KOSOVO STATUS PROCESS TIMELINE -- AUSTRIA IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 000167

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCT - BLACK AND EUR/AGS - SAINT-ANDRE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: PREL UN UNMIK PGOV YI EU AU
SUBJECT: KOSOVO STATUS PROCESS TIMELINE -- AUSTRIA IN
AGREEMENT

REF: STATE 5652

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Scott F. Kilner. Reasons: 1.4 (b) an
d (d).


1. (SBU) Charge delivered reftel demarche on January 24 to
Austrian MFA Political Director Thomas Mayr-Harting. Embassy
had previewed the message to the MFA's EU affairs office on
January 19.


2. (C) Charge stressed that it was crucial that the EU and
U.S. maintain unity in backing UN Special Envoy Martti
Ahtisaari's approach, especially regarding the timetable for
presenting his proposal. Mayr-Harting said Austria fully
supported Ahtisaari's plans and timetable. Ahtisaari was,
Mayr-Harting said, "the master of the game," and the EU
should follow his lead. There were some in the EU who
believed Ahtisaari's presentation of his report to the
parties should wait, in order to give a chance for Serbia to
form a government. (He quickly added, however, that "no one"
suggested waiting until April.) However, Mayr-Harting said
it was his own view that Serbian government formation would
be a long process, and he did not favor a delay. Charge
pressed Mayr-Harting for his views on which EU member states
were most reluctant to proceed on the Kosovo issue.
Mayr-Haring said Hungary, Greece, and Romania were the most
reluctant. He opined, in this regard, that the U.S. had the
most leverage on Romania. He said Spain was less
problematical, and noted that Spain had worked well with the
Austrian EU presidency on Montenegro.


3. (C) Mayr-Harting added that Ministers at the recent
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) had
discussed visits to Belgrade in troika format of both
Ministers and political directors. The current thinking was
that it would be best for these visits to occur before
Ahtisaari presents his proposal in Belgrade and Pristina,
although the question of timing has not yet been settled. It
was important, they thought, that Serbia have a clear view of
its "European perspective" at the same time as Belgrade
received Ahtisaari's proposal. Mayr-Harting said the visits
would signal that the EU was open to resuming negotiations on
Serbia's Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). He
added that, under these circumstances, the requirement for
full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) would remain as a precondition
to concluding, but not to resuming, SAA negotiations.


4. (C) On Russia, Mayr-Harting said Ahtisaari seemed
reassured that the U.S. was confident the Russians would
indeed compromise in the end, and not block a UN Security
Council resolution. Mayr-Harting emphasized that the EU
could not move forward toward recognition of Kosovo or the
maintenance of a presence there without a UNSC resolution.
He expressed the view that Russia would seek to link Kosovo
not to Serbian issues, or even to frozen conflicts, but to
something like Georgian accession to NATO. It would be
important to avoid any such linkage by presenting Kosovo to
Russia as sui generis. It would also be important for the EU
to take a clear and united position after the UN Security
Council passed a resolution on the issue, especially because
any resolution that avoided a Russian veto was likely to be
rather vague.
Kilner