STILL NO CLEAR UN PLAN FOR CHAD/CAR PEACEKEEPING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000596 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CD PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU UNSC KPKO SUBJECT: STILL NO CLEAR UN PLAN FOR CHAD/CAR PEACEKEEPING USUN NEW Y 00000596 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. At July 13 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) consultations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Under-Secretary-General Guehenno revealed a revised proposal for deployment of UN civilian police and Chadian gendarmes in eastern Chad/northeastern CAR, based around a French/European Union military deployment. Details remained sketchy, particularly with regard to force numbers, and UN DPKO Military Chief COL Ian Sinclair told USUN privately that details of the operation were preliminary only and that the French/EU were awaiting authorization from the GAERC on July 23 simply to proceed with planning. French Permanent Representative (PR) de La Sabliere expressed hope that the Council would authorize the police component but noted that the plan still necessitated EU and Chadian buy-in, particularly on an exit strategy or transition to a more conventional security presence. END SUMMARY. DPKO: CHAD/CAR DEPLOYMENT IS A "MOVING TARGET WITH CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES" ¶2. (SBU) At July 13 UNSC consultations, DPKO Under-Secretary-General (U/SYG) Guehenno revealed a revised proposal for deployment of UN civilian police in eastern Chad/northeastern CAR, based around a French/European Union military deployment, motivated by what Guehenno called six weeks of targeted violence resulting in a serious deterioration in humanitarian efforts. Guehenno reported a June 10 agreement between French FM Kouchner and Chadian President Deby that resulted in Deby's acceptance of the need for a military force to provide wide-area security through French/EU military deployment and in the recognition at the June 25 Darfur Ministerial in Paris of this acceptance. ¶3. (SBU) U/SYG Guehenno described the UN's revised proposal in line with the French/Chadian agreement, which was based on a 12-month EU military deployment of battalion size, after which a possible UN successor operation would be put in place. An assessment would be conducted after six months, and Guehenno considered it important to evaluate "benchmarks and milestones," especially given events in Darfur, which he considered would have a material impact on regional security. ¶4. (SBU) Acknowledging that the revised UN deployment plan was a "moving target with changing circumstances," U/SYG Guehenno described its principal objectives as deployment of: 1) a multidimensional presence that would include UN police and liaison officers; 2) Chadian gendarmes and police screened, selected and trained by the UN to maintain law and order around refugee camps, IDP locations and sites of humanitarian activities; and 3) an EU force, with "significant" French participation, to protect civilians at risk and to facilitate provision of humanitarian assistance. Guehenno elaborated that the military component would seek to reduce tensions, defuse conflict and provide security coverage for the UN personnel deployed. Cross-border activities, Guehenno stressed, would not be a focus of the force's activities. U/SYG Guehenno explained that EU infantry battalions would conduct land and air patrols to expand the zone for humanitarian operations and recommended that they be mandated to use all necessary means to accomplish this goal. Guehenno said that advance medical, engineering and logistics units would be necessary for deployment of the military force. ¶5. (SBU) On the police side, the goal would be for a contingent of 300 UN police officers to enhance capabilities of approximately 850 Chadian police and gendarmes, to provide effective police services and to assist the GOC in establishing law enforcement activities. Guehenno said an MOU would be signed between the UN and Chadian forces to delineate responsibilities, which on the UN side would include upgrading facilities, providing basic accommodations and equipment and paying a stipend based on local scales. Guehenno emphasized the importance of pre-deployment training for the UN police officers selected. Guehenno said he would brief the EU in Brussels on July 17 and would present "concrete proposals" to the Council in the following weeks. FRANCE ADMITS NOT DONE DEAL ¶6. (SBU) French PR de La Sabliere said President Deby USUN NEW Y 00000596 002.2 OF 002 understood the need for a military presence around the refugee camps but was still reluctant to cede this responsibility to the UN. He stated that Chadian and EU agreement on the plan was still outstanding and looked to U/SYG Guehenno's visit to Brussels as a good lobbying opportunity. De La Sabliere expressed hope that the Council would authorize the police mission and recommended that the future resolution address the issue of a successor presence "since Deby is changing his mind so much." De La Sabliere acknowledged that Libya was an obstacle to an international force on the eastern Chad border and urged the Council to be "innovative" in its thinking if the EU and/or the GOC failed to agree the proposed plan. ¶7. (SBU) USUN Acting PolCouns pressed U/SYG Guehenno for military analysis of the plan, and Guehenno responded that French, EU and DPKO military planners were discussing the proposals, with differences emerging in force numbers due to details of respective troop-to-task breakdowns (NOTE: DPKO COL Ian Sinclair told USUN privately after consultations that planning and discussions were only preliminary and that the UN and France were awaiting a signal from the July 23 GAERC to authorize them to continue planning. END NOTE). ¶8. (SBU) Acting PolCouns inquired about funding for the proposed plan, especially given that the UN refused overall command and control of the operation (a detail Guehenno omitted from his council presentation but shared privately in advance of the meeting with Poloff). Guehenno considered that using Chadian gendarmes was a way to alleviate the financial burden the expansion of UN peacekeeping operations was placing on Members. He said that gendarmes were cheaper to deploy than international police ($1000s of monthly Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA) for UN personnel versus $100s of monthly MSA for non-UN personnel) and reported that this funding was envisioned through assessed contributions. On the issue of command and control, Guehenno advised a unified military approach, especially given the planned deployment around Birao in northeastern CAR. KHALILZAD