 girls). ¶8. (C) The like-minded discussed next steps and agreed that applying pressure on the GOL at this time would be counterproductive and could jeopardize a resolution of the boys, detention. By publicly stating that it will allow the voluntary reunification of the girls with their families, the GOL would not risk losing face by not following through on this reunification. According to the French Ambassador, the girls are being well treated and are attending school. Visit to Bolikhamsai -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The like-minded group also reviewed the visit, organized by the MFA Press Department, to Bolikhamsai Province on March 7. This visit was arranged for members of the international community to meet three Hmong men who had been repatriated with their families (a total of 16 people) from Thailand in January. The three men described themselves at the briefing for the visitors as victims of human trafficking who had been misled into believing they could be resettled in the United States if they were able to enter Thailand. (Comment: an earlier MFA tour had taken international community representatives in February to meet a family of five in northern Vientiane Province who said they had entered Thailand as economic migrants before being repatriated to Laos as part of a group of 53 in November -- ref B). ¶10. (SBU) The names of the three men were given at the briefing as Ga Long Va, Nhia Long Lor, and Yong Hua Yang although subsequent press reports gave their names as Kua Long Vang, Nia Nong Lor, and Toou Hua Yang respectively. Ga said each family had paid a trafficker $210 for transport to Thailand in November, but the group was arrested and detained a short time after reaching Thailand, detained in Nong Khai for more than a month, and then returned to Bolikhamsai in January. They claimed they were happy to be back, and Ga expressed appreciation to what he described as "a government VIENTIANE 00000288 003 OF 006 that loves us." Ga noted rumors that the group members had been killed after being returned from Thailand but told the audience "we are alive and the Hmong in Thailand should not be afraid to return to Laos." Comment: More Than Meets The Eye In Bolikhamsai -------------- -- ¶11. (C) Since the GOL's decision to accept that at least some portion of the Hmong in Thailand -- including the 8000 at the holding camp in Petchabun -- are from Laos (ref B),we have seen three events: the well-publicized repatriation of 53 "economic migrants" in November (reported on the front page of Vientiane newspapers); the January return of the 16; and the failed attempt to return the 152 3 -- all given refugee status by UNHCR -- from Nong Khai on January 30. While no one has raised questions about the return of the 53 in November (they appear actually to have been economic migrants),the repatriation of the group of 16 caused much concern among Hmong activists who claimed all had links with the insurgency and should have been interviewed by UNHCR (and given refugee status) rather than being returned to Laos by the Thais. ¶12. (C) One prominent Hmong activist visited the group of 16 in Nong Khai before the repatriation. He tells us that all three were insurgents captured during the past few years: Nhia Long Lor was captured in November 2004; Ga Long Vang in late 2005; and Yong Hua Yang in May 2006. All had been resettled at the Sob Na lowland village in Bolikhamsai's Viengthong District; they had managed to slip away from Sob Na and make it to Thailand before being arrested there by the Thais and sent back. ¶13. (C) The activist notes that both Ga and Yong showed him scars from bullet wounds they had received fighting against the Lao military when the activist met them in Nong Khai. Moreover, Yong Hua Yang (whose name was Jia Yang before he was married) is the son of former insurgent leader Wa Meng Yang. Wa, now living quietly in Thailand, told the activist the GOL has relocated 70 Hmong insurgent families to the Sob Na Village and uses it as a detention location. Although telling the international visitors that the three men they were meeting lived in Sob Na, the MFA Press Department took the group only as far as neighboring Borikhan District town for the briefing "due to poor road conditions." ¶14. (C) No mention was made during the briefing -- by the three Hmong men or the MFA officials -- that these were former insurgents much less that one is the son of a prominent insurgent leader. The MFA was "selling" the image of innocent victims of human traffickers even though the Hmong community apparently knows the difference. This raises questions not only about the value of the MFA trips on this side of the border but also about the willingness of Thai officials to repatriate former Lao insurgents rather than allowing them access to UNHCR screening. For the moment, the attempt by the MFA Press Department to lump together the November group of 53 economic migrants and the January group of "trafficking victims" has run into the angry buzz saw of information available on the Internet. The Nong Khai 152 3 -------------- ¶15. (C) The like-minded group also discussed the still uncertain fate of the 152 Hmong refugees (plus their three new babies) being held in detention in Nong Khai, Thailand, across the bridge from Vientiane. The GOL has not backed away from its position demanding the return of all 152 3, including two insurgent leaders -- Chong Lee Lor and Blia Shoua Her -- despite a request from the German Foreign Minister to Lao FM Thongloun, when the latter was in Nuremburg for the ASEAN-EU meeting March 14-15, to focus GOL attention on the Petchetbun Hmong and not on the Hmong being held in Nong Khai who have already received UNHCR refugee VIENTIANE 00000288 004 OF 006 status. Comment: More Than Meets The Eye In Nong Khai Also? -------------- -------------- ¶16. (C) In ref E, the Embassy examined the "material support" issue as it relates to the Hmong. Although establishing the identities of perpetrators of past attacks has always been difficult, all information held by the Embassy pointed to several violent attacks in 2003 -- including the 02/06/2003 attack on a bus in northern Vientiane Province that killed two passing Swiss cyclists in addition to nine others -- as having been carried out by the insurgent group led by Yang Toua Thao. However, at their March 13 lunch, MFA Spokesman Yong told P/E Chief that Blia Shoua Her was the insurgent leader whose group carried out the 2003 attacks. According to Yong, Blia's group was located in northern Vientiane Province while Yang's group was further north -- in southern Luang Prabang Province. The desire to bring to justice the leader of the 2003 attacks may be at least part of the reason for the GOL's insistence on the return of the Nong Khai group to Laos despite its UNHCR status. Minimally, spreading the accusation -- even if untrue (and we have no way to confirm Mr. Yong's claim) -- that Blia was the insurgent leader responsible for the 2003 attacks may be an attempt to derail Blia's planned resettlement to Australia. Possible Political Prisoners Released -------------- ¶17. (C) The like-minded group discussed conflicting reports about whether four of the remaining five "student" agitators (in fact hired laborers) who were arrested and incarcerated in 1999 for attempting to organize a pro-democracy demonstration in Vientiane were released from prison as part of the Lao President,s annual amnesty granted to prisons in December. Ministry of Justice officials told visiting EU Parliamentarians that the four had been released. When questioned, Vice Foreign Minister Phongsavath Boupha, however, expressed ignorance of their release and promised to check on their status. ¶18. (C) The French Ambassador reported that Laos's most prominent political prisoner -- condemned killer Colonel Sing Chanthakoumane, a former government official who is serving a life sentence after a 1990 trial that was not conducted according to international standards -- had also been released. He did not have information, however, on the status of the three Hmong porters, who were arrested in Xieng Khong Province along with French and a Belgian reporter and their interpreter. The journalists and interpreter were released, but the three porters were charged with having conspired with ethnic Hmong villagers in the killing of local militia member and given long prison sentences. One later escaped, but at year,s end the other two remained in custody. ¶19. (C) Comment: The Embassy's information does not have COL Sing being released. We are still trying to clarify the fate of the remaining prisoners from the 1999 trials of the pro-democracy demonstration organizers. The Embassy's information is that one of the five laborers who were incarcerated for this event has already died in prison and the other two were released in amnesties in previous years. In our Human Rights Report, we still list the remaining two incarcerated laborers as Thongpaseuth Keuakoun and Sengaloun Pengboun. ¶20. (C) Comment continued: The GOL announced pardons and commutations of sentences on December 11, 2006. Three political prisoners were among the 117 persons pardoned and released from prison; most were pardoned because they had turned 60 and were considered too old to be in prison. None of the three (arrested in 1996 for spying, in 2003 for betraying the nation, and in 2006 for spying) were previously known to the Embassy in this still very secretive society. Among those also described as political prisoners, ten had VIENTIANE 00000288 005 OF 006 sentences reduced. Two were indeed jailed in 1999 for "gathering a group to cause trouble" but neither name (Mr. Khamlaab and Mr. Phavanh) matches those of the two incarcerated laborers we attempt to monitor. Prison Access -------------- ¶21. (C) The Swedish Political Chief reported to the like-minded that his country had wrapped up round nine of their twice-yearly human rights dialogue with the GOL -- held in Pakse in Champhasak Province in late March. The theme of the Swedish-Lao workshop, part of the dialogue process, was juvenile justice. UNICEF also participated in these meetings. The GOL presented to the Swedes the first draft of its National Action Plan on Human Rights in preparation for a regional workshop on the subject. The Lao officials also discussed human rights indicators, which are now a required part of Swedish bilateral assistance. The GOL agreed to create a sub-group within the workshop setting to discuss the indicators. ¶22. (C) The Swedes were able to visit a district prison but could not go inside. They also went to the Pakse detention center, where they were able to go inside and see the prisoners but not talk to them. They saw about 400 prisoners -- 300 men repairing fishing nets and 100 women cleaning rice. The prison officials told the visitors that 100 prisoners lived in each of the four dormitories and received kip 2,000 (USD 0.20) each month for food etc. The Swedes reported that the prisoners looked disciplined and relatively well fed. French Progress with Security Forces -------------- ¶23. (C) The French have begun a dialogue with the Lao security forces emanating from their workshop on trafficking held with Lao and Vietnamese police and immigration officials in February. At that time, French Ambassador Maurice Portiche invited the Minister of Public Security (MOPS) Thongbanh Sengaphone to a working lunch. While he declined the invitation at that time, the Minister recently contacted Ambassador Portiche and accepted lunch with him at his residence on March 26. The lunch included the Minister, who was accompanied by the Director of the MOPS Cabinet and the MOPS Director for International Relations. ¶24. (C) According to Ambassador Portiche, the atmosphere was open, and they discussed human rights and other sensitive subjects. The Minister asked for training and seemed particularly concerned that Laos could in the future face a hostage-taking situation -- similar to what occurred in Peru a number of years ago. Ambassador Portiche followed up the lunch with a visit to the National Police Academy, where the Director repeated the Minister,s request for training. ¶25. (C) Ambassador Portiche told the like-minded that this new relationship has already paid some tangible benefits. The GOL responded when the French asked the Lao to detain and extradite a French criminal to France, despite the lack of an extradition agreement between the two countries. Ambassador Portiche opined that the Politburo has clearly decided to let the security forces work with non-traditional partners by allowing Minister Thongbanh to dine at the French Ambassador,s residence. Thongbanh is rising in the Party Central Committee and is relatively young (born in 1953). He has already served as governor in the key province of Bolikhamsai. (Note: The Embassy included then-Governor Thongbanh in a 2003 International Visitor Governors Group on "Sustainable Development.") Bolikhamsai has been the site of several skirmishes with the Hmong insurgents and is where many insurgent families from nearby Xieng Khong Province have been resettled, so Thongbanh is well aware of these issues. Ambassador Portiche also reported that the GOL has given a French non-governmental organization permission to work with resettled insurgent families in Poukout District in Xieng VIENTIANE 00000288 006 OF 006 Khong Province with the Lao Red Cross. This is close to the area where the ICRC has also received permission to work -- Poukoun District. COMMENT -------------- ¶26. (C) We were pleased to see some positive signs relating to the complicated and sensitive set of human rights issues in Laos. The Swedish dialogue process seems to be making slow progress, and the MOPS contact with the French is a step toward opening up this silent giant. However, the reluctance of the like-minded to press on anything at this time, including throwing their support behind the proposed visit of UNHCR's Assistant High Commissioner for Protection Ericka Feller to Laos April 25-26, remains a bit uncomfortable. (Note: The Lao MFA on April 3 sent a formal diplomatic note "welcoming" Ms. Feller's visit.) While we agree with the group's assessment that public statements might be detrimental at this point to the release of the 26 children, the Lao need to be told privately to keep to their word. The Lao also need to be told that focusing on the return of the 152 3 in Nong Khai will not be supported by the international community since they have UNHCR refugee status. The fact that the Lao and Thai were able to quietly repatriate the group of 16 to Bolikhamsai without a great deal of attention at the time since none had UNHCR status seems to have given them both a false sense of confidence. It would be good to nip that in the bud. HASLACH