UNSC EXPANSION: DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000635

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL UNSC KUNR
SUBJECT: UNSC EXPANSION: DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

REF: STATE 100029


1. (SBU) Summary. On July 19, the UNGA,s Open-Ended
Working Group on UNSC Expansion discussed the two recent
reports on the issue prepared by facilitators appointed by
UNGA President Khalifa. Although the debate on Security
Council reform and expansion gained some momentum in the wake
of these reports of April 19 and June 26, serious divergences
among UN members over the nature, scope, and size of any UNSC
expansion persist. The new element in the UNGA debate is the
possibility of an "interim" phase to Council expansion, as
suggested in the facilitators, reports. This phase would
temporarily increase the membership until a pre-appointed
review period, perhaps ten or fifteen years down the road, at
which time more permanent changes in the size and composition
of the Council would be decided. The G-4 were divided in
their response to the facilitators, reports, with both India
and Germany commenting on the type and size of an acceptable
interim solution, while Japan and Brazil reiterated their
previous positions and criticized the reports for excluding
the full range of UNSC reform options, including the
immediate addition of new permanent members. Opponents of
the G-4, including the Uniting for Consensus Group (which
includes Pakistan, Algeria, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico,
Kenya, South Korea, Italy, and Spain),wholeheartedly
endorsed the facilitators, report, claiming that it
represented the only viable way forward, and were largely in
favor of moving quickly to intergovernmental negotiations.
The decision on how to proceed with negotiations now rests
with UNGA President Khalifa, who has expressed her desire for
the preparation of concrete proposals during the 61st session
for negotiation during the 62nd session. End Summary


The Facilitators, Report: Adding the Possibility of an
Interim Expansion
--------------


2. (U) On July 19, General Assembly (GA) President Khalifa
convened a meeting of the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) on
the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in
the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters
Related to the Security Council. The meeting was designed to
provide an opportunity for UN members to respond to
Khalifa,s facilitators, reports released in April and June
on UNSC expansion and to establish an UNGA process for
dealing with UNSC reform for the rest of the 61st session.
The sharp, negative exchanges that emerged during the May 3-4
UNGA debate on UNSC expansion were even more pointed during
the debate on July 19, as member states appeared increasingly
anxious now that specific options for negotiation are being
discussed. Intergovernmental negotiations on concrete
proposals are unlikely to occur prior to the 62nd session,
however, as all of the main groups would like to see the main
points of their original proposals retained in any negotiated
text.


3. (U) Per reftel, the U.S. representative reaffirmed U.S.
support for a reform of the UN as a whole to enable it to
address more effectively the new challenges facing us in the
21st century. The U.S. expressed support for a "modest" UNSC
expansion and for Japan,s permanent membership and advised
that the U.S. remained "open to considering proposals that
include a modest increase in membership as well as
interim, options, as suggested in the facilitators,
report."


4. (U) The facilitators, reports of 19 April and 26 June
outlined four different expansion options:

-- Option 1: Extended-term, non-permanent seats that could be
allocated for the full duration of the intermediary
arrangement, up to the review conference, to be held at a
date in the future.

-- Option 2: Extended-term, non-permanent seats for a longer
period than the existing non-permanent seats with the
possibility of re-election

-- Option 3: Extended-term, non-permanent seats for a longer
period than the existing non-permanent seats without the
possibility of re-election

-- Option 4: Regular two-year term, non-permanent seats with

the possibility of immediate re-election.


5. (U) The reports fail to identify the following key
variables in any interim phase, opting instead to leave these
decisions to later intergovernmental negotiations:

-- The number of new non-permanent seats

-- The basis for selection, e.g. allocation by regions,
election at-large, or allocation to developed/developing
countries

-- The timing and format of the review of the interim phase


6. (U) The facilitators, approach calls for the "widest
possible political acceptance" of any proposed expansion
model, beyond the UN Charter requirement of a two-thirds
majority. The facilitators, report is available at
www.un.org/ga/president/61/letters/SCR-Report -26June07.pdf


7. (U) UN Member States generally opposed the interim
options 2 and 3 for creating a third tier of membership,
which might increase Council divisions and further downgrade
the status of the regular two-year non-permanent seats.
Option 4 was not included in the 26 June report, but the
facilitators reassured its supporters that the option was
still on the table, as the two reports should be considered
jointly. The reports add that any of these options can be
combined with enlargement of regular, non-permanent, two-year
seats.


G-4 Split, Africa Goes It Alone
--------------


8. (U) The G-4 (India, Brazil, Japan, and Germany) are split
on their views on an interim phase. India and Germany, while
reiterating the G-4 proposal of expansion in both the
permanent and non-permanent categories, expressed willingness
to accept the extended seats, as described in Option 1, as an
alternative to permanent seats. Japan and Brazil, on the
other hand, stood firm on the need for new permanent seats,
expressing disappointment that this option was not included
in the facilitators, reports. With regard to the way
forward, Japan and Brazil recommended that "interested
groups" submit concrete proposals for negotiation, while
Germany assigned that task to President Khalifa.


9. (SBU) India and Germany appear to support the
facilitators, approach for two reasons. First, they believe
that delegations that had co-sponsored the G-4 resolution in
2005 have lost their enthusiasm for the expansion debate.
The Germans blame this diminishing support on the lack of
cohesion among the G-4 (which they primarily attribute to
Japanese courtship of U.S. support). Others attribute it to
a general sense of fatigue after more than a decade of
debates on this topic. Second, unlike the Japanese and
Brazilians, the Indians and the Germans appear unwilling to
re-introduce the G-4 proposal as a basis for forthcoming
negotiations, understanding that it will receive a lukewarm
reception and/or be seen as disrupting President Khalifa,s
new process. Therefore, the only viable option for obtaining
a Council seat with any semblance of permanency, while not
appearing to disrupt the current process, would be to support
Interim Option 1.


10. (SBU) Diminished prospects for African support have also
added to G-4 disunity. During the May 3-4 debate, the G-4
sought African support for their proposal as the key to
achieving the two-thirds majority in the UNGA required for
passage. They had hoped that the facilitators, report,
which eliminated as unrealistic the African position of
eleven new UNSC members, including six new permanent members
(two from Africa) with a veto, would break the African
consensus position and allow at least some Africans to choose
the G-4 model. However, African Union let stand its previous
position in support of the twenty-six member UNSC at its July
Summit. Ugandan PR Butagira, speaking on behalf of the
African Group, merely reaffirmed the long-held African
position and complained that at this "important stage Africa
is expected to make concessions while other groups maintain
their positions." Egypt, Mauritius, and South Africa all
spoke in support of the African position, though South Africa
also held that the African position and an intermediary phase


were not mutually exclusive. Panama, Italy, and Pakistan
also voiced their support for the African cause, perhaps out
of the (misplaced) fear that the G-4 might lure some of the
Africans to its side.

UFC Cheering on the Facilitators
--------------


11. (U) The Uniting for Consensus (UFC) group of G-4
opponents (led by Pakistan, Italy, and South Korea) expressed
support for Option 4, which would create non-permanent
two-year seats with the possibility of re-election. The UFC
countries were clearly pleased both by Khalifa,s decision to
continue consultations on the basis of the April report and
by the contents of the June report, which reiterated that the
creation of new permanent seats was not a viable option.
However, they continued to worry that the G-4 would
capitalize on the new momentum without accepting the lack of
support for new permanent seats. Pakistani Acting PR Farukh
Amil underlined this sentiment, stating that "there should be
an assurance...that no unilateral moves...such as tabling of
draft resolutions, will be resorted to by any one while the
negotiating process is underway."


12. (U) With regard to the next step, the majority of UFC
countries (Pakistan, Spain, Indonesia, Romania, Costa Rica)
suggested that the facilitators, reports of 19 April and 26
June should act as the basis for intergovernmental
negotiations. However, the facilitators themselves responded
that their reports were not intended for that purpose and
that any text should come from the member states. In
addition, Italy and South Korea were the only countries to
explicitly reject the call for intergovernmental
negotiations. Perhaps noting the popularity of the
facilitators, Option 1 and fearing that the extended seats
might eventually become permanent seats, both countries
stressed that member states were not ready for compromise and
more clarity was needed on the framework for negotiations.

P-5 Positions
--------------


13. (U) China and Russia expressed concern that the
established groups were seeking to capitalize on the
facilitators, reports and advance their own Council
expansion proposals. Both the Chinese and the Russian
statements stressed that, although none of the old models for
expansion had garnered the required support, the wide
disparity of views among the membership and the large number
of concrete issues still unresolved precluded the launch of
negotiations based on an interim phase. Russia then
underlined that any expansion could not exceed a "reasonable"
level, defining "reasonable" as around five additional
members, and China voiced its support for enhanced
representation of African countries.


14. (U) France and the UK were much more willing to move
forward with negotiations and stressed the need for concrete
developments in the 62nd session. France, a G-4 co-sponsor
in 2005, had noted during the May debate that none of the
previous resolutions had garnered the necessary support. The
French reiterated this position during July,s debate,
underlining that the interim approach has the advantage of
broad support. The UK now appears to be the G-4,s biggest
supporter, as they confirmed their continued support for the
G-4, as well as for a permanent seat for Africa.


15. (SBU) Privately, UKUN officers have been more skeptical
about the benefits of expansion than their national
statements. They remain concerned about any discussion that
calls attention to the "special status" of permanent members.



KHALILZAD