CHAD/CAR: UN URGES COUNCIL TO "TRUST BUT VERIFY"

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 000695 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CD PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU UNSC KPKO SUBJECT: CHAD/CAR: UN URGES COUNCIL TO "TRUST BUT VERIFY" PEACEKEEPING PLANS REF: SECSTATE 116973 USUN NEW Y 00000695 001.2 OF 004 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. At August 21 consultations, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Assistant-Secretary-General Annabi advised the Security Council to "trust but verify" plans for peacekeeping in eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic (CAR), given Chadian President Deby's acceptance in principle to the French and European Union forces that would comprise the military component of the proposed operation. Annabi reported that the EU Council of Ministers would finalize the proposal in its September 17 meeting, necessitating Security Council action beforehand in the forms of a Presidential Statement as a political signal to the EU to continue planning (circulated by the French delegation and contained in paragraph 10) and a resolution (to be circulated in draft by the end of August). Annabi deferred discussions of costs and troop numbers of the follow-on operation, in which the UN would assume military control from the EU, saying only that the cost estimates would be small compared to that of the hybrid operation in Darfur. Annabi said the UN did not see a need to include formed police units as part of its police deployment at this time and seemed relieved to avoid command and control issues that formed units would likely trigger. Members were generally supportive of the proposed operation and expressed willingness to engage constructively in an August 22 Experts Meeting on the PRST so that it could be adopted by the August 25 departure for the region of a joint UN-EU assessment team. END SUMMARY. ANNABI OUTLINES REVISED PEACEKEEPING CONCEPT -------------- ¶2. (SBU) At August 21 Security Council consultations, United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Assistant-Secretary-General (A/SYG) Annabi outlined the three key features of the revised concept for Chad and CAR peacekeeping, per the August 10 Secretary-General's (SYG) Report (S/2007/488),versus the SYG's February 23 Report (S/2007/97). The first was that the military component of the operation would be provided by the European Union (EU) for the first 12 months, vice the UN, based on discussions between French FM Kouchner and Chadian President Deby, in which Deby agreed "in principle" to such a concept. The second was that the force would have no direct involvement in cross-border activities with Sudan. The third was that Chadian gendarmes would be mentored, trained, equipped, paid and monitored by the UN but would fall under national authority. ¶3. (SBU) A/SYG Annabi went on to describe the three pillars of the proposed deployment. The first such pillar would be a multidimensional UN presence (including inter alia political affairs officers, civil affairs officers and human rights officers),to be based in large part in a forward headquarters in Abeche, eastern Chad, with field offices in Iriba, Farchana and Goz Beida. The second pillar would be a police component comprised of UN-trained Chadian gendarmes mandated to maintain law and order in and around the 12 refugee camps, IDP concentrations and civilian populations at risk in eastern Chad, with six "jurisdictions" in Abeche, Bahai, Guereda, Iriba, Farchana and Goz Beida. The final pillar would be an EU military force mandated to assist in protecting civilians at risk and to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance. Annabi expected the concept of operations for this pillar to be finalized by the EU by mid-September, after which the force would deploy for an initial 12-month period, with follow-on arrangements to be decided by a joint EU-UN assessment at the six-month mark. ¶4. (SBU) A/SYG foresaw coordination of the EU-UN operation with the UN Country Team in Chad in the areas of assisting in the protection of civilians at risk; of selecting, training and advising Chadian law enforcement elements; of liaising with relevant national military and judicial organs; of facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance; of liaising with the Government of Chad and with UNHCR to re-locate refugee camps in close proximity to the Darfur border; of protecting UN personnel, facilities and equipment and ensuring their freedom of movement; of liaising with the Sudanese Government, the African Union (AU),the AU Mission USUN NEW Y 00000695 002.2 OF 004 in the Sudan (AMIS),the UN-AU Mission in the Sudan (UNAMID), the UN Peace-building Office in CAR (BONUCA) and the Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CENSAD); and of promoting reconciliation and cohesion. Annabi noted that a Special Representative of the SYG would be appointed as overall Head of Mission and that the UN team based in N'djamena would serve as the nucleus of the operation. ¶5. (SBU) On timelines, A/SYG Annabi reported the EU Council of Ministers would meet September 17 to consider the arrangements, necessitating coordinated efforts among the UN, EU and Government of Chad. Annabi noted that in addition to weekly UN-EU video conferences on the proposed Chad/CAR operation, a joint EU-UN information-gathering mission would go to N'Djamena, Abeche and Birao from August 25 to September 1 to inform the "Crisis Management Concept" to be presented to the EU Ministers on September 17. Once the EU approved the military component, Annabi explained that the SYG would submit another report to the Security Council containing specific recommendations on EU troop numbers and structure and strength of the UN component of the operation, in order to inform a draft resolution. In response to a question from Ambassador Wolff, Annabi deferred discussion of cost estimates to the forthcoming SYG report, saying that the cost for the initial UN component (SRSG and office, 350 international police) would be limited but would increase "dramatically" if/when the UN absorbed the military component from the EU. Still, Annabi assured, the price tag would be small compared to that of UNAMID in neighboring Darfur. Also in response to Ambassador Wolff's question, Annabi said the UN did not see a need to include formed police units as part of its police deployment at this time, adding however that had they been necessary, they would have fallen under UN command and control. ¶6. (SBU) A/SYG Annabi acknowledged that more work remained to be done with Chadian President Deby to ensure his support for the hand-over of the military part of the operation to the UN after the initial 12-month deployment but advised the Council to "trust but verify," meaning, he said, trust the EU and FM Kouchner but verify that Deby's agreement in principle translates to realization of the plan. Annabi hoped that some EU elements would transition to the UN force after 12 months to give "immediate credibility" to the operation. Annabi added the faster the follow-on deployment could be clarified, the better it would be for the UN, not least in identifying troop- and police-contributors. He noted that Deby had opposed from the outset any deployment at the border with Sudan, but Annabi was optimistic that the presence would nonetheless have a stabilizing effect where deployed in eastern Chad. MEMBERS EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR PROPOSED PLAN AND PRST -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Members were generally supportive of the proposed operation. French Permanent Representative (PR) Ripert detailed the extent of French engagement with the Governments of Chad, CAR and Sudan on improving the security situation in the region, which resulted in "unanimous support of all governments concerned." He urged the Council to seize this opportunity to act and accordingly circulated a draft Presidential Statement (PRST),which he hoped could be adopted by the time a joint UN-EU assessment team would depart for the region on August 25. Ripert added that his delegation would submit by the end of August a draft resolution based on the three pillars A/SYG Annabi had outlined (NOTE: French Poloff told USUN on August 21 that the French Mission hoped the draft resolution would be adopted by September 14, ahead of the September 17 EU Council Ministers' meeting. END NOTE). The Belgian delegate advised that any draft resolution be clear on the requirement for coordination structures between the UN and the EU, on command and control, and on logistical coordination between all components of the operation. The Slovakian delegate was firm that the force be given Chapter VII mandate authority to protect civilians at risk. ¶8. (SBU) Several delegations, including South Africa and Indonesia, spoke to the need for the force to support the political processes in Chad and CAR, despite A/SYG Annabi's USUN NEW Y 00000695 003.2 OF 004 reminder that President Deby had opposed any involvement of the proposed force in the internal dimension of the Chadian problem and that to do otherwise could jeopardize Deby's agreement to the deployment. Russian Deputy PR Dolgov, supported by the Qatari representative, urged solicitation of the Sudanese Government's opinion on Chad/CAR deployment so as to foster cooperation on strengthening the border regime and movement of refugees. A/SYG Annabi responded that the UN had been working transparently with Sudan since the outset and that an upcoming visit by SYG Ban to Sudan, Chad and Libya would reinforce this spirit. The Chinese and Qatari delegates similarly urged Annabi to secure Chadian consent for any deployment. ¶9. (SBU) Members expressed willingness to engage constructively in an August 22 Experts Meeting on the PRST so that it could be adopted by the time a joint UN-EU assessment team would depart for the region on August 25. ¶10. (U) Begin draft PRST text: The Security Council reiterates its concern about the prevailing insecurity along the borders between the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic and about the threat which this poses to the civilian population and the conduct of humanitarian operations. Following the adoption of resolution 1769 (2007),the Security Council welcomes the report of the Secretary-General dated 10 August 2007 (S/2007/488),which proposes a revised concept of operations aimed at contributing to the protection of refugees, internally displaced persons and civilian populations at risk in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic. The Security Council expresses its readiness to authorize the establishment of the proposed multidimensional presence in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, on the basis of the recommendations contained in the Secretary-General's report. The Council takes note of the SIPDIS Secretary-General's observations and proposals relating to SIPDIS military elements for the protection of the multidimensional presence. It welcomes the readiness of the European Union, expressed at the meeting of the Council of the European Union on 23 and 24 July 2007, to consider the establishment of an operation in support of the United Nations presence in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic. The Security Council encourages the Secretary-General and the European Union, as far as they are concerned and in consultation with the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic, to proceed with preparations for this multidimensional presence. It requests the Secretary-General to study, in consultations with the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic, the follow-on arrangements for this multidimensional presence after a period of 12 months, in particular on the basis of a joint assessment of requirements to be conducted by the United Nations Organization and the European Union six months after its deployment. The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to continue to keep it closely informed of the preparations for the multidimensional presence. ¶11. (U) End draft PRST text. ¶12. (SBU) COMMENT. An issue that will require consistent follow-up once deployment begins is that of accountability for UN-trained Chadian gendarmes. Annabi assured that the UN would conclude a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Government of Chad on the responsibilities and modalities of the revised peacekeeping concept to ensure the type of "quality control" over the gendarmes that UNHCR (which currently trains gendarmes in the refugee camps) lacks. Annabi saw the oversight role of UN civilian police and rotation of gendarmes as direct means of verifying the gendarmes' conformity with UN performance standards. Nonetheless, we should ensure that any MOU signed is clear on this point so as to avoid problems in the future. END USUN NEW Y 00000695 004.2 OF 004 COMMENT. KHALILZAD