ALGERIAN READOUT ON AUGUST 10-11 WESTERN SAHARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000671 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC WI AG MO SUBJECT: ALGERIAN READOUT ON AUGUST 10-11 WESTERN SAHARA TALKS REF: USUN 666 Classified By: Amb. Jackie W. Sanders. E.O 12958. Reasons 1.4 (B&D). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with Ambassador Sanders, members of the Algerian delegation to the second round of the Manhasset talks between Morocco and the Polisario on Western Sahara expressed lower expectations of the progress of the talks than they had after the initial round. The Algerians said that Morocco had been less provocative in this round and claimed that the talks on issues not directly prejudicing Western Sahara's final status had gone well, but they lamented Morocco's veto of talks on confidence building measures (CBMs),and complained that Morocco was trying to delay the next round of talks. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) USUN Ambassador Jackie Sanders met on August 13 with the Algerian delegation that attended the August 10-11 Western Sahara peace talks at Manhasset, NY in order to get their readout of the talks. The Algerian delegation members included MFA Secretary-General Ramdane Lamamra (who had headed the delegation) and UN Permrep Youcef Yousfi; MFA Senior Advisor Abdullah Baali, the third delegation member, was not present. ¶3. (C) The Algerians were subdued in their assessment of the talks. Lamamra characterized the negotiations as "not promising, but useful," noting that the "psychological atmosphere" of the talks was markedly less friendly than at the first round. He attributed this change to Morocco's hardened position. The latter was encapsulated in King Mohammed's Throne Day speech, which, by stating that Morocco would negotiate on the basis of "autonomy and nothing but autonomy," had imposed "the mother of all preconditions" on the supposedly precondition-free talks. The Algerians admitted that the Moroccans had been considerably less provocative in the second round than in the first and that Moroccan Royal Council on Sahrawi Affairs (CORCAS) President Khalihenna Ould Errachid's role had been much reduced. Algeria itself, Lamamra said, had done its best to help the process, but had adhered strictly to the Baker formula (under which the UN requested its attendance) and would only attend the opening and closing sessions and those sessions which specifically addressed issues which would affect Algeria directly. ¶4. (C) Given the impasse between Morocco and the Polisario on the question of which plan to discuss, Lamamra believed that Van Walsum's approach of bringing in outside experts was the best course forward. He lamented the failure of an Walsum to convince the Moroccans to broach the subject of confidence-building measures (CBMs),as such measures would best create the trust needed to move forward. While the Moroccans had insisted that such measures must be negotiated within the UNHCR framework, there were several potentially helpful CBMs that fell outside of that framework, to include demining, joint military patrols, and international monitors for human rights in the Western Sahara. (Comment: All of these, and particularly the latter, would be objectionable for the Moroccans. End comment.) ¶5. (C) The Moroccan attitude toward the next round of talks, Lamamra claimed, was disingenuous. While he understood the need for the Moroccan delegation to prepare for the Moroccan elections, these were on September 7 and the new Moroccan government would be in place by early October. There was no need to wait until November for the next round, and indeed, Algeria and the Polisario had argued that it would be preferable to have the next round prior to the next SYG report (with the MINURSO renewal at the end of October), if only so that report might have something to say. Van Walsum had unfortunately given in to the Moroccans on this point, Lamamra said; nevertheless, he saw a possibility for moving the talks forward. ¶6. (C) As the discussion of local government and natural resources had gone well, said Lamamra, future rounds should include such discussions on topics that are "not politicized." The delegations themselves could be polled on the topics that they would like to see raised in this regard, though this would run the risk of assuring that suggested topics would be automatically vetoed by the other party. Another way to move forward would be for the two sides to have a smaller meeting at some point in the talks, with the delegation leader from each side together with Van Walsum. This formula would, however, be difficult for Morocco to accept, as it would exclude CORCAS, which Morocco had repeatedly made clear must be present at every discussion between the two sides. Ultimately, Lamamra said, Morocco would have to come to a formula that would satisfy the Polisario's "dignity and aspirations;" otherwise the talks could not proceed to any level of success. KHALILZAD