P5 DISCUSSES SUDAN AND BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000881 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC BM SUBJECT: P5 DISCUSSES SUDAN AND BURMA Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, Permanent Representative. For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. During a P-5 meeting on October 16, Ambassador Khalilzad, supported by his British and French counterparts, pressed Russian PR Churkin and Chinese DPR Liu for coordinated pressure on Sudan to cooperate with UNAMID deployment, and to work together to get UN Special Adviser Gambari into Burma immediately and a reconciliation process started. On Sudan, Khalilzad proposed a joint P-5 demarche in Khartoum or individual demarches with compatible messages. Liu rejected a P-5 demarche, reporting that China had already made its own demarche in Khartoum, expressing concern about deployment delays. Churkin agreed the Sudanese needed a signal that they were pushing things too far. Ambassador Khalilzad suggested the P-5 find ways to express support for the SYG's efforts on UNAMID deployment, and meet unilaterally with the GOS in Khartoum with a message that further delays would lead to more pressure and penalties. On Burma, Khalilzad asked the Chinese to help facilitate Gambari's return to Burma. Liu responded that Burma should not be "a P-5 issue" and that the Council did not have a monopoly on UN action. He said ASEAN engagement would be more productive now. Churkin agreed but acknowledged that there would be pressure for more action in the Security Council and that Gambari's idea of a P-5 plus core group for discussions on next steps had merit. End Summary. SUDAN/DARFUR -------------- ¶2. (C) During lunch with Security Council members on October 16, UN Secretary General Ban called for coordinated action to increase pressure on Sudan to cooperate with UNAMID deployment and for political support in advance of the Tripoli meeting. In a previously-scheduled P-5 meeting that followed, Ambassador Khalilzad, supported by UK PR Sawers and French PR Ripert, urged the group to support the SYG's appeal and consider options to pressure Sudan. Apart from additional Council action, he proposed a joint P-5 demarche in Khartoum, or individual demarches with similar messages, particularly from those with the most influence. These can be sequenced to ensure maximum effect, he suggested. ¶3. (C) Chinese DPR Liu expressed skepticism about a P-5 initiative in Khartoum. Quiet diplomacy, not pressure, would work best. Liu recommended that the P-5 encourage the SYG and AU Chair Konare to communicate directly with President Bashir, adding that the SYG should deal with the GOS, particularly concerning force deployment. "That is his role," said Liu. He noted that China had already made its own demarche, conveying its concerns privately to the Sudanese, and asking them to show flexibility. Others should do the same. The international community needed to help the GOS find a solution. ¶4. (C) Amb Khalilzad responded that the P-5 had the responsibility to ensure actions mandated by the Council were carried out. When the SYG needs help it doing it, the Council, in particular the P-5, had to provide support. He appealed to Liu to ask Beijing to reconsider its approach. If the Chinese demarche did not have the desired effect, then the P-5 should jointly call on the Sudanese. PR Ripert agreed, noting that GOS behavior negotiating the composition of every UN outpost was unacceptable. GOS delays in UNAMID deployment were now endangering the CPA. ¶5. (C) Russian PR Churkin agreed that the SYG's formula for troop composition was reasonable and should be supported. He acknowledged that the GOS had pushed it too far. There was nothing wrong with signaling the Sudanese that "enough is enough." Churkin was less optimistic about a P-5 demarche for practical reasons -- reaching agreement on the language would be a lengthy and difficult process. Rather, he suggested the P-5 meet with the SYG to convey support of his efforts and that the deployment plan was a good deal for Khartoum and the Sudanese ought to take it. ¶6. (C) UK PR Sawers responded that if a P-5 demarche was not possible, then individual demarches were needed in Khartoum with compatible messages. UNAMID deployment had to proceed immediately. If delayed further, the Council would have to return to considering punitive measures. Ambassador Khalilzad summed up the discussion, saying that the P-5 needed to find ways to express support for the Secretary General and pursue unilateral meetings with the GOS with the message that a continued lack of cooperation and further delays in UNAMID deployment would inevitably lead to additional pressure and penalities. USUN NEW Y 00000881 002 OF 002 BURMA -------------- ¶7. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad urged the P-5 to work together to get Special Adviser Gambari into Burma as quickly as possible and to do more to get a process started toward reconciliation. Gambari's visit to the region was positive so far, but he needed to return to Burma. He asked the Chinese DPR if Beijing would be willing to facilitate this with the Burmese. French PR Ripert echoed Khalilzad's concerns, insisting that the P-5 had remain engaged, be linked to what was happening on the ground, and actively help Gambari through the proposed core group or other initiatives in New York and the region. ¶8. (C) Chinese DPR Liu responded that Burma was not a P-5 issue. The group did not have a "monopoly" on the issue and needed to remain cautious in its approach. Gambari's mandate came from the General Assembly. The Security Council's PRST called for all parties to start a dialogue, which Beijing supported. Too much Council involvement would be counterproductive. He said the UN should encourage ASEAN countries to help move things forward. UK PR Sawers said he understood Chinese concerns about too much pressure being counterproductive, but the Council had spoken and the generals needed to know that they had to move forward in some way. The message needed to be, if they cooperated, there would be benefits. If they did not, there would be penalties. ¶9. (C) Russian PR Churkin agreed with the Chinese that Burma was not an issue for the P-5. But he acknowledged that there would be considerable pressure for more action in the Security Council, and that Gambari's idea of a P-5 plus core group had merit. "We don't disregard this idea," he said. "It can be contemplated if everyone is comfortable with this approach, and could be a good mechanism to deal with Mr. Gambari and the Secretary General." Churkin went on to say that the P-5 could continue to discuss Burma informally as long as the profile of such discussions remained low. KHALILZAD