DARFUR: UN-P3 SHARE UNAMID DEPLOYMENT CONCERNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000768 SIPDIS SIPDIS IO AND AF FOR FRONT OFFICE; PLEASE PASS TO SE NATSIOS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2107 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SUBJECT: DARFUR: UN-P3 SHARE UNAMID DEPLOYMENT CONCERNS REF: USUN 00750 Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 B/D. ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 10. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY. P3 representatives pushed UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Under Secretary-General Guehenno for rapid deployment of UNAMID forces to Darfur and strategized about support for African troop contributing countries (TCCs). Guehenno said that many of the potential African units were not up to UN standards and would need extensive equipment and logistical support to deploy. He strongly criticized the African Union's rejection of offers of specialized military units from Uruguay and Norway and asked the P3 to urge the AU to take a more flexible attitude towards non-African TCCs. He also asked P3 countries to approach potential TCC's with needed technical capabilities, requesting support for UNAMID and involved African TCCs. USUN seconds that request here. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (U) Representatives of the P3 (U.S., UK, France) Missions to the UN discussed Darfur on September 18 with Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Under-Secretary Jean Marie Guehenno. Guehenno was joined by A/SYG Jane Holl Lute and Major General (MG) Per Five. P3 principals were Ambassador Sanders (USUN),PermRep John Sawers (UK),and French Deputy PermRep Jean-Pierre Lacroix. -------------- DPKO: AU Unhelpful on UNAMID Implementation -------------- ¶4. (C) UKUN PermRep Sawers said the P3 were concerned that the UNAMID deployment timeline has been delayed by UN-AU disagreements over UNAMID force composition. Guehenno agreed that some aspects of force generation were "stuck" and that the UN and AU had competing notions of how much of the UN-AU force should come from non-African countries. He said he hoped to come to an agreement with the AU on a finalized list of infantry in advance of the September 21 Darfur Ministerial meeting in New York. ¶5. (C) Regarding logistical support, Guehenno said UNAMID still lacks specialized units to provide adequate aviation, transport and specialized military assets. Guehenno said that a recent AU rejection of offers from Uruguay, Norway and Sweden of specialized military assets had sent the "wrong message" to potential TCCs with the right capabilities. He added that many potential European TCCs were not confident that the AU forces would be able to provide adequate security for their specialized military units and were asking to include their own force protection units. A/SYG Holl Lute said that the security of specialized military units is a concern for many potential TCCs, but that the UN is sensitive to the AU's desire to be a "full partner" in UNAMID. ¶6. (C) On troop deployment more generally, Holl Lute said, "there is going to be a problem" as new troops arrive whose units have been brought up to UN equipment, staffing, and training standards, and troops already on the ground note the contrast with their own circumstances. Picking up on this theme, Guehenno said that morale among troops already in the field is very low. He said Force Commander General Agwai had recently confided that the "force we have now is a broken force." Guehenno said Agwai has concluded that the morale problem can't be fixed except by replacing all present forces because "we can't change the mindset once they have been broken." ¶7. (C) In response to Ambassador Sander's inquiry about which countries might be able to make up UNAMID shortfalls, Guehenno said that Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Czech Republic, India, South Africa and Ukraine had all provided needed capacities to UN peacekeeping missions in the past and might be willing to provide these assets to UNAMID as well. (NOTE: UKUN contacted USUN subsequent to this meeting to report that they have recommended that HMG approach these governments to request support to UNAMID prior to the September 21 Ministerial Meeting in New York. END NOTE.) -------------- Many Potential TCCs Do Not Meet UN Standards -------------- ¶8. (C) Guehenno said that there are several delicate issues to be resolved with the AU regarding the quality, composition and equipping of the African TCCs. Guehenno noted that USUN NEW Y 00000768 002 OF 002 several of the TCCs use different metrics for force strength. (NOTE: The UN standard battalion is 800 men. Many of the current AMIS battalions have as few as 530 men. END NOTE.) He added that many of the current troops available from proposed lists of TCCs lack the equipment and training that will need to deploy. Lacroix reported that several potential African TCCs had already approached France on a bilateral basis to request support. Lacroix asked that DPKO provide a prioritized list of TCC equipment requirements so the P3 can begin looking at support in a coordinated manner. MG Five said many of these units that do not qualify at present could well be brought up to UN training and equipment standards eventually and would therefore become eligible for UNAMID deployment later in the process. -------------- Unresolved Political and Legal Issues -------------- ¶9. (C) Guehenno noted that several issues impacting deployment of the Heavy Support Package (HSP),most involving the Government of Sudan (GOS),have not been resolved with the GOS, including land to expand camps, lifting of air lift restrictions and visas for UN personnel. Holl Lute referred to difficulties with a "letter of assist" needed to keep U.S. contractor PA&E on the ground under a sole source contract extension pending a longer term competitive bill process. Guehenno commented that Sudanese officials were still making "different noises" regarding UNAMID deployment and suggested that this reflected a lack of a "strategic shift" by the Sudanese to accept the UN components of the force. He summed up Sudan's position by saying he is well aware that "Khartoum's insistence on African troops doesn't come from Sudanese nationalism. Khartoum doesn't want a capable force." Five added that DPKO was moving forward with military planning on the assumption that the GOS would not be fully cooperative with UNAMID deployment. For this reason, DPKO planned to use the UNMIS supply lines based in Entebbe, Uganda, rather than Port Sudan, to move many of the technical equipment and other assets into Darfur. -------------- Action Request -------------- ¶10. (C) USUN requests that the Department coordinate with P3 capitals to approach Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Czech Republic, India, South Africa and Ukraine regarding support to UNAMID in advance of the September 21 Ministerial meeting in New York. KHALILZAD