UN AND U.S. AGREE TO SEEK TO EXPAND UNAMI MANDATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000550

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2012
TAGS: PREL UNSC IZ
SUBJECT: UN AND U.S. AGREE TO SEEK TO EXPAND UNAMI MANDATE

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff for reas
ons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: On June 26, S/I Ambassador David Satterfield
led a discussion with the UN on Iraq (including the UN's role
in Iraq) as part of an ongoing high-level dialogue. Both the
U.S. and the UN agreed that the UN's mandate in Iraq should
be updated and expanded, wherever possible. The UN expressed
willingness to consider any options for expanding the United
Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI),but noted the
crucial importance of security and logistic support. Both
sides agreed to coordinate closely in the run-up to the
August 10 expiration of the UNAMI mandate. End summary.


2. (U) Ambassador David Satterfield led the U.S. delegation,
and was accompanied by USUN D/POL Counselor Molly Phee, NEA/I
Dana Linnet, IO/UNP Maria Germano and USUN POL Peter
Kujawinski (note taker). The UN delegation was led by U/SYG
for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe, and included U/SYG for
Safety and Security David Veness, U/SYG and Special Advisor
on the Compact Ibrahim Gambari, A/SYG for Peacekeeping
Operations Jane Holl Lute, A/SYG for Political Affairs Angela
Kane, Rashid Khalikov from the Office for Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, and Ngonlardje Mbaidjol from the Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.


3. (C) Ambassador Satterfield briefed on the status of
current events in Iraq based on his recent trip with Deputy
Secretary Negroponte. He noted that the "surge" was working,

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but that political progress continued to lag. While Egypt,
Jordan and Kuwait fully accept the legitimacy of the Iraqi
government, the Saudis and the UAE do not. All of Iraq's
Arab Sunni neighbors have grown impatient with the GOI's lack
of progress on reconciliation; Iran and Syria continue to
display no signs of changing their negative behavior in Iraq,
and the Iraqis are becoming impatient with Syria's "non
action" to stop takfiri fighters. Satterfield noted that the
bright spot is Anbar province, where the tribal sheikhs have
teamed with MNF-I and the Iraqi Security Forces to go after
Al Qaida. With the improved security situation in Anbar,
reconstruction is now taking place. Satterfield said that we
need to find a way to replicate this type of success in
Baghdad and its surrounding provinces.


4. (C) Pascoe thanked Satterfield for his overview and turned
to possible new UN roles in Iraq. He asked if the United
States would give the UN sufficient political space to expand
its role in Iraq. Pascoe said that speculation about a
possible UN role in Kirkuk and Article 140 issues had been
met by coolness from the Kurds. Satterfield said that the
U.S. would support an expanded UN role and make that view
known to the GOI. He reported that the Kurds had agreed to
postpone the Kirkuk referendum and are searching for a way
out of the current impasse. This situation creates an
opening for the UN. Satterfield offered to preview this with
the Kurds; the UN would then engage with concrete offers of
assistance. Satterfield noted that UN assistance on border
arbitration would be helpful in areas other than Kirkuk, as
well. Pascoe agreed with this approach.


5. (C) Turning to provincial elections, Pascoe said that the
UN preferred that conditions (e.g., registration and a
revised elections law) be met before new elections are held.
Satterfield agreed on the need for an election law and raised
the importance of UN technical advice on alternative
electoral models. He noted that Iraqis in the provinces
generally are seeking an open list system presumed to create
opportunities for local representatives, whereas political
leaders in the capital prefer a closed list, which they
believe will enhance their control of political posts. The
U.S. and UN sides also discussed the prospect of rolling
elections, an approach which might lead to greater Sunni
participation and greater political legitimacy in the
provinces. Satterfield noted the utility of setting a target
date for elections in order to encourage Iraqi action on this
process. UN elections expert Richard Gee said the UN prefers
to focus first on creating the necessary conditions for
credible elections and therefore is less comfortable with the
idea of setting deadlines. Satterfield replied that setting
a target date might help to focus efforts. Gee said that the
UN is not opposed to the concept of rolling elections, with
Anbar province being the first, but reiterated that any
direction on this would have to come from the central
government and be expressly supported by the Maliki
government. Satterfield recommended that UNAMI brief Embassy
Baghdad on its vision and concerns and that the Embassy and
UNAMI coordinate efforts.


6. (C) Gambari reported that agreement had been reached on a
secretariat for the International Compact with Iraq. The

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Secretariat will be located within the Prime Minister's

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offices under the direct supervision of DPM Barham Salih.

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Gambari said the UN and Iraq are considering a mid-July
meeting in New York on the Compact to update member states at
the PermRep level. Satterfield encouraged Gambari to speak
with Treasury about this. He praised the Compact process as
a model for engaging the Maliki government and ensuring broad
buy-in. Satterfield also briefed on the improved flow of GOI
funds to the provinces as a sign of progress on budget
execution.


7. (C) Gambari asked Satterfield for his assessment of
Iraq's leadership. Satterfield used this opportunity to
press the point that there is a real need for the UN to
exercise its comparative advantage by providing Iraqi leaders
with examples and models drawn from UN experience in other
countries on how to address issues common to conflict
environments, such as border arbitration, minority rights,
election processes, and constitutional questions.
Satterfield urged the UN to "forcefully" suggest to Iraqi
contacts that there are concrete means to resolve such
problems.


8. (C) Pascoe and Satterfield agreed that the UNAMI renewal
must include language to address the UN's humanitarian role.
OCHA official Rashid Khalikov said that the current mandate
allows UNAMI only to address issues in Iraq, whereas the
humanitarian problems have impacted other countries, notably
Jordan and Syria. He outlined several areas where the UN's
capacity to act is challenged: 1) lack of reliable data on
refugees outside Iraq as well as internally displaced Iraqis
(IDPs); 2) lack of mobility in Iraq -- the UN's drawdown in
2003 had cut off the UN's connection with local Iraqi
communities, hampering the UN's ability to help Iraqis in
country; and 3) the GOI is in denial about humanitarian needs
and the GOI has yet to disburse the $25 million pledged in
Geneva. UNHCR funding is not the issue; it's getting
reliable information and trying to coordinate efforts
remotely from Amman. Satterfield said that the U.S. looks to
the UN as a crucial resource and noted the June 26
announcement that Jordan would host the Neighbors Working
Group on Refugees in July, suggesting that the UN could
channel efforts through the Working Group to further advance
assistance to Iraqi refugees.


9. (C) Veness expressed the UN's appreciation for security
support provided by MNF-I to UNAMI. The UN remains concerned
about the future security arrangements for the International
Zone. Veness said that any change in middle-ring security
would need to be fully interoperable with MNF-I. Satterfield
stated clearly that any decision regarding the future
security of the International Zone will be
"conditions-dependent." He speculated that, while it is
still our goal to reach a state where we could hand things
over, it is unlikely that would happen in 2008 given the
conditions on the ground. Veness said that a premature
handover to the Iraqis would be a "showstopper" for the UN.
Satterfield briefed that Iranian support for increasingly
precise and sophisticated attacks on the IZ means that we can
expect an increase in rocket attacks in the future but that
we are factoring this into our security posture. On
middle-ring security, Satterfield urged that both the U.S.
and the UN engage with possible donor countries and suggested
that, if none could be found, UNAMI might consider
contractors. Lute said that the contractor option for middle
ring security would "blow the lid off the UN's security
budget." Both sides agreed that MNF-I contributing countries
would be the best option for political and command and
control reasons. (Note: UN officials believe UNSCR 1546, and
the annexed letter from then Secretary of State Powell,
confer the lead on middle ring security to MNF-I. End
Note.). Pascoe reported that Romania had offered to consider
contributing its troops for middle-ring security.
Satterfield agreed that both the UN and U.S. should assess
the viability of this offer.


10. (C) Lute expressed opposition to potential UN
involvement in DDR as part of an expanded UN mandate, saying
that conditions now do not merit action. She added that
there could also be resistance from members of the Council to
such a UN role. Satterfield confirmed that the U.S. has no
expectation that there will be prompt Iraqi action on DDR but
wants to keep the door open for future involvement when
conditions merit it.


11. (U) S/I Satterfield has cleared this cable.
WOLFF