AUSTRIA'S POSITION ON IAEA ISSUES: ISRAEL

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 002366 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/RA (NEPHEW),AND IO/T (VON BEHREN). E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2017 TAGS: MNUC AADP AROC KNNP KDEM PARM PREL IAEA AU IS, IR SUBJECT: AUSTRIA'S POSITION ON IAEA ISSUES: ISRAEL RESOLUTION AND IAEA-IRAN "WORK PLAN" REF: (A) STATE 119672 (B) STATE 123352 (C) STATE 124747 Classified By: A/DCM J. Dean Yap for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Austria supports a consensus outcome that would eliminate the Israel-specific agenda at the IAEA BoG and expects the EU to work toward this outcome. However, Austria is unlikely to raise any concerns regarding the Iran-IAEA "work plan" at the BoG. Rather, it wishes to protect IAEA-Iran relations as one of the few channels for addressing Iran's nuclear program. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Charge, accompanied by Econ/Poloff, delivered reftel A-C demarches to Austrian MFA PolDir Mayr-Harting on September 7. FonMin Plassnik was in Portugal for the Gymnich meeting of EU FonMins. Econ/Poloff had previewed both issues with MFA Disarmament Office staffer Lassmann on Sept. 6. Israel-Specific Agenda Item -------------- ¶3. (C) Mayr-Harting was unaware of the Israel issue when initially raised, and called on Disarmament Office Director Marschik into his office for the discussion. The EU, according to Marschik, will seek the same solution as in previous years, i.e., a regional agenda item adopted by consensus vice country-specific agenda items. He also reported that this was the common EU position and that the Portuguese, as EU President, will work with the Arab members of the BoG to resolve the matter. IAEA-Iran Work Plan -------------- ¶4. (C) Mayr-Harting was aware that the IAEA-Iran work plan had been completed, but neither he nor Marschik seemed aware of its contents in any detail. Charge outlined the problems identified by the U.S. Mayr-Harting stated that Austria was not concerned that the IAEA-Iran process could delay UNSC diplomacy. Marschik said he thought the "work plan" could be completed in three months, even after the sequential and flawed program for addressing the old and outstanding issues was pointed out. ¶5. (C) Rather than raise concerns about the work plan, Mayr-Harting argued that El-Baradei's and the IAEA's role in negotiating with Iran was very important because there were few others in the position to speak directly with Iran. To attack the work plan would undermine his position with Iran. Charge noted that many of the problems with the work plan arose from Iranian demands; to object to them would indicate support for El-Baradei and his negotiators. Nonetheless, they remained reluctant to press the matter at the IAEA or in the BoG, given that the IAEA offered one of the few channels available for substantive dialogue. At the end of the conversation, Mayr-Harting fell back on the need to develop an EU consensus on the issue before Austria could take action. He stressed that in this regard a common position from the EU-3 would be particularly important. Yap