DARFUR RESOLUTION: DPKO COOL TO PROPOSED TIMELINE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000623 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SUBJECT: DARFUR RESOLUTION: DPKO COOL TO PROPOSED TIMELINE LANGUAGE Classified By: Ambassador Jackie W. Sanders for Reasons 1.4 B/D. SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED; PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. USUN presented Department's proposed edits to the Darfur hybrid draft resolution to UN Peacekeeping Undersecretary Guehenno and asked that he consider carefully our proposed phasing-in of UN ownership of the hybrid as a reasonable reflection of the realities of the AMIS-UNAMID transition. Guehenno agreed to study the language but made clear he considers January 1, 2008 an extremely ambitious target date for an AMIS-UNAMID transfer of authority (TOA) and was not disposed to making the transfer earlier as the USG advocates. Assistant Secretary-General Jane Holl Lute said the USG-proposed language would create an impression that the UN is in charge at a time when the UN could not be in charge as a matter of fact. Ambassador Sanders replied that "an initial operational capability" is a minimal standard and that UNAMID declaring it had gotten off the ground would send a strong message that things were changing. Guehenno said the UN is fearful of a TOA that does not bring an immediate and substantial difference on the ground because, he said, the backlash against an ineffective TOA would be terrible. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) Ambassador Sanders presented Department's proposed edits (OP2bis, OP3, OP3bis, OP3ter) to the hybrid draft resolution to UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Undersecretary Jean-Marie Guehenno on July 27. Guehenno was joined by DPKO assistant secretary-generals Jane Holl Lute and Hedi Annabi, senior political officer Mike Gaouette, and senior Darfur military advisor Filip Vander Linden. USUN was also represented by DepPolCouns and MSC Lt Col Sadowski. ¶3. (C) Setting a frank tone at the outset of the meeting, U/SYG Guehenno pre-empted USUN's presentation of the proposed edits by referring to a July 25 Reuters article entitled "U.S. Wants Earlier Transfer of Force in Darfur." Reading from the article quoting a U.S. official as saying "(e)ssentially they (the UN) are saying these African forces are not good enough and that is a huge problem. It is just not correct. I don't know where that prejudice is coming from. These are UN-qualified troops." ¶4. (C) Guehenno said, "I don't like that quote to be blunt. The United States Government is saying the UN is a racist organization that looks down on Africans. You (the USG) are insisting that total command and control be in the UN because you distrust the AU, and we share that concern. These are not UN-qualified troops. If we had vetted them as you want, they would have been disqualified. They are trying to do their best, but our view that they are not qualified is not some bizarre UN view -- it is the consensus view. This (the article) is unfortunate and it is not going to help us with troop contributing countries." ¶5. (SBU) Coming back to the purpose of the meeting, Ambassador Sanders said it is obvious that the eventual AMIS-UNAMID transition would not be achieved at a single "ribbon-cutting" because the innumerable aspects of contracts, personnel, administration, and financial oversight will take serious time to be fully transferred. She argued that our language reflects this reality by acknowledging that a period of time is required for the transition with an October 1 "initial operational capability" giving way to full "operational effectiveness" over three months. ¶6. (SBU) Guehenno replied that DPKO has two objectives in Darfur for the rest of the year -- to keep the AU mission from collapsing and to set up a transfer of authority that would allow people on the ground to see a significant difference and to then build on it. He said DPKO is "going beyond what has ever been done by the UN" to assist the AU. He especially touted plans to access pre-hybrid mandate funds to pay troop contributors, saying that the assurance of cash for the last three months of the year (to be paid retroactively in December) "will matter to these countries and these troops." This imaginative funding, he said, would allow deployment of the two additional HSP battalions needed to reorganize from eight to three sectors. ¶7. (SBU) Regarding the AMIS-UNAMID transition, Guehenno said "it is essential there be seen to be a difference because, if UNAMID just sort of dribbles in, the backlash will be terrible. Hybrid must make an immediate and sustained difference and I think it enormously ambitious to expect to make that kind of difference by January 1." ¶8. (SBU) Lute added detail to Guehenno's plea for time, saying "I don't have enough land; I can't get equipment out USUN NEW Y 00000623 002 OF 002 of airports; I have no nightfly authorization; I don't have drilling rights. We are going down a sole-source contract route with PA&E, despite six months of protest against all the waivers of procurement rules, to speed up preparations but we won't see results in the short term." Pressed as to whether an October 1 AMIS-UNAMID transition would help DPKO prime the budget and procurement pipelines, Lute insisted that the transfer of authority would have no bearing on these pragmatics. She said all these practical tasks involve "real people doing real things on the ground and we are working all out on all fronts to put those people in place." ¶9. (SBU) Further to DPKO's offer to carefully consider the proposed edits notwithstanding these initial reactions, USUN military staff committee officers and UKUN and French counterparts will meet with DPKO military planners on July 30. KHALILZAD