DEMARCHE DELIVERED: ENCOURAGING ENGAGEMENT ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000545 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2017 TAGS: PREL UNSC WI AG MO SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: ENCOURAGING ENGAGEMENT ON MOROCCO'S AUTONOMY PLAN REF: STATE 88684 Classified By: Amb. Jackie Sanders. E.O 12958. Reasons 1.4 (B&D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Sanders delivered reftel demarche points July 2 to Polisario New York Rep Ahmed Boukhari urging serious and substantive Polisario engagement in the upcoming August talks with Morocco, underscoring international expectations of real progress between the parties, and noting that the serious and credible Moroccan proposal represented a realistic solution that would provide Western Sahara many of the attributes of a sovereign state and lead the Sahrawi closer to their goal of self-determination. Boukhari said that the Polisario plans to submit to Personal Envoy van Walsum for the August talks a suggested agenda that included a proposal to "move on two feet" -- to alternate discussion of the Moroccan plan with that of the Polisario plan. In addition, the Polisario plans to suggest discussions of issues the result of which might achieve a positive result for the August talks: the release of political prisoners, cooperation on landmine identification and disposal, joint military patrols, and increased family visits. Boukhari said the one redline for the Polisario would occur if, in its continuing effort to make the negotiations seem to be one between Sahrawi groups rather than between Morocco and the Polisario, Morocco attempted to increase CORCAS participation in the August talks. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador Sanders delivered reftel demarche July 2 to Polisario New York Rep Ahmed Boukhari, expressing U.S. satisfaction with the reported positive atmosphere the June 18-19 talks and the agreement for additional talks in August. She noted that engagement in the negotiations and the resulting increase in international interest works in favor of the Polisario and urged continued efforts on the part of the Polisario to ensure that the positive momentum created by the just completed round of talks be accelerated in the next, more difficult round, when both sides will have to begin making compromises. Ambassador Sanders said that if no substantive engagement and agreement on any elements of a solution are achieved in the next round, the international community will consider the process a disappointment. Thus the Polisario should begin to consider engaging realistically in order not to be seen as the cause of a potential breakdown in the negotiations. Ambassador Sanders ended by detailing our belief that the Moroccan autonomy proposal is serious and credible and deserves careful study by the Polisario. As proposed, the plan gives the Western Sahara many of the attributes of a sovereign state and it is difficult to imagine a realistic solution that would lead the Sahrawi closer to their goal of self-determination than this proposal does. ¶3. (C) Boukhari said that he and negotiating team member Mohamed Khaddad have been considering how the Polisario might help move the August meetings forward and developed some ideas that they planned to submit to the Polisario leadership in mid-July. If approved, the Polisario team would offer the suggestions to Personal Envoy van Walsum during a scheduled August 5 pre-negotiation meeting. Boukhari said that the fundamental Polisario proposal would be that the parties "move on two feet" -- that each plan, the Moroccan and the Polisario, be considered in turn. On one day the Moroccan plan would be discussed, with both sides suggesting ways in which the plan might be improved and on the second day, the Polisario plan would be considered, with each side suggesting ways in which the plan night be improved. In addition, Boukhari said, with a view to achieving positive results during the August meeting, the Polisario would suggest four issues for discussion as confidence building measures that would benefit all Sahrawi: the release of political prisoners, cooperation on landmine identification and disposal, joint military patrols as suggested by MINURSO, and increased family visits. ¶4. (C) Assuring the U.S. that the Polisario intended to continue to take the negotiations seriously, Boukhari said that the one red line for the Polisario in August would be continued Moroccan provocative behavior in its attempt to make the negotiations seem to be a negotiation between two Sahrawi groups rather than between the Polisario and Morocco. If the Moroccans again attempted to increase the size of the CORCAS component -- already three out of eight in the first meetings -- the Polisario would be hard pressed to believe that Morocco was entering talks with seriousness. In that respect, Boukhari said, he urged the U.S. to use its influence to convince the Moroccans to behave. ¶5. (C) Reviewing the Polisario team's take on the June 18-19 Manhasset meetings, Boukhari said that both delegations had, for the most part, behaved well and that there had been psychological progress if not substantive progress. The sole discordant note had been the presence of the CORCAS and the long-winded interventions of its representative. Boukhari said that the head of the Polisario delegation had left the room to express the delegation's displeasure. Boukhari asserted that the Polisario had gone the extra mile to test Moroccan intentions. He said that, in April, Jamaal al Omar, a Moroccan national working in the office of the UN Deputy Secretary-General, had approached him with a message from the SIPDIS Moroccans -- that the Moroccans would be open to informal side meetings at Greentree. Having received permission from the Polisario leadership, the Polisario delegation chief had approached the Moroccan delegation chief after dinner on the first evening to suggest an informal talk. But the Moroccans had said they would talk only if the CORCAS representative also participated in the discussion and the informal talks never occurred. ¶6. (C) Boukhari said that although the Polisario intended to work seriously on substance in the August meeting, he did not believe much would be achieved until the third or fourth set of negotiations. The first meeting had been very important, but now the parties needed time to become accustomed with each other and to work together on agendas. What is important now is that both parties take the negotiations seriously and that neither party act provocatively. To ensure this last important requirement, Boukhari said, he hoped that the U.S. would use its influence. WOLFF