DPKO URGES PRESSURE ON BASHIR, KONARE TO ASSURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000063

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: MARR PREL SU KPKO
SUBJECT: DPKO URGES PRESSURE ON BASHIR, KONARE TO ASSURE
ASSISTANCE TO AMIS

REF: A. SECSTATE 08615


B. 01/25/2007 BRUNO-DEPARTMENT EMAIL

C. 01/25/2007 MURRAY-DEPARTMENT EMAIL

Classified By: Ambassador Jackie W. Sanders for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. USUN Ambassador Sanders delivered ref A
points to United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO) Assistant Secretary-General (A/SYG) Hedi
Annabi on January 25, stressing our interest in helping DPKO
to identify and deploy as early as possible any and all
elements of the heavy support package (HSP) to assist the
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Annabi confirmed that
letters from the SYG and African Union (AU) Commission Chair
Konare endorsing the HSP were transmitted to Sudanese
President Bashir January 25 (ref B). Annabi urged
international pressure on Bashir to respond positively to the
HSP. Lamenting the AU's (in particular Konare's)
obstructionist stance during HSP negotiations, Annabi said
that HSP deployment would realistically take months, not
weeks, despite its being an "absolute priority" for the UN.
He recommended intense international community engagement
with Konare as a concrete way of expediting the deployment
process. Regarding hybrid force negotiations, several issues
remain outstanding, and DPKO was not optimistic that the
draft framework would be adopted at the AU Summit on January
29-30. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) USUN Ambassador Sanders delivered ref A points to UN
DPKO A/SYG Annabi on January 25; Under-SYG Guehenno was in
Addis Ababa with the SYG for the AU Summit. Ambassador
Sanders congratulated Annabi for agreeing on the HSP
provisions with the AU, something Annabi acknowledged had
required three re-openings of the document since December 4
on account of in-fighting between Konare and AU Peace and
Security Council (PSC) Ambassador Said Djinnit and between
Djinnit and his staff. Annabi confirmed that the HSP had
been transmitted January 25 to President Bashir via twin
letters from the SYG and Konare, and Annabi asserted that
Bashir's reaction would constitute the first "reality check"
of the tripartite mechanism for HSP implementation. Annabi
was concerned by Bashir's recent backtracking in a phone call
to the SYG, in which he insisted on maintaining an
exclusively African character to any international presence
in Darfur, a position Annabi said Konare shared. Annabi
hoped that the January 29 meeting between the SYG and Bashir
would clarify this issue.


3. (C) Annabi described the "conditionality" which the AU saw
as inherent in deployment of the HSP, in particular the
addition of two new battalions, which presents a logistical
challenge for AMIS and its partners as far as construction of
accommodations and provision of water. Annabi asserted that
conclusion of the outstanding 607 Agreement could help in
this regard. DPKO also pointed out the need to restructure
from eight to three sectors. Given these constraints, Annabi
averred it would be "nothing short of a miracle" if the HSP
were to fully deploy within four to six months, despite this
deployment's being an "absolute priority" for the UN.
Ambassador Sanders responded that it was important to get the
deployment started quickly, which would have the additional
benefit of proving Bashir's acceptance of the force. Annabi
went on to say that lack of viable troop contributors
presented another obstacle, and he was receptive to
Ambassador Sanders' assurances of U.S. assistance in
identifying and encouraging troop contributors to commit to
the operation.


4. (C) Regarding the draft hybrid force proposals (ref C),
Annabi said that the UN team negotiating the HSP had traveled
from Khartoum to Addis Ababa to negotiate with the AU the
terms of the hybrid operation, which Annabi hoped could be
finalized by January 26. Annabi reported that the AU had
agreed to forgo another Joint Assessment Mission (JAM),which
it had originally insisted upon after disputing the UN's
force size projections in its June 2006 JAM Report. Still,
the final draft of the hybrid framework had to be submitted
to the AU PSC before it could be adopted, and DPKO was not
optimistic that this adoption would occur at the AU Summit.
Annabi identified outstanding issues in these negotiations as
disagreement over how to appoint force commanders and deputy
force commanders (Konare refused to accept a UN-proposed
"mirror situation" by which the AU could propose a candidate
for force commander if the UN could propose its own for
deputy force commander); specifics of the force generation
process (given Konare's insistence that troops be African at
all costs); and creation of a strong planning capacity.


5. (C) Annabi was clear that Djinnit, after numerous phone
conversations, proved to be flexible on these points and
willing to negotiate. The problem, according to Annabi, was

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Konare's intransigence, and he recommended strong pressure be
exerted on Konare to more openly entertain the UN's
proposals. Ambassador Sanders noted that Assistant Secretary
Frazer would be present in Addis Ababa for the Summit, and
Annabi expressed hope that she would have an opportunity to
weigh in with Konare then.


6. (C) DPKO confirmed that it was receptive to proposals for
reallocation of existing peacekeeping resources in planning
for the hybrid operation, as well as for eventual operations
in Somalia and Chad/Central African Republic, mentioning the
possibility of using air assets from the DRC as an example.
Annabi warned that any such shift would require concurrence
of troop contributors and would assume that existing
operations were downsizing, noting that this was not always
the case. Finally, he cautioned that such a reallocation
carried no guarantees of logistics capabilities from one
operation to the next.


7. (C) COMMENT. Annabi did not reject the idea of deploying
an advance component of the HSP, but he clearly needs TCC
commitments before the idea can be seriously explored. DPKO
is frustrated by its dealings with the AU on provisions of
the HSP and the hybrid operation. Engagement by A/S Frazer
with Konare at the AU Summit could be critical in reversing
this trend and thereby expediting the deployment process, as
could similar such engagement by our Embassy to the AU. END
COMMENT.
WOLFF