SECURITY COUNCIL PUTS KOSOVO RESOLUTION ON HOLD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000595 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2017 TAGS: PREL UNSC YI SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL PUTS KOSOVO RESOLUTION ON HOLD Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Kirk McBride for Reasons 1.4 b/d. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Following an hour of closed Security Council consultations during which Russia made clear an intent to veto the latest draft resolution on Kosovo if it were brought to a vote, sponsors of the resolution announced to the press that they would "put on hold discussions of a new resolution." END SUMMARY. Russia Removes All Doubt About Veto -------------- ¶2. (SBU) France, U.S., and Belgium walked Security Council members one last time through the outstanding draft resolution on Kosovo during July 20 Consultations. French PermRep de la Sabliere explained in particular that the language of OP3 (on the details of the proposed 120-days of further negotiations) of the final draft reflected efforts by the sponsors to address South Africa's recent request for clarification. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad summarized recent major developments on Kosovo -- including the Council's trip to the region, the EU's welcome willingness to shoulder more responsibility, and Special Envoy Ahtisaari's development of a plan when the parties could not agree on one. The ambassador also summarized the efforts of the sponsors to "meet all of Russia's red lines" by successively producing draft texts that deleted "automatic Ahtisaari" and the sunsetting of UNSCR 1244, called for more negotiations, and called for enhanced EU responsibilities and continued NATO engagement. He said the sponsors had gone as far they can go and that "today is the moment for Russia to clarify where we go." He ended the U.S. intervention by asking Russian PernRep Churkin directly: "Is this draft acceptable or not?" ¶4. (C) Belgian PermRep VerBeke picked up this overview, explaining that the sponsors had reacted to members' concerns by producing five different draft resolutions reflecting three fundamentally different concepts: "endorsement (of Ahtisaari),sunrise/default (of Ahtisaari),and the current version comprising a simple invitation to the parties to keep talking with no prejudgment of the result. He closed by pointing out that the current draft would also achieve what Belgium considers a very important result -- "it keeps Kosovo in the Security Council and ensures that the final status process remains a managed process." ¶5. (C) Russian PermRep Churkin spoke for ten minutes (in Russian but without reading instructions). He said Russia has been involved in lots of discussions on Kosovo in many formats and "no-one can say we have just said no." He said sponsors had not substantively changed the text at any stage in reaction to Russian concerns but rather had paid "just cosmetic attention." ¶6. (C) Turning to the text, Churkin was disdainful. "Look at the text. It does not say parties will sit down across a table. The negotiations would also be undermined from the start by the fact that the Kosovars would have no motive because Ahtisaari goes into effect at 120 days. Some provisions go even beyond Ahtisaari regarding the administration of Kosovo and Kosovo eventually joining NATO. Our position is that 1244 stays in effect during the negotiations. The sponsors are setting up to declare that 1244 is no more after 120 days." ¶7. (C) Churkin's intervention reached a dramatic highpoint when he said, "Ambassador Khalilzad asks can Russia vote in favor -- no; can Russia abstain -- no; we will not allow this resolution to pass." 8.(C) Churkin suggested a way forward as follows: "we need a break filled with intensive diplomatic work on the problem of Pristina-Belgrade talks. Our concept of this kind of dialogue is well-known -- no timeline, take both parties into account. We need an envoy with the trust of both sides. 1244 provides the basis for all this. We can get started at the experts level on July 25 in Vienna." ¶9. (C) De la Sabliere and UK PermRep Jones-Parry replied that Churkin had at least been clear at long last and expressed sadness that the Council was proving incapable of dealing with Kosovo's final status. ¶10. (U) At a press conference following the Consultations, the sponsors (U.S., UK, France, Belgium, Italy, Germany) appeared together with de la Sabliere reading a joint statement as follows. USUN NEW Y 00000595 002 OF 002 (Begin Text) UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari presented his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement to the UN Secretary General on March 26. We believe that the Special Envoy's recommendations, which UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon fully endorsed, are fair and balanced and provide the best solution that will advance stability not only in Kosovo but in the region as a whole. Since that date we have worked intensively to achieve a resolution that would allow for this proposal to be taken forward. We have received broad support in the Council for these efforts. The Council itself took a trip to the region to become better acquainted with the situation. In order to secure full support the co-sponsors have circulated several drafts and spared no effort to accommodate the concerns and incorporate the proposals of other Council members. We regret, however, that it has been impossible to secure such a resolution in the UNSC. We will therefore put on hold discussions on the resolution. Our latest draft resolution calls for a period of time-limited discussions. We have decided to renew discussions within the Contact Group and with the parties along these lines. We reiterate our support for the Special Envoy's Proposal and believe that it should be the base for any further discussions. EU foreign ministers will also discuss Kosovo at their meeting on July 23. When Secretary-General Annan launched the Kosovo status process in 2005, it was widely recognized that the status quo in Kosovo was unsustainable. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recently reminded us that "any further delay or prolongation of this issue is not desirable, not only for Balkan states, but also for all European countries" and has reported that "while Kosovo's overall progress is encouraging, if Kosovo's future status remains undefined, there is a real risk that the progress achieved by the United Nations and the Provisional Institutions in Kosovo can begin to unravel". The people of Kosovo should be given the opportunity to realize their political and economic development. We are determined to assist them in that aim in the period ahead. A timely resolving of Kosovo's status will also enable Serbia to move beyond the conflicts of the 1990s and towards a brighter European and Euro-Atlantic future. Therefore, we believe that resolving Kosovo's status must be achieved as soon as possible. We hope that these discussions will lead to agreement between the parties. If not, we continue to believe that the Ahtisaari Plan is the best way forward. (End Text) KHALILZAD