P5 DISCUSSES SUDAN AND BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000881

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC BM
SUBJECT: P5 DISCUSSES SUDAN AND BURMA


Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, Permanent Representative.
For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. During a P-5 meeting on October 16,
Ambassador Khalilzad, supported by his British and French
counterparts, pressed Russian PR Churkin and Chinese DPR Liu
for coordinated pressure on Sudan to cooperate with UNAMID
deployment, and to work together to get UN Special Adviser
Gambari into Burma immediately and a reconciliation process
started. On Sudan, Khalilzad proposed a joint P-5 demarche in
Khartoum or individual demarches with compatible messages.
Liu rejected a P-5 demarche, reporting that China had already
made its own demarche in Khartoum, expressing concern about
deployment delays. Churkin agreed the Sudanese needed a
signal that they were pushing things too far. Ambassador
Khalilzad suggested the P-5 find ways to express support for
the SYG's efforts on UNAMID deployment, and meet unilaterally
with the GOS in Khartoum with a message that further delays
would lead to more pressure and penalties. On Burma,
Khalilzad asked the Chinese to help facilitate Gambari's
return to Burma. Liu responded that Burma should not be "a
P-5 issue" and that the Council did not have a monopoly on UN
action. He said ASEAN engagement would be more productive
now. Churkin agreed but acknowledged that there would be
pressure for more action in the Security Council and that
Gambari's idea of a P-5 plus core group for discussions on
next steps had merit. End Summary.


SUDAN/DARFUR
--------------


2. (C) During lunch with Security Council members on October
16, UN Secretary General Ban called for coordinated action to
increase pressure on Sudan to cooperate with UNAMID
deployment and for political support in advance of the
Tripoli meeting. In a previously-scheduled P-5 meeting that
followed, Ambassador Khalilzad, supported by UK PR Sawers and
French PR Ripert, urged the group to support the SYG's appeal
and consider options to pressure Sudan. Apart from
additional Council action, he proposed a joint P-5 demarche
in Khartoum, or individual demarches with similar messages,
particularly from those with the most influence. These can
be sequenced to ensure maximum effect, he suggested.


3. (C) Chinese DPR Liu expressed skepticism about a P-5
initiative in Khartoum. Quiet diplomacy, not pressure, would
work best. Liu recommended that the P-5 encourage the SYG
and AU Chair Konare to communicate directly with President
Bashir, adding that the SYG should deal with the GOS,
particularly concerning force deployment. "That is his
role," said Liu. He noted that China had already made its own
demarche, conveying its concerns privately to the Sudanese,
and asking them to show flexibility. Others should do the
same. The international community needed to help the GOS
find a solution.


4. (C) Amb Khalilzad responded that the P-5 had the
responsibility to ensure actions mandated by the Council were
carried out. When the SYG needs help it doing it, the
Council, in particular the P-5, had to provide support. He
appealed to Liu to ask Beijing to reconsider its approach. If
the Chinese demarche did not have the desired effect, then
the P-5 should jointly call on the Sudanese. PR Ripert
agreed, noting that GOS behavior negotiating the composition
of every UN outpost was unacceptable. GOS delays in UNAMID
deployment were now endangering the CPA.


5. (C) Russian PR Churkin agreed that the SYG's formula for
troop composition was reasonable and should be supported. He
acknowledged that the GOS had pushed it too far. There was
nothing wrong with signaling the Sudanese that "enough is
enough." Churkin was less optimistic about a P-5 demarche for
practical reasons -- reaching agreement on the language would
be a lengthy and difficult process. Rather, he suggested the
P-5 meet with the SYG to convey support of his efforts and
that the deployment plan was a good deal for Khartoum and the
Sudanese ought to take it.


6. (C) UK PR Sawers responded that if a P-5 demarche was not
possible, then individual demarches were needed in Khartoum
with compatible messages. UNAMID deployment had to proceed
immediately. If delayed further, the Council would have to
return to considering punitive measures. Ambassador
Khalilzad summed up the discussion, saying that the P-5
needed to find ways to express support for the Secretary
General and pursue unilateral meetings with the GOS with the
message that a continued lack of cooperation and further
delays in UNAMID deployment would inevitably lead to
additional pressure and penalities.


USUN NEW Y 00000881 002 OF 002


BURMA
--------------


7. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad urged the P-5 to work together to
get Special Adviser Gambari into Burma as quickly as possible
and to do more to get a process started toward
reconciliation. Gambari's visit to the region was positive
so far, but he needed to return to Burma. He asked the
Chinese DPR if Beijing would be willing to facilitate this
with the Burmese. French PR Ripert echoed Khalilzad's
concerns, insisting that the P-5 had remain engaged, be
linked to what was happening on the ground, and actively help
Gambari through the proposed core group or other initiatives
in New York and the region.


8. (C) Chinese DPR Liu responded that Burma was not a P-5
issue. The group did not have a "monopoly" on the issue and
needed to remain cautious in its approach. Gambari's mandate
came from the General Assembly. The Security Council's PRST
called for all parties to start a dialogue, which Beijing
supported. Too much Council involvement would be
counterproductive. He said the UN should encourage ASEAN
countries to help move things forward. UK PR Sawers said he
understood Chinese concerns about too much pressure being
counterproductive, but the Council had spoken and the
generals needed to know that they had to move forward in some
way. The message needed to be, if they cooperated, there
would be benefits. If they did not, there would be
penalties.


9. (C) Russian PR Churkin agreed with the Chinese that Burma
was not an issue for the P-5. But he acknowledged that there
would be considerable pressure for more action in the
Security Council, and that Gambari's idea of a P-5 plus core
group had merit. "We don't disregard this idea," he said.
"It can be contemplated if everyone is comfortable with this
approach, and could be a good mechanism to deal with Mr.
Gambari and the Secretary General." Churkin went on to say
that the P-5 could continue to discuss Burma informally as
long as the profile of such discussions remained low.
KHALILZAD