SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000058 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: UNGA AORC KUNR PREL SUBJECT: SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. OF POSSIBLE NEW FUNDING APPROACHES REF: USUN 52 ¶1. 1. This is an action request. Please see paragraphs 2 and 13. ¶2. As reported reftel, the General Assembly (GA) agreed on December 22, 2006 to additional funding for 27 special political missions (SPMs),including the UN missions in Iraq and Afghanistan (A/RES/61/252 Section VII). However, during the Fifth Committee's consideration of the draft resolution, the Syrian delegate raised objections to the expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement associated with implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1559 (withdrawal of foreign forces from southern Lebanon). He also conveyed Syria's dislike of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Terje Roed-Larsen of Norway) in charge of the mission. The Syrian delegate proposed a change in the financing scheme of special political missions, suggesting that SPMs be funded on the peacekeeping scale vs. the regular budget scale. Both issues touch on the sensitive relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as the role of the P-5 at the United Nations. While a lack of time eventually cut off this conversation, USUN believes these issues are not behind us and that they will be raised again during the Fifth Committee's next discussion on SPM financing, scheduled for the March resumed session, when the Committee will consider financing for two new SPMs in Nepal and Burundi. This cable provides background, analysis, and thoughts on these issues. USUN requests guidance on how to approach these issues in upcoming discussions. FINANCING OF SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS -------------- ¶3. Over the last several biennia (the UN regular budget is a two-year budget),the funding requirements for special political missions, as well as the nature of these missions, have changed significantly. The initial provision for the 2002-2003 UN budget for special political missions was $98 million, while the current 2006-2007 estimate for all special political missions is $702 million, more than a 700 percent increase. In addition, special political missions now cover a wide range of activities and include everything from special envoys of the Secretary-General assigned to address a specific political situation, to panels of experts on sanctions, to peacebuilding missions, and to complex, multi-disciplinary missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the nature of the mandates of special political missions become more complex and diverse and begin to include human rights, electoral and other functions, the mandates of many SPMs have become similar to those of most peacekeeping missions, which themselves have become more complex in recent years. However, no methodology exists to define a special political mission or a peacekeeping mission. The general understanding has been that the key difference between the two is related to the deployment (or lack thereof) of troops. All peacekeeping missions have troops deployed, generally to enforce some type of ceasefire or peace agreement, while SPMs do not have such a function. PROPOSALS TO FUND SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS USING THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE -------------- ¶4. Until now, there has been agreement among Member States to finance special political missions from the regular budget and therefore at the scale of assessments applicable to the regular budget (currently 22 percent for the U.S.). However, given the increasing costs associated with SPMs, their impact on the overall regular budget level, and the fact that all but one are mandated by the Security Council, some delegations, notably Japan and Syria, have called for the General Assembly to consider financing Security Council-approved special political missions at the peacekeeping scale of assessment (26.0864 percent for the U.S.). Syria actually went one step further by proposing draft language during the December 2006 Fifth Committee discussions that, if adopted, would have immediately changed the scale of assessment used for special political missions. A change in the scale of assessments would impact only the P-5. The P-5 pay a higher percentage of the budgets for peacekeeping missions than they do for the regular budget, based on the notion of "special responsibilities" for the permanent members of the Security Council. Developing countries pay less on the peacekeeping scale, and therefore would benefit the most from a change in the scale used to finance SPMs. Most developed countries, such as the non-P5 EU members, Japan, and CANZ, would pay the same amount. Any change in the scale used to finance SPMs would only, therefore, impact the P-5. POTENTIAL IMPACT ON U.S. FUNDING OF SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS -------------- ¶5. A special consideration for the U.S. is the way we pay our contributions to the regular budget vs. peacekeeping. Regular budget contributions are funded through the Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) account, while the Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account funds our assessments for peacekeeping. Both accounts are facing shortfalls that challenge our ability to pay our contributions in full. Legislative language currently caps our payments for peacekeeping at 25 percent, although we are assessed at a higher rate, i.e. 26.0864 percent for 2007-2009. In addition, CIPA language requires that Congress must be notified 15 days in advance of the U.S. agreeing to a new peacekeeping mission or any change in an existing peacekeeping mission. If SPMs are funded on the peacekeeping scale, and therefore from the CIPA account, USUN would presume that this notification would apply to all 26 SPMs that are mandated by the Security Council, adding another step to the U.S. approval process. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS APPROVER OF THE BUDGET -------------- ¶6. Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations states that "The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization." Over the years, the process for GA consideration and approval of the budget has evolved, with greater emphasis now placed on GA assessment of the views concerning program priorities expressed by the 34 members of the Committee for Program and Coordination (CPC). Under the provisions of GA resolutions 58/269 and 59/275, the CPC convenes prior to the GA's consideration of each proposed two-year budget to consider and subsequently make recommendations on a plan outline prepared by the Secretary-General reflecting the longer-term objectives of SIPDIS the Organization and a proposed biennial program plan. This "experiment" in strategic framework planning, beginning with the 2006-2007 biennial UN budget, was strongly influenced by public sector trends toward results-based budgeting. As a result, the UN budget now includes not only program narratives, but also expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement. ¶7. The strategic framework serves as the principal policy directive and the basis for program planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation for the UN regular budget. The strategic framework is comprised of a number of logical frameworks - one for each program. CPC members, including until recently the U.S., review the strategic framework in non-budget years and make recommendations for changes to the program narratives, expected accomplishments, and indicators of achievement in order to align them with the legislative mandates previously approved by the GA. The recommendations are then, with few exceptions, routinely endorsed by the GA under the Fifth Committee's consideration of the agenda item on "program planning." They then form the basis for the Secretary-General's proposed program budget for the following SIPDIS biennium period. DANGER OF POSSIBLE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ATTEMPTS TO REINTERPRET SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATES -------------- ¶8. The level of detail included in the strategic framework with regard to the Department of Political Affairs (where funding for all special political missions falls) does not allow for much scrutiny by the CPC with regard to individual SPMs. However, as special political missions have grown larger and more complex, the General Assembly has requested greater detail about them in order to justify resource requests. The GA ultimately has the authority to approve the strategic framework, as well as to seek additional information concerning any activity funded from the UN budget. This has led to a unique problem for special political missions, where all but one current mission is approved by the Security Council. While there are other elements in the regular budget that are based on Security Council decisions, they tend to be buried and have not been subject to much GA discussion or scrutiny. However, we are now facing a situation where the GA, acting in its role overseeing and approving resource allocation, may also suggest changes to expecQ accomplishmQand indicators of achievement, including for special political missions, thereby essentially reinterpreting Security Council mandates. ¶9. This issue surfaced during the December discussions on financing for special political missions, in particular with regard to the logical framework associated with the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559. The Syrian delegate, under instructions from Damascus, submitted all manner of objectionable language for the draft resolution on SPM's being considered by the Fifth Committee in response to the Syrian Government's dislike of the expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the UN mission in Southern Lebanon, as well as the Syrian Government's dislike of the Secretary-General's Special Representative (Terje Roed-Larsen of Norway) in charge of the mission. In effect the changes that were submitted would have constituted a reinterpretation of the mandate. Despite objections by USDel and the EU to opening up the logical framework, and repeated statements that it was not the role of the General Assembly, or the Secretariat for that matter, to interpret Security Council resolutions, Syria insisted that as part of the GA's responsibilities in allocating resources, GA members had the right to ensure that results-based budgeting was being accurately implemented. THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE -------------- ¶10. As we look ahead to the Fifth Committee's next discussions on SPMs in March, USUN believes that more thought must be given to the issues raised above, taking into account the high priority we place on the mandates of many special political missions, as well as the paramount role played by the Security Council. Given the higher costs the U.S. would face if SPMs were financed from the peacekeeping scale, as well as the CIPA-related issues that might make it more time-consuming and difficult for the Department to secure Congressional support for financing these missions, USUN recommends that we work with other members of the P-5 to ensure SPM financing is kept in the regular budget. However, achieving this will not be easy given the likely lack of interest by many traditional allies, such as Japan and CANZ (since the change in scale would not impact them),and the group dynamics that play into Fifth Committee negotiations. ¶11. The Russian Federation and the U.S. are the only members of the P-5 that operate on their own during Fifth Committee discussions. China is part of the Group of 77 and China (G-77),typically endorsing the G-77 "group" position, while the United Kingdom and France are constrained by their alignment with other European Union partners. The EU consistently now speaks with one voice in the Fifth Committee. Separately, Russia and China are not particularly vocal in the Fifth Committee on budgetary issues. During the December discussions, the Chinese clearly had no understanding of the extent of the implications for the Security Council and the P-5 of the language proposed by Syria. Only after other P-5 Ambassadors raised the issue with the Chinese Ambassador did the Chinese Fifth Committee delegate begin to pay some attention. And even then, neither the Chinese nor the Russians provided much support to the P-3 in trying to eliminate problematic language. ¶12. Another item to consider is that if we succeed in keeping SPM funding in the regular budget, we will continue to have discussions on the logical frameworks for the various missions, most likely those in the Middle East. There is also the possibility that some delegations will move to have the CPC review the logical frameworks, a topic which also was raised in December, although such an idea did not gain traction at that time. With a review of the entire strategic framework "experiment" scheduled for the sixty-second General Assembly in the fall of 2007, the door is open to further changes in the review process, including CPC's role in examining the logical frameworks for SPMs. Given our numerous concerns with the CPC and the fact that the GA seems perfectly content to endorse CPC's recommendations, and not make its own changes to the strategic framework, this could prove highly problematic in our efforts to promote U.S. interests. Therefore, we should keep in mind that any position that supports keeping SPM funding in the regular budget will need to take into account the possible CPC and the GA roles reviewing logical frameworks and the impact of these reviews on mandates created by Security Council resolutions. GUIDANCE REQUEST -------------- ¶13. USUN requests guidance as to how to approach these issues in the upcoming Fifth Committee discussions in March. WOLFF