SYG BAN VENTS DARFUR FRUSTRATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000949

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UNSC
SUBJECT: SYG BAN VENTS DARFUR FRUSTRATION

REF: (A) MCBRIDE-DEPARTMENT OCTOBER 30 E-MAIL

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) SUMMARY. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
told the Security Council's Perm 5 that he has become
"personally angry" with Sudanese President Bashir for lack of
cooperation on UNAMID force generation and for lack of
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Urging
the P-5, collectively and individually, to carry word of his
anger to Bashir, Ban pointedly confronted the Chinese
representative, saying "I think China should do something
more." The Chinese DPR replied that big-power pressure on
Bashir would be counterproductive and that China therefore
would continue to avoid criticizing Khartoum. Ambassador
Khalilzad, joined by the UK and French representatives,
argued that Bashir's behavior shows a lack of interest in
deploying a competent force in Darfur. Ban closed by urging
the P-5 and the full Security Council to do more to mobilize
military resources for UNAMID, particularly helicopters, and
to engage Khartoum more constructively, both by pushing
African leaders to influence Bashir and by directly engaging
Bashir themselves. A UN-led military team leaves today to
inspect troops pledged for Darfur and expects to find that
some African units are not up to standard at present, a
circumstance that could further complicate relations with
Khartoum. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) Following-up on a personal appeal from UN SYG Ban
Ki-moon regarding Khartoum's lack of cooperation with UN
efforts in Sudan, Ambassador Khalilzad convoked the P-5 to an
October 30 meeting (ref A) and arranged an October 31 P-5
meeting with the SYG. Joining Ambassador Khalilzad,
Ambassador Wolcott, and Deputy PolCouns at the meetings were
UK PermRep Sawers, French DPR LaCroix, Chinese DPR Liu
Zhenmin, and Russian PDPR Shcherbak and DPR Dolgov. At the
October 31 session, Ban was joined by UnderSecretary for
Peacekeeping Operations Guehenno and SYG Chief of Staff
Nambiar.

P-5: Three Out of Five Isn't Enough
--------------


3. (C) At the October 30 session, Ambassador Khalilzad
explained that an exasperated Ban had informed him that he
was at his wits end about how to persuade Sudanese President
Bashir to agree to the list of potential UNAMID troop
contributing countries that has been sitting on his desk
since September after being approved by both the UN and the
AU. To Russian and Chinese suggestions that UNAMID
deployment problems were essentially technical, the
Ambassador countered that Khartoum's record of persistent
obstruction and delay since UNSCR 1769 was adopted (July 31)
demonstrates that Bashir "wants a force that is incapable and
wants even that only later." He renewed a USG suggestion
that the P-5 jointly demarche Bashir in Khartoum.


4. (C) France and the UK readily agreed to the idea of a
joint P-5 demarche, but Russia's Dolgov dismissed it, saying
"working individually is better than working in a group
because it avoids politicizing what is basically a technical
matter." Dolgov assured the group that "our ambassador in
Khartoum has just been instructed to go into the GNU at a
high level to talk about UNAMID deployment." Agreeing with
Russia that UNAMID deployment problems are practical in
nature, China's Liu said "we can't just say to Khartoum that
we've selected a force and you must accept it." He added
that China is aware of Ban's complaints but insisted that
China's special representative in Sudan "got a whole
different story from Khartoum" that suggested that the
UN-AU-GNU tri-partite process just needed to be activated to
resolve these different perceptions with practical solutions.
Ambassador Khalilzad challenged Russia and China to show how
repeating the same bilateral contacts can be expected to
produce different results and urged the full P-5 to consider
incrementally all our options "if we are serious about
getting the job done," adding that insisting that these
delays "are not political but only technical is not to be
serious."

Ban to P-5: It's Your Resolution - Do Something
-------------- --


5. (SBU) All P-5 members having agreed to listen first-hand
to Ban's concerns, a meeting with the SYG was scheduled for
October 31. At that meeting, Ban described three tracks in
the UN's engagement in Sudan -- peacekeeping, peace talks,
and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. He said he
understands that making progress on the peace talks was
largely beyond GNU capacity because the rebels were not under

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its control, but he argued that progress on the peacekeeping
and CPA tracks "just depends on how Bashir thinks. He can
decide to make force composition happen tomorrow morning.
What rationale is there to accept only China, Bangladesh, and
Pakistan from Asia but reject Thailand and Nepal. There is
no rationale behind (his decisions on) Sweden and the Nordic
engineers." On CPA, Ban said "all problems rest with Bashir."



6. (SBU) Venting at length his exasperation with Bashir, Ban
said, "I really wanted to have a personal relationship with
him. I went there. He said 'no problem' on land and the
rest. I hope some of you can give this message to him. Many
informations leak from the United Nations -- the
secretary-general reported in anger to the P-5 about Bashir.

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I spoke to (AUPSC Chair) Konare yesterday. I've spoken to
more than a dozen African leaders, India, Europeans, Egypt --
who should have influence on him. Yesterday I also spoke to
the South African representative and I have spoken to
President Mbeki recently because Bashir is going there next
week. I speak to all these people to try to make Bashir more
practical and cooperative. I've really tried, but he is not
listening. I am becoming personally angry and upset."


7. (C) Ban was especially direct with Chinese DPR Liu, saying
"I think China should do something more." An awkward pause
was finally broken by laughter, but Ban did not join in.
UK's Sawers said "you have a right to be angry. We've gone
to great lengths to achieve Security Council unanimity, but
we (UK) fear Bashir wants to prevent an effective force in
Darfur." Russia's Shcherbak replied "it is hard to separate
deployment from the political process. We need more effort
on the political process to secure the ground for a
successful peacekeeping operation. We need to engage the
splinter factions. It's risky to start operations without the
political process off the ground."


8. (C) China's Liu agreed that Bashir "should be more
flexible" and suggested that "we need to be more creative
with him. But China prefers to have the secretary-general
and his special envoys out front with Security Council
members standing behind you. If the P-5 talks directly to
Khartoum, they will take it as big power pressure rather than
UN pressure and they will not respond. We should continue
with UN talking and with we members standing behind and using
bilateral channels to reinforce your message. We know we
could play a role, and they will listen to us. But 60 years
of dealing with African nations tells us to avoid pressuring
them, to avoid criticizing them. We should show flexibility
and try to resolve this at the technical level."


9. (C) Ban urged the P-5 and the Security Council to organize
itself: to take advantage of the early November visit to New
York of Sudan Vice President/Southern Sudan President Salva
Kiir (to discuss CPA implementation); to do more about
mobilizing resources for UNAMID (regarding helicopters in
particular so that lack of mobility does not retard
deployment); and to engage the GNU in a more constructive way
(in particular by P-5 joint visits to African leaders and
even to President Bashir). Ambassador Wolcott ended the
meeting by emphasizing that, while a great deal of
responsibility for hybrid deployment rests with the SYG and
DPKO, 1769 is a Security Council creation and "it's up to us
to implement it." She invited Ban to continue to regularly
express his views and solicit P-5 help, individually and
collectively, on Darfur.


10. (C) COMMENT. The new UN-led High Ranking Officer
Technical Assessment Team (HROTAT),created especially to
facilitate UNAMID deployment, leaves tonight (November 1) for
Senegal, Mauritania, and Gambia on the first in a series of
trips to evaluate troops offered for UNAMID deployment.
Looking only slightly ahead on the deployment agenda, HROTAT
evaluations can be expected to further complicate relations
with Khartoum. Although all pressure should be brought to
bear on Bashir to accept the list of troop contributing
countries on his desk, that pressure should also anticipate
that some troops on offer, especially from African countries,
will likely prove substandard, at least at present, for lack
of equipment, training, or force strength. Bashir needs to
be made to accept that HROTAT rejection of some troops under
these circumstances would not amount to UN backtracking on
UNAMID African-centricity but rather would provide the
quality control essential to deployment of a fully capable
force. END COMMENT.
Khalilzad