Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07VIENNA2836
2007-11-21 07:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vienna
Cable title:  

AUSTRIAN VIEWS ON IAEA REPORT ON IRAN

Tags:  KNNP MNUC IAEA IR PARM AORC EU AU 
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VZCZCXRO1901
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVI #2836 3250728
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 210728Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9039
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0421
C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 002836 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2022
TAGS: KNNP MNUC IAEA IR PARM AORC EU AU
SUBJECT: AUSTRIAN VIEWS ON IAEA REPORT ON IRAN

REF: STATE 157039

Classified By: Econ/Pol Couns Dean Yap. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 002836 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2022 TAGS: KNNP MNUC IAEA IR PARM AORC EU AU SUBJECT: AUSTRIAN VIEWS ON IAEA REPORT ON IRAN REF: STATE 157039 Classified By: Econ/Pol Couns Dean Yap. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Austria recognizes and is disappointed by Iran's failure to cooperate fully with the IAEA and expects leading EU states in IAEA BOG to issue a statement expressing many of the themes identified by the U.S. End Summary. El Baradei Report -------------- ¶2. (C) Econ/Pol Couns met Nov. 20 with Alexander Marschik, Non-proliferation Director at the Austrian MFA, to discuss Austrian and EU reaction to the El Baradei report of Nov. 15 and to urge a strong statement at the Nov. 22-23 IAEA BoG. Marschik reported that FonMin Plassnik had had a private dinner Nov. 16 with DG EL Baradei and he expected their conversation to be a factor in determining Austria's position. He had as yet, though, received no instructions and could only offer the view of the Ministry's senior staff. ¶3. (C) That view, he said, was disappointed with and critical of Iran's failure to respond to the opportunities offered by the work plan. He cited in particular DG El Baradei's statement that Iran remained reactive rather than proactive. Austria would continue to support IAEA-Iran dialogue, and hoped that Iran would change its attitude, but Marschik was not optimistic. More than in past meetings, Marschik appeared to recognize that a change in European attitudes toward Iran was coming. The El Baradei report, he said, made it easier for Europeans to take a tough line. ¶4. (C) Marschik reported that at the GAERC discussion of Iran on Nov. 19, HighRep Solana had little positive to offer. Solana told the Ministers that though Iran had taken some modest steps on outstanding issues, there was little more clarity about Iran's ongoing activities. His hoped-for meeting with Iranian negotiator Jalili was caught up in scheduling problems. ¶5. (C) Marschik said the EU Presidency would take the lead on preparing an EU statement for the BoG. He had thus far not seen a draft. He said the EU would be careful not to make the mistake of criticizing El Baradei, and that the relatively restrained French reaction to the report would be an interesting element in the pre-BoG discussions. Econ/Pol Couns reviewed the themes the U.S. had identified as important in national statements and Marschik said he thought the U.S. and EU were not very far apart. Sanctions -------------- ¶6. (C) Econ/Pol Couns and Marschik briefly discussed the question of autonomous sanctions. Marschik reported that at the Political Directors discussion on the margins of the GAERC there had been agreement that he EU needed to enact steps that would "pressure the system," i.e., implement measures that would focus on the governing elites. Marschik recalled Austria's experience with EU sanctions in 1999 - sanctions that led to a rally 'round the flag effect - as a reason to proceed with great care. Econ/Pol Couns suggested that Iranian and Austrian domestic politics were perhaps not very comparable. McCaw

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