SYRAIN PRESIDENT ASAD'S DEC 17 MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENNA 003005 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2022 TAGS: PREL SY AU SUBJECT: SYRAIN PRESIDENT ASAD'S DEC 17 MEETING WITH AUSTRIAN PRESIDENT FISCHER Classified By: Econ/Pol Counselor Dean Yap. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d) Summary -------------- 1.(C) In an hour-long meeting with his Austrian counterpart, Syrian President Asad indicated a willingness to work with the Annapolis process, to seek a resolution of Hamas-Fatah infighting. In his remarks, he stressed the importance of the U.S. role, and seemed prepared to recognize that resolution of the Golan Heights would be put on the back-burner. Asad was "very detailed" in discussing Lebanon, where he thought the French could play a constructive leading role. Asad's comments on Iran and Iraq were cautious and limited. He defended Syria's human rights practices as appropriate given the country's political and cultural development. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Amb. Alfons Kloss, Diplomatic Advisor to Austrian President Fischer, provided Econ/Pol Couns with a read-out on Fischer's Dec. 17 call on President Asad. The meeting followed Fischer's visit to Austrian peacekeeping troops in the Golan Heights. In addition to Asad, Syria's Vice-President and Foreign and Defense Ministers attended the meeting. Annapolis Process -------------- ¶3. (C) Asad described Annapolis as similar to an airplane just taking off - whether it would complete the trip and in what direction it would go were not clear, but it was the important beginning of a process. Kloss was struck by how much importance Asad placed on the U.S. role, and he also reported that Asad had praised Secretary Rice's conduct of the meeting. Asad said that he would do what he could to try and bring about a Hamas-Fatah resolution before a March meeting of Arab states, but he urged the west not to ignore Hamas even if it continued to reject the peace process. Golan Heights -------------- ¶4. (C) Asad had nothing new to say on the Heights, but Kloss left with the impression that Asad is prepared to accept that the issue be kept on a back burner and not be used to disrupt the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Lebanon -------------- ¶5. (C) Kloss was impressed by the "very detailed" manner in which Asad addressed Lebanon. Asad pointed to his own good relations with the Sarkozy government. He thought the French were well-placed to play a constructive role in resolving Lebanon's political crisis. Iraq -------------- ¶6. (C) Asad was very critical of Al Qaeda's role in Iraq. He talked at length about the burden that Iraqi refugees were placing on Syria, though he did note that about 50,000 had returned in recent weeks. His tone regarding the U.S. role was "very careful and reserved." Iran -------------- ¶7. (C) Asad did not go into any detail on the nuclear issue, saying only that Iran's motives were primarily related to its search for international recognition. Human Rights/Death Penalty -------------- ¶8. (C) Fischer raised Syrian human right's practices, focusing in particular on the pubic application of the death penalty. Asad argued that given Syria's level of cultural and political development, a strong and visible hand was needed to govern successfully. For these reasons, public application of the death penalty was appropriate. Kloss' Impressions -------------- ¶9. (C) In addition to Asad's surprisingly strong emphasis on the importance of the U.S. role (a line Asad also repeated in Austrian press interviews),Kloss was struck by how eager Asad appeared to be to hear an EU view of developments and to VIENNA 00003005 002 OF 002 hear what was going on inside the EU. Kloss left with the impression that Asad wants to play a serious role in the Annapolis process and he urged the U.S. to engage him with equal seriousness. However, as shown by the presence of advisors from his father's generation, new Syrian thinking would be held within limits. Kilner