2007 SPECIAL 301 REVIEW:POST RECOMMENDATION FOR

UNCLAS VIENTIANE 000143 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLA; EB/TPP/IPE STATE PASS TO USTR STATE PASS TO USPTO STATE FOR USAID BANGKOK PASS TO USAID FOR SKIP KISSINGER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON ETRD EAID KIPR LA SUBJECT: 2007 SPECIAL 301 REVIEW:POST RECOMMENDATION FOR LAOS REF: STATE 7944 ¶1. (SBU) Post recommends that the Lao PDR not be designated as a country of special concern under Special 301 due to absolutely low levels of piracy, past actions taken by the IPR authorities, and the elevation of the Science, Technology and IPR Office to the status of a ministry, which may enhance cooperation with international IPR stakeholders. ¶2. (SBU) Optical media piracy is at low but growing levels in Laos, and there are clothing trademark violations in some town markets. In 2006 Post convinced the owner of a large hotel in Vientiane to switch from a pirated CNN signal to a legitimate one. According to the owner, a respected businessman here, he originally had a legal signal but eventually gave it up after not receiving service from CNN's Bangkok office and having decoder issues following the sale of CNN to Time Warner. Overall, absolute levels of piracy remain less for the whole country than the level found in a given good-sized provincial town in any larger neighboring country. Post's main IPR objective is to enhance the capacity of the Office of Science, Technology, and Environment (STEA),which currently houses a small but well-informed IPR Office that has been responsive to complaints by American interests in the past. STEA is tiny, and so is the Lao economy, but STEA is also one of the few offices of the GOL that appears interested in doing its job. Implementation of the IPR-related clauses of the 2005 Bilateral Trade Agreement with the US can act as a further test of STEA's preparedness. Implementation of many aspects of the BTA has been sluggish thus far. ¶3. (SBU) However, Post is not sanguine about STEA's ability to cope with international pirate interests should they move to Laos and settle into a corrupt environment here. Post's main IPR worry is that ramped-up enforcement in neighboring economies might create incentives for optical media pirates to move across Laos' porous borders to set up shop in an environment almost wholly lacking in real rule of law--making them all but impervious to international enforcement. This will be a particular danger as north-south and east-west economic corridors link the Thai, Vietnamese, and Chinese economies through Lao territory over the coming several years. It therefore seems to us that we should do more to elicit cooperation and develop the capacity of STEA, and to enlist the GoL in international enforcement regimes. ¶4. (SBU) The GOL has repeatedly requested assistance in both implementing the BTA and in WTO accession, pointing to the STAR program in neighboring Vietnam as the perfect idea to copy. A "STAR-lite" program, taking into account Laos, smaller economy and costing perhaps $1 million a year, would likely be an excellent investment in the long-term improvement of Laos, IPR regime. Capacity in the Lao government is very, very low--put simply, the line ministries who are responsible have no bench, and can barely field a team. Post, while willing, is not staffed with the capability to offer the in-depth legal advice and daily follow-up required. HASLACH