AUSTRIA'S FREEDOM PARTY: SUCCEEDING WITH NEGATIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 002787 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2022 TAGS: PGOV AU SUBJECT: AUSTRIA'S FREEDOM PARTY: SUCCEEDING WITH NEGATIVE POLITICS Classified By: Econ/Pol Counselor Dean Yap. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The Austrian political climate appears to be tilting o the advantage of the far-right Freedom Party, whse blend of nationalism, social conservatism, an economic populism appeals to that segment of the population unnerved by immigration, loss of soveeignty to the EU, and globalization-driven econoic change. Party leaders themselves share this iew, but are unable to describe a positive agend for governance and readily admit that they couldnot implement more than 15 percent of their "progrm" as junior partners in a future coalition. Paty leader Strache acknowledges, but is unfazed by the challenges of moving from a purely oppositional role into government, with its demands for responsible action. End Summary. Congenial Environment -------------- ¶2. (C) Though most Austrians feel quite comfortable -- an October poll showed satisfaction with living standards at 89 percent - a significant part of the population is unhappy and apprehensive. Political scientist and pollster Peter Filzmaier of the Donau University identifies loss of sovereignty in the EU; globalization's impact on the social welfare state; and the cultural and domestic security effects of eastern European and (especially) Muslim immigration as Austria's most salient political concerns. That negative aspects of these issues predominate in media coverage feeds popular anxieties. The Freedom Party's opposition to these phenomena, Filzmaier maintains, has given it the highest profile of any party in dealing with them. It is, therefore, set to gain support and, ceteris paribus, do well in upcoming elections, according to Filzmaier. Representatives of other parties agree. Josef Kalina, the Business Manager of the SPO, agrees that the FPO has a set of issues it can exploit and, when asked about counter-strategies, admitted his party had none. Green party leader Alexander Van der Bellin blamed the SPO and conservative FPO for failing to address these long-term challenges seriously in the past. FPO: Putting Its Troubles Behind It -------------- ¶3. (U) Not only is the environment favorable. The FPO appears ready to take active advantage of it. The party has largely recovered from the 2005 schism that led to the establishment of the Alliance for Austria's Future (BZO) under ex-FPO chief Haider. The FPO is now at 14-15 percent in polls and gaining slightly. The most recent poll of hypothetical voting intentions put it moving just past the Greens to become again the third most-favored party. The BZO has slipped below the four percent required to gain parliamentary seats in elections. While the FPO still lacks leadership depth, it has been pushing hard to profile party leader Heinz Christian Strache. It has also found an issue on which to run a between-elections popularity campaign: the EU Treaty. The FPO, with the support of the tabloid daily "Kronenzeitung," has been pushing hard for a referendum on the Treaty. Polls show two-thirds or more of the public want a vote. The government, however, resolutely insists that there will be no referendum. FPO ads, with the text backed by a photo of Strache, hit all its clientele's buttons: no EU treaty to steal Austrian independence, no Turkish membership in the EU, and no to globalization (in ads which also claim the EU is a U.S. dependency). And Not Worried About a Program -------------- ¶4. (C) Econ/Pol Counselor and POL FSN called Nov. 8 on Harald Vilimsky, MP, the FPO's parliamentary leader, to discuss the party's platform and prospects. Vilimsky was accompanied by caucus Director Norbert Nemeth. Discussion focused initially on party attitudes toward the EU. Vilimsky responded in predictable and unoriginal language, describing the EU as, inter alia, a danger to Austrian neutrality. Nemeth, more polished and more intellectual than Vilimsky, explained that the real issue was not neutrality, but rather the erosion of Austrian sovereignty in the EU. Asked about FPO attitudes toward the U.S., Vilimsky first defended a local Vienna district council member who had said, after the attempted bombing, that the Embassy was a danger to the people of his district and should move out of Vienna. Vilimsky did, however, note at the end of his remarks that the party leadership "might" not share those views. ¶5. (C) At this point in the meeting party leader Strache appeared. Informed of the subject of the discussion, Strache hastened to assure Emboffs that, while critical of certain U.S. policies, on the whole there was much he admired about the U.S. For example, the FPO, he said, would never criticize the right of a democratic country to apply the death penalty! Emboffs asked about party policy on immigration. Strache (the only one of the three FPO officials who spoke more than a few words once he arrived) listed the dangers immigrants, especially Muslims, posed and stressed Muslim refusal to integrate into Austria. His comments included references to the Islamization of Europe and the inappropriateness of minarets in a European cityscape. Emboffs twice asked what the party's policy response was to these problems, especially at a time of coming shortfalls in the labor market. Strache offered further criticism, but no specifics. ¶6. (C) Emboffs raised the party's prospects. Strache was non-specific, but upbeat. He did say that he thought the FPO had nothing to worry about from the BZO. Rather, the BZO was useful because it was a contrast to the more moderate positions of the FPO. The FPO, for example, would not call for mass expulsions of Muslims as the BZO had. Emboffs asked about the danger of winning support based solely on opposition and then being confronted with the need to be a responsible and constructive partner in government. Strache readily acknowledged that the FPO could not hope to implement more than 10-15 percent of its "program" in government, and that the party would accept many things it now opposed. He admitted as well, seemingly without concern, that this would cause problems for some FPO supporters. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Strache, who spent more than an hour with Emboffs, came off as both a convinced national conservative and a cynical politico. Vilimsky's formulaic interventions hint at the lack of leadership depth in the FPO as it rebuilds after the 2005 schism, but Nemeth's more thoughtful comments suggest it has talent to be developed. As to the party's prospects, given the uniformity of views we hear, it seems indeed that the climate is favorable for the FPO. 2008 state elections will be a first test of the party's strength. Other parties' inability or unwillingness to confront FPO populism on immigration issues and desire to avoid a debate on sovereignty is a sad commentary on the quality of Austrian political leadership. End Comment. ¶8. (C) Note on Contact with the FPO: Strache was interested in continuing contact with the Embassy, but his and Vilimsky's awkward attempts to curry favor (e.g., the death penalty comments, or hints that the FPO and USG have similar views about Islam) suggest little benefit from dialogue. We suspect the FPO would seek to exploit contacts with the Embassy to raise its own standing. Embassy will continue to engage the FPO at lower levels for the insight we may gain into Austrian political processes, but not reach out to Strache. End Note. McCaw