AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD'S MEETING WITH SYG'S PERSONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000985 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC AG MO WI SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD'S MEETING WITH SYG'S PERSONAL ENVOY FOR WESTERN SAHARA PETER VAN WALSUM Classified By: Amb. Zalmay Khalilzad. E.O 12958. Reasons 1.4 (B&D) ¶1. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad met November 2 with the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for Western Sahara Peter SIPDIS van Walsum, who, following the October 31 renewal of the MINURSO (Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) mandate, was consulting the "parties" (Morocco and the Polisario Front),the "neighboring countries" (Algeria and Mauritania),and "Friends of Western Sahara" (U.S., UK. France, Russia, and Spain) to exchange views on the next steps to be taken toward the third round of the Western Sahara negotiations. ¶2. (C) Reviewing his understanding of the U.S. position, Van Walsum said that he and the U.S. agreed on several points. First, both agreed that an independent Western Sahara was not a realistic option. Both agreed as well that the current stalemate characterized by two mutually irreconcilable proposals (the Moroccan and the Polisario Front) was going nowhere. Finally, both were agreed that a "push" was needed. What that "push" should entail, however, was the point on which van Walsum and Washington differed. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad said that the U.S. believes that the Moroccan proposal is "serious and credible" and should form the basis of negotiations. He said that Morocco already controlled the Western Sahara; the problem seemed to be Algeria, which has refused to engage and which has yet to help the Polisario accept a realistic view of the future of the Western Sahara. Van Walsum said that while it is true that the Polisario needs a push to understand that independence is not in the cards, Morocco also needs to be nudged. The Moroccans, he said, should be pushed to be more forthcoming on making concessions. Van Walsum said that the Moroccans continue to insist they are "open," but have done little to demonstrate that openness. He said they need to let the Polisario know that hypothetically there would be a significant role for the Polisario in an autonomous Western Sahara. Van Walsum said he had mentioned the idea to the Moroccans and they had nodded their heads, but without much enthusiasm. Moreover, van Walsum said, the Moroccans have been wasting time by calling into question the standing of the Polisario. It is clear, van Walsum said, that the "parties" are not equal, but if the Moroccans continued to insist that the other side does not represent the Sahrawi, how could a deal ever be reached? ¶4. (C) Asked by Ambassador Khalilzad what the Polisario thought of a hypothetical discussion of Polisario roles in an autonomous Western Sahara, van Walsum replied that the Polisario Front feels it is a trick to make them discuss the Moroccan proposal and are suspicious that doing so would bind them to an acceptance of autonomy. Van Walsum stressed that the key to progress was to push the Moroccans and Algerians into a realistic appraisal that an independent Western Sahara is not in the cards. Ambassador agreed that the key seemed to be to find a way to bring Morocco and Algeria into dialogue. he said that the U.S. might be able to contribute by exploring the possibilities of a Moroccan-Algerian dialogue. ¶5. (C) Van Walsum said he understood that the U.S. wants each time to go a little further to saying that the only proposal is the Moroccan proposal. But in doing so, the U.S. is moving from an honest broker to the French position. He said that the U.S. feels that he should follow that line as well and that had he done so in his recent report, it would have been possible for the U.S. to obtain a better resolution. He said if that was Washington's view, then Washington was underestimating the strong resistance to the approach of Morocco and it was overestimating its own influence. Van Walsum noted how effective Algeria had been in mobilizing South Africa and Russia into generating resistance to weakening language that guaranteed self-determination and the equality of the two proposals. Khalilzad