U.S. AND JAPAN DISCUSS BURMA, AFGHANISTAN, DPRK,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 000918

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: PREL UNSC KUNR BM AF KS IR
SUBJECT: U.S. AND JAPAN DISCUSS BURMA, AFGHANISTAN, DPRK,
IRAN, AND UN REFORM

USUN NEW Y 00000918 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, per 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. At Japanese request, Amb Khalilzad and
Japanese PermRep Yukio Takasu held a wide-ranging
consultation on October 22 on issues currently before the
UNSC as well as on UN reform. On Burma, Takasu urged
increased pressure on the regime, but argued against actions
which risk losing UNSC consensus. On Afghanistan, Amb
Khalilzad described U.S. interest in a high-level envoy
appointed by the SYG or a high-profile SRSG, and Takasu
suggested consideration of a Japanese official for the post.
On DPRK and the six-party talks, Takasu said Japan would be
satisfied with progress rather than an immediate solution to
the abductee issue, and trusts the U.S. will "not sacrifice
its bilateral relationship with Japan to make a deal with
North Korea." On Iran, Amb Khalilzad described the
three-track strategy pursued by the P5 1, and noted that work
continues on a third sanctions resolution should no positive
outcome transpire on the other two tracks by November.
Takasu argued UNSC unity on Iran is essential for progress.
On UNSC reform, Takasu argued for seizing a "window of
opportunity" before next summer's Olympics to move forward.
But Amb Khalilzad emphasized that no expansion of the UNSC
would be possible without broad reform of the UN. On other
issues, Takasu agreed that the time was right to move forward
on mandate review. He acknowledged that the UN budget
submission was excessive but cautioned against embarrassing
SYG Ban. Lastly, Takasu urged that the U.S. view the
Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) with fresh eyes given Japan's
chairmanship and make a contribution to the PBC fund. End
Summary.

Burma: More Pressure But No Chinese Veto
--------------


2. (C) Takasu argued that the Council should continue to
apply pressure on Burma but should stop short of actions
which would risk breaking consensus in the UNSC or provoke a
Chinese veto. Noting that Ban's special adviser Ibrahim
Gambari was traveling to Japan and would soon travel to
Burma, Takasu made several points about how to encourage
progress in Burma. First, Gambari could convene an informal
Core Group, which could include the P-5, Japan, India,
Singapore, and other countries. Takasu was skeptical of the
value of including Norway, as Gambari had proposed. Second,
the international community should continue to press China to
use its influence with the Burmese government. Although
Japan had engaged the PRC at a high level on this subject,
Takasu was doubtful that Burma had heard the right message
from China. Third, although Japan had decreased its aid to
Burma -- including by suspending a human resources center it
planned to build -- Takasu said it would be difficult to cut
the remaining humanitarian assistance. Fourth, Takasu
stressed the important role of Singapore, noting that several
Burmese leaders have bank accounts there. He praised
Singapore's strategy on Burma as being "very realistic," as
it has been harshly critical of the government, but is also
against sanctions.


3. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad agreed that the international
community needed a comprehensive strategy to encourage
progress in Burma and suggested that we use the time before
the ASEAN summit on November 19-21 to apply maximum pressure
on the regime. He urged the Japanese to send a strong
message to the Singaporean FM, expected in Tokyo on October
27, on the need for change in Burma. Noting that the U.S.
had just imposed expanded sanctions on the Burmese regime,
Ambassador Khalilzad suggested that the UNSC might also
threaten sanctions to force change. But he recognized that
the UN is only one tool in this process. As for Gambari's
visit, Ambassador Khalilzad expressed disappointment that the
Burmese had agreed to a meeting only in the first week of
November, and noted that the Chinese FM had promised to work
on this issue. He assessed more flexibility on the part of
China and Russia towards setting up a Core Group on Burma,
and agreed that Gambari should convene this group soon.
Ambassador Khalilzad echoed Gambari's opinion that it would
be useful to include Norway in the Core Group if Oslo is
prepared to contribute funds to support reconciliation and
democratization in Burma.

Afghanistan: Consider Japanese for SRSG
--------------


4. (C) Briefing on the series of high-level meetings held on
Afghanistan during the UNGA, Ambassador Khalilzad focused on

USUN NEW Y 00000918 002.2 OF 004


the successor to SRSG Koenigs and whether it would be useful
to also appoint a high-level envoy (HLE) to sustain
international support for Afghanistan in capitals as well as
take on a regional role. Noting the division within the UNSC
on whether the HLE is needed, he suggested such an envoy
would not be necessary if the SRSG is of sufficiently high
stature, and said the U.S. would soon produce a paper on the
HLE. Running through names of possible SRSGs / HLEs, the
Ambassador mentioned former UK MP Paddy Ashdown, former NATO
rep. in Afghanistan Hikmet Cetin, Norwegian political
director Kai Eide, and former German FM Joschka Fischer.
Ambassador Khalilzad said UK PermRep had confirmed that
Ashdown is interested in the job, but noted that Afghan
President Karzai has some doubts about appointing a British
official given the UK's history in Afghanistan.


5. (C) Takasu said he had raised with SYG Ban the absence of
any Japanese SRSGs and suggested to Ambassador Khalilzad that
a Japanese official might be considered for the Afghanistan
position. Although his staff later told USUN that the GOJ
has yet to decide whether to support this nomination, Takasu
suggested that former Japanese Ambassador to Afghanistan
Komano might be one candidate for the job. Regarding the
other candidates, Takasu suggested that the SYG was reluctant
to appoint Fischer, given that Koenigs is also German.
Takasu concluded the discussion on Afghanistan by expressing
appreciation for the cooperation with USUN on the negotiation
of UNSCR 1776. Although the OEF issue is still very
sensitive in Japan, he said the fact that the parliamentary
bill authorizing further deployments could quote language
from a Security Council resolution would help its chances of
passage.

DPRK: Expect U.S. Support on Abductees
--------------


6. (C) Although Takasu expressed satisfaction with progress
in the six-party talks, and noted that the new Japanese PM
wants to normalize relations with the DPRK, he made clear
this would not be possible without progress on the issue of
Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea. Characterizing
DPRK responses on this issue so far as "insincere," Takasu
said North Korea could take steps such as re-opening the
investigation into the fate of the abductees to demonstrate
sincerity. He acknowledged that this issue cannot be settled
immediately, adding that Japan would be satisfied for now
with "progress" rather than a "solution." Takasu expressed
appreciation for assurances from Secretary Rice and others
that the U.S. "would not sacrifice the U.S.-Japan
relationship to make a deal with North Korea."


7. (C) Takasu noted that Japan would again work with the EU
to submit a resolution in the UNGA third committee on the
human rights situation in the DPRK. Lastly, he said that
Japan sees two possibilities for UNSC involvement in the DPRK
issue: either the six-party process fails, in which Japan
would expect UNSC involvement immediately, or the six-party
talks succeed, in which case the UNSC could eventually
endorse the agreement. Ambassador Khalilzad pledged to work
with Japan on the third committee resolution and said the
U.S. would continue to be sensitive to Japanese views on the
abductee issue.

Iran: Pursuing Three Tracks Simultaneously
--------------


8. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad explained that the U.S. continues
to pursue a three-track strategy on the Iranian nuclear
issue. The first track is the Larijani-El Baradei agreement
with timetable for implementation, although the Ambassador
noted that this agreement does not address the suspension of
uranium enrichment. The second are the meetings between
Solana and new Secretary of the Supreme National Security
Council Jalili. Ambassador Khalilzad mentioned that we do
not yet have a good understanding of what President Putin
told the Iranians in Tehran nor the reasons behind Ali
Larijani's recent resignation. The third track is the effort
to sanction Iran in the UNSC. Ambassador Khalilzad
acknowledged that the third sanctions resolution is a work in
progress, but noted that P5 1 FMs had agreed to continue work
on the SCR so that we could move quickly in the Council if
the first two tracks do not result in a positive outcome in
November.


9. (C) Takasu, recalling his days in Vienna as Japan's IAEA
representative, confirmed that Japan has "no confidence" in

USUN NEW Y 00000918 003.2 OF 004


Iran's stated nuclear intentions. As a result, he agreed
that the IAEA work plan is insufficient to assuage the
international community's concerns about the Iranian nuclear
program. But Takasu also emphasized that Japan believes
unity of the UNSC is essential. It is "crucial" to maintain
Russian and Chinese support for international policy towards
Iran, he argued, lest the Iranians benefit from differences
between world powers. He reported that Japan had decided to
restrict its export credits to Iran, had suspended dealings
with banks implicated in the nuclear program, and had reduced
its stake in a joint oil project from 75 percent to 10
percent. Takasu also mentioned that during a bilateral
meeting on the margins of UNGA, the Japanese FM had taken a
"very tough" line with Iranian FM Mottaki, repeatedly urging
Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and come into line with
UNSC demands.

UNSC Reform: Which Reforms Go First?
--------------


10. (C) Expressing appreciation for President Bush's UNGA
comments about UNSC reform, Takasu described a "small window
of opportunity" to reform the Council before next summer,
when the Olympic Games begin in Beijing and the U.S. will
become focused on its presidential elections. Noting the
importance of obtaining African support, Takasu said certain
African states are deviating from their demand for two
permanent seats with veto power. With a "weakened" UFC bloc
and an "energized" PGA, he suggested it might be possible to
find a formula that could achieve two-thirds support. Japan
and its G-4 partners are now discussing proposals for the
inter-governmental negotiations on UNSC reform set to begin
this year, which he predicted would result in changes to the
G-4 approach. The question now, Takasu said, is who will
manage these negotiations and on what basis they will be
conducted. He argued that "every effort" should be made to
achieve concrete progress by next summer.


11. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad said the U.S. is open-minded
about UNSC reform but that the right conditions for broad
reform of the UN must also be in place to put together an
attractive overall package. He suggested the SYG's upcoming
retreat on UN reform, now tentatively scheduled for January
2008, would be a good forum to discuss the elements of this
package. Takasu agreed that broad reform of the UN is
important but objected to any "linkage" between these reforms
and expansion of the UNSC. We cannot place UNSC reform in a
"straightjacket," he insisted, by blocking inter-governmental
negotiations if there is no broader reform of the UN.
Ambassador Khalilzad told Takasu that UNSC reform on its own
could not be accepted by the U.S. without other elements of
system-wide reform.

Mandate Review, UN Budget, PBC
--------------


12. (C) USUN/MR Counselor underscored that the mandate review
process should be re-energized and that the recent meeting of
Member States with the PGA provided an opportunity to move
forward. He said the two important questions now are how to
identify the mandates to focus on and the role of the SYG in
moving the process forward. Takasu agreed that the elements
provided by the PGA has created goodwill among PermReps
focused on mandate review and declared that Japan was ready
to start engaging in the process again. Takasu suggested
that JUSCANZ could be the "motor" through which to make
progress, and that PermReps could meet to plot strategy and
then experts could follow up on the details soon thereafter.


13. (C) Turning to the UN budget, Takasu argued that the most
important goal is to approve the budget submission --
including the Capital Master Plan -- by Christmas. While he
agreed that the budget request seemed excessive -- Japan
believes the year-over-year increase is 12 percent rather
than the U.S. figure of 15 percent -- Takasu argued it was
important not to embarrass SYG Ban through the budget
process. At the same time, he agreed with Ambassador
Khalilzad that the UN could not just constantly add budget
items onto its original submission, and noted the need to
find additional savings and restrain growth in future
budgets. In regard to this budget, Takasu expressed concern
by the manner in which the SYG unfolded DPA's proposed budget
increase as well the size of that increase, which he
described as quite large. He suggested that the U.S. and
Japan might want to send a joint letter to the SYG on the UN
budget.

USUN NEW Y 00000918 004.2 OF 004




14. (C) Takasu urged that the U.S. to take a fresh look at
the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) now that Japan has assumed
the chair. Contrary to the past year, Takasu said he would
focus on ensuring the PBC actually gets work done and assists
the UNSC where possible. He urged USUN to devote
higher-level attention to the PBC and to contribute to the
PBC fund. Noting that Japan had donated USD 10 million to
the UN democracy fund at U.S. request, Takasu asked that the
U.S. consider contributing to the PBC fund.
Khalilzad