DPKO BRIEFS P3 PLUS BELGIUM AND SOUTH AFRICA ON

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000557 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL ASEC UNSC KPKO MOPS CG SUBJECT: DPKO BRIEFS P3 PLUS BELGIUM AND SOUTH AFRICA ON KIVUS AND CONSULTATION WITH DRC REF: KINSHASA 754 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Guehenno briefed the P3 plus Two (South Africa and Belgium) on the situation in the DRC and its implications for an eventual MONUC phase-out. The discussion mostly concerned the deteriorating security situation in the Kivus and the Government's failure to come up with a coherent plan for a political and diplomatic settlement of serious ethnic tensions and conflict. Guehenno also discussed the role of the Rwandan government given its economic and political interests in eastern DRC and suggested diplomatic initiatives to ecourage positive Rwandan involvement in resolving the Kivu conflict. Guehenno advocated continued international support of security sector reform and the formation of a DRC-based consultation mechanism to be similarly led by the P3 plus Two. END SUMMARY. SITUATION IN THE KIVUS ¶2. (SBU) At his initiative, DPKO A/S Jean-Marie Guehenno briefed the P3 plus 2 missions on July 5 on the deteriorating security situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), particularly in the Kivus region. PolMinCouns and Pol Intern represented USUN. ¶3. (SBU) According to Guehenno, it is not a question of if hostilities will break out, but rather when. A government-proposed roundtable in Kisangani has not materialized and there seems to be little thought of a political settlement, with key stakeholders opposing any meeting outside of the Kivus. Suspicion in the Kivus remains strong that the government has a military resolution in mind for insecurity in the provinces. The Tutsi and Banyamulenge are reacting to what they feel is a genuine threat. This lack of trust has also stalled efforts to integrate military forces in the region. As a result, Guehenno reported that citizens are turning to self-defense groups rather than the national army for protection. The Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) and former DRC Army General turned rebel Laurent Nkunda are two such groups, according to Guehenno. ¶4. (SBU) Efforts continue to deprive General Nkunda of his political base, said Mr. Guehenno. He regretted that DRC President Kabila was not making more use of the presidents of the Senate and the Assembly who could clearly play positive roles in facilitating a political settlement. (COMMENT: Council members received on July 5 the text of the peace plan for the Kivus proposed during the SC mission by Assembly President Kamerhe. The document was circulated to Council members at the request of the Congo mission but government endorsement is not clear. END OF COMMENT.) Rwanda's relationship to Gen. Nkunda remains unclear, although there are reliable reports about the recruiting of troops in Rwanda for Nkunda's ranks. Given a relatively well-run public administration in Rwanda, Guehenno found it difficult to believe that this is happening without at least tacit permission of the Government. According to PermRep Kumalo of South Africa, while the GOR publicly denies any support of Nkunda, the Rwandan Government also seems to think Nkunda is a viable way of countering the threat from the former genocidal forces in Rwanda, the Interahamwe. ¶5. (SBU) According to MONUC estimates, 115,000-200,000 people have been displaced by the situation in the Kivus. Both Mr. Guehenno and PermRep de La Sabliere of France expressed the belief that President Kabila wants a pacific solution to the problems in the east, although he is under strong countervailing political pressure from his political base in the east. PermRep de La Sabliere offered to work on agreed upon points should member capitals decide to deliver demarches in Kinshasa. All agreed that more active diplomacy was required to bring Rwandan President Kagame and DRC President Kabila together in a relationship of mutual benefit aimed at stabilizing Eastern Congo and opening up trade links. Rwanda has remained a key player, according to Guehenno, both because of its economic and political interests in the neighboring eastern DRC and due to the number of former Rwandan armed forces present in the region. ¶6. (SBU) There was skepticism in the meeting about the seriousness of the threat to Kigali of the remaining FDLR USUN NEW Y 00000557 002 OF 002 elements, with several representatives asserting that the Rwandans appear to be exploiting the alleged threat for their own purposes in the DRC. Others suggested using the brassage (retraining and reintegration of regional units into one national military) and SSR processes to weed out ex-Interahamwe who have infiltrated the ranks of the FADRC. According to MONUC, 6,000-8,000 FDLR fighters are now present in the DRC. The Rwandan Ambassador estimates the number at 15,000. Due to the aging of FDLR members into their forties, and in many cases their settlement in the DRC, however, Guehenno agreed that they did not seem poised to attack Rwanda or capable of doing so. ¶7. (SBU) Some participants, however, made the point that Rwandan President Kagame believes that the international community has not taken the issue of impunity for the ex-genocidaires in the DRC as seriously as it should. His relations with Nkunda needed to be seen in the light of Nkunda's self-appointed role as protector of the Tutsis and allied ethnic groups, although Nkunda was personally responsible for atrocities that made him an unacceptable ally. The Council needs to acknowledge the need to deal with the leaders of these criminals, who should be brought before the tribunal in Arusha. P3 plus Two representatives also pushed for MONUC to continue its active role in containing militia forces, although Guehenno insisted that the real solution to the problem of armed militias in the DRC was the extension of legitimate government authority to all parts of the country. This underlined the necessity of successful security sector reform. MONUC would continue active sweeps to reduce violence against civilians but could not be expected, given the vastness of the territory, to chase down and disarm all the armed groups in the Kivus. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND A CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM ¶8. (SBU) These comments led directly to Guehenno's final pitch for increased international support for achieving security sector reform and DDR. Progress was uneven and the process would be long, but there is no other realistic way to neutralize armed groups preying on the civilian population. The inter-mixing of Rwandan soldiers into DRC battalions is a new cause for concern. The negative experience with mixing of armed groups in the case of Nkunda underlined the necessity of genuine integration of forces, especially in the ethnically tense Kivus. ¶9. (SBU) On the issue of a consultative mechanism for the main players in the international community to communicate with the government, French Ambassador de La Sabliere provided an account of the SC mission's discussions of this proposal in Kinshasa. He noted the evident sensitivity of President Kabila about recreating the mechanisms of the transition but also Kabila's expressed openness to a formal or informal dialogue with the international community. USUN PolMinCouns noted that there seemed to be a clear preference for an informal arrangement. ¶9. (SBU) Most delegations expressed willingness to have a group of ambassadors from like-minded states engage in regular, informal meetings and to periodically consult directly with President Kabila. These meetings would be coupled with ongoing technical exchanges facilitated by MONUC. Guehenno encouraged the P3 plus Two representatives in Kinshasa to organize themselves for such a dialogue in cooperation with MONUC. He believed this group would be the most appropriate interlocutor for such a high level dialogue with the GDRC. One dissenting note came from South African Ambassador Kumalo, who said that Kabila had made clear on a recent visit to Pretoria his unwillingness to entertain any sort of standing consultative mechanism. The sensitivities of a sovereign elected government had to be respected. Kumalo then went on to suggest that an informal dialogue with President Kabila may not be appropriate now that there is an elected government in place. Rather an informal dialogue should be maintained with PM Gizenga and his ministers, since the PM's office is the working head of the Cabinet. KHALILZAD