UNSC EXPANSION: DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000635 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL UNSC KUNR SUBJECT: UNSC EXPANSION: DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY REF: STATE 100029 ¶1. (SBU) Summary. On July 19, the UNGA,s Open-Ended Working Group on UNSC Expansion discussed the two recent reports on the issue prepared by facilitators appointed by UNGA President Khalifa. Although the debate on Security Council reform and expansion gained some momentum in the wake of these reports of April 19 and June 26, serious divergences among UN members over the nature, scope, and size of any UNSC expansion persist. The new element in the UNGA debate is the possibility of an "interim" phase to Council expansion, as suggested in the facilitators, reports. This phase would temporarily increase the membership until a pre-appointed review period, perhaps ten or fifteen years down the road, at which time more permanent changes in the size and composition of the Council would be decided. The G-4 were divided in their response to the facilitators, reports, with both India and Germany commenting on the type and size of an acceptable interim solution, while Japan and Brazil reiterated their previous positions and criticized the reports for excluding the full range of UNSC reform options, including the immediate addition of new permanent members. Opponents of the G-4, including the Uniting for Consensus Group (which includes Pakistan, Algeria, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Kenya, South Korea, Italy, and Spain),wholeheartedly endorsed the facilitators, report, claiming that it represented the only viable way forward, and were largely in favor of moving quickly to intergovernmental negotiations. The decision on how to proceed with negotiations now rests with UNGA President Khalifa, who has expressed her desire for the preparation of concrete proposals during the 61st session for negotiation during the 62nd session. End Summary The Facilitators, Report: Adding the Possibility of an Interim Expansion -------------- ¶2. (U) On July 19, General Assembly (GA) President Khalifa convened a meeting of the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council. The meeting was designed to provide an opportunity for UN members to respond to Khalifa,s facilitators, reports released in April and June on UNSC expansion and to establish an UNGA process for dealing with UNSC reform for the rest of the 61st session. The sharp, negative exchanges that emerged during the May 3-4 UNGA debate on UNSC expansion were even more pointed during the debate on July 19, as member states appeared increasingly anxious now that specific options for negotiation are being discussed. Intergovernmental negotiations on concrete proposals are unlikely to occur prior to the 62nd session, however, as all of the main groups would like to see the main points of their original proposals retained in any negotiated text. ¶3. (U) Per reftel, the U.S. representative reaffirmed U.S. support for a reform of the UN as a whole to enable it to address more effectively the new challenges facing us in the 21st century. The U.S. expressed support for a "modest" UNSC expansion and for Japan,s permanent membership and advised that the U.S. remained "open to considering proposals that include a modest increase in membership as well as interim, options, as suggested in the facilitators, report." ¶4. (U) The facilitators, reports of 19 April and 26 June outlined four different expansion options: -- Option 1: Extended-term, non-permanent seats that could be allocated for the full duration of the intermediary arrangement, up to the review conference, to be held at a date in the future. -- Option 2: Extended-term, non-permanent seats for a longer period than the existing non-permanent seats with the possibility of re-election -- Option 3: Extended-term, non-permanent seats for a longer period than the existing non-permanent seats without the possibility of re-election -- Option 4: Regular two-year term, non-permanent seats with the possibility of immediate re-election. ¶5. (U) The reports fail to identify the following key variables in any interim phase, opting instead to leave these decisions to later intergovernmental negotiations: -- The number of new non-permanent seats -- The basis for selection, e.g. allocation by regions, election at-large, or allocation to developed/developing countries -- The timing and format of the review of the interim phase ¶6. (U) The facilitators, approach calls for the "widest possible political acceptance" of any proposed expansion model, beyond the UN Charter requirement of a two-thirds majority. The facilitators, report is available at www.un.org/ga/president/61/letters/SCR-Report -26June07.pdf ¶7. (U) UN Member States generally opposed the interim options 2 and 3 for creating a third tier of membership, which might increase Council divisions and further downgrade the status of the regular two-year non-permanent seats. Option 4 was not included in the 26 June report, but the facilitators reassured its supporters that the option was still on the table, as the two reports should be considered jointly. The reports add that any of these options can be combined with enlargement of regular, non-permanent, two-year seats. G-4 Split, Africa Goes It Alone -------------- ¶8. (U) The G-4 (India, Brazil, Japan, and Germany) are split on their views on an interim phase. India and Germany, while reiterating the G-4 proposal of expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories, expressed willingness to accept the extended seats, as described in Option 1, as an alternative to permanent seats. Japan and Brazil, on the other hand, stood firm on the need for new permanent seats, expressing disappointment that this option was not included in the facilitators, reports. With regard to the way forward, Japan and Brazil recommended that "interested groups" submit concrete proposals for negotiation, while Germany assigned that task to President Khalifa. ¶9. (SBU) India and Germany appear to support the facilitators, approach for two reasons. First, they believe that delegations that had co-sponsored the G-4 resolution in 2005 have lost their enthusiasm for the expansion debate. The Germans blame this diminishing support on the lack of cohesion among the G-4 (which they primarily attribute to Japanese courtship of U.S. support). Others attribute it to a general sense of fatigue after more than a decade of debates on this topic. Second, unlike the Japanese and Brazilians, the Indians and the Germans appear unwilling to re-introduce the G-4 proposal as a basis for forthcoming negotiations, understanding that it will receive a lukewarm reception and/or be seen as disrupting President Khalifa,s new process. Therefore, the only viable option for obtaining a Council seat with any semblance of permanency, while not appearing to disrupt the current process, would be to support Interim Option 1. ¶10. (SBU) Diminished prospects for African support have also added to G-4 disunity. During the May 3-4 debate, the G-4 sought African support for their proposal as the key to achieving the two-thirds majority in the UNGA required for passage. They had hoped that the facilitators, report, which eliminated as unrealistic the African position of eleven new UNSC members, including six new permanent members (two from Africa) with a veto, would break the African consensus position and allow at least some Africans to choose the G-4 model. However, African Union let stand its previous position in support of the twenty-six member UNSC at its July Summit. Ugandan PR Butagira, speaking on behalf of the African Group, merely reaffirmed the long-held African position and complained that at this "important stage Africa is expected to make concessions while other groups maintain their positions." Egypt, Mauritius, and South Africa all spoke in support of the African position, though South Africa also held that the African position and an intermediary phase were not mutually exclusive. Panama, Italy, and Pakistan also voiced their support for the African cause, perhaps out of the (misplaced) fear that the G-4 might lure some of the Africans to its side. UFC Cheering on the Facilitators -------------- ¶11. (U) The Uniting for Consensus (UFC) group of G-4 opponents (led by Pakistan, Italy, and South Korea) expressed support for Option 4, which would create non-permanent two-year seats with the possibility of re-election. The UFC countries were clearly pleased both by Khalifa,s decision to continue consultations on the basis of the April report and by the contents of the June report, which reiterated that the creation of new permanent seats was not a viable option. However, they continued to worry that the G-4 would capitalize on the new momentum without accepting the lack of support for new permanent seats. Pakistani Acting PR Farukh Amil underlined this sentiment, stating that "there should be an assurance...that no unilateral moves...such as tabling of draft resolutions, will be resorted to by any one while the negotiating process is underway." ¶12. (U) With regard to the next step, the majority of UFC countries (Pakistan, Spain, Indonesia, Romania, Costa Rica) suggested that the facilitators, reports of 19 April and 26 June should act as the basis for intergovernmental negotiations. However, the facilitators themselves responded that their reports were not intended for that purpose and that any text should come from the member states. In addition, Italy and South Korea were the only countries to explicitly reject the call for intergovernmental negotiations. Perhaps noting the popularity of the facilitators, Option 1 and fearing that the extended seats might eventually become permanent seats, both countries stressed that member states were not ready for compromise and more clarity was needed on the framework for negotiations. P-5 Positions -------------- ¶13. (U) China and Russia expressed concern that the established groups were seeking to capitalize on the facilitators, reports and advance their own Council expansion proposals. Both the Chinese and the Russian statements stressed that, although none of the old models for expansion had garnered the required support, the wide disparity of views among the membership and the large number of concrete issues still unresolved precluded the launch of negotiations based on an interim phase. Russia then underlined that any expansion could not exceed a "reasonable" level, defining "reasonable" as around five additional members, and China voiced its support for enhanced representation of African countries. ¶14. (U) France and the UK were much more willing to move forward with negotiations and stressed the need for concrete developments in the 62nd session. France, a G-4 co-sponsor in 2005, had noted during the May debate that none of the previous resolutions had garnered the necessary support. The French reiterated this position during July,s debate, underlining that the interim approach has the advantage of broad support. The UK now appears to be the G-4,s biggest supporter, as they confirmed their continued support for the G-4, as well as for a permanent seat for Africa. ¶15. (SBU) Privately, UKUN officers have been more skeptical about the benefits of expansion than their national statements. They remain concerned about any discussion that calls attention to the "special status" of permanent members. KHALILZAD