ALGERIAN READOUT ON JUNE 18-19 WESTERN SAHARA TALKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000513 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017 TAGS: PREL WI AG MO SUBJECT: ALGERIAN READOUT ON JUNE 18-19 WESTERN SAHARA TALKS REF: USUN 512 Classified By: Amb. Jackie W. Sanders. E.O 12958. Reasons 1.4 (B&D). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a June 20 meeting with USUN and NEA, Algerian negotiators present at the June 18-19 Western Sahara peace talks praised the talks' atmospherics and results, complimented Van Walsum on his handling of the negotiations, and patted themselves on the back for the role that they had played. They complained about the role of pro-Moroccan Sahrawis in the negotiations but still saw the talks as a breakthrough overall. The Algerians suggested that no additional participants be added to the next round of talks, and they requested a positive, but evenhanded, U.S. press statement. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) USUN Ambassador Jackie Sanders and NEA DAS Gordon Gray met on June 20 with the Algerian delegation that had attended the negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario in Manhasset, NY, in order to get their views on the talks. The delegation, which included MFA Secretary-General Ramdane Lamamra (who had headed the delegation),MFA senior advisor (and former UN Permrep) Abdullah Baali, and UN Permrep Youcef Yousfi, had been present on site, but not allowed to attend all sessions of the talks. ¶3. (C) The Algerian delegation was in good spirits. Like the UN Secretary General's Personal Envoy Peter Van Walsum (reftel),they stated that the talks had gone as well as could possibly have been hoped (and gave themselves some of the credit for this). The Algerians described themselves as the voice of reason, providing advice to Van Walsum and keeping the Polisario in line. Van Walsum, they said, had initially voiced to them his worries that direct talks might not even be possible given the antipathy of the parties, and had been prepared to lead off with proximity negotiations that ultimately proved unnecessary. Once negotiations began, Van Walsum had been frustrated at their pace, but the Algerian advice that he show patience had borne fruit. Van Walsum had also initially questioned the wisdom of starting only with the easiest issues and working to the more difficult ones, but the Algerians said they had counseled him that this was the best way to proceed. Lamamra noted that while Algeria and Van Walsum disagreed strongly on "metaphysical issues" (e.g., the issues underlying the Western Sahara dispute and the way in which it would best be resolved),the Algerians saw him as a man who understood how to pragmatically move things forward. The Algerians also praised the role of MINURSO SRSG Julian Harston, who had been present at the talks. ¶4. (C) Lamamra said the meeting also was a breakthrough in the sense that, for the first time, the Algerians had had the opportunity to meet with Morocco's "core foreign policy team" rather than its various mouthpieces, and they were able to gain a greater understanding of the foundational principles underlying the Moroccan position. The only negative element in the talks, the Algerian delegation said, had been the presence of several members of the pro-Moroccan Royal Council on Sahrawi Affairs (CORCAS) in the Moroccan delegation, some of whom the GOM had inserted at the last minute. However, they viewed the lack of a CORCAS speech in the closing session of the talks (after an unannounced CORCAS speech in the opening session) as a positive step. ¶5. (C) The Algerians expected the next round of talks to be much more difficult, as the first round had been essentially a reciprocal statement of positions, much easier than finding areas of mutual compromise. They suggested that two things could help the next round be productive. First, while the Friends' help had been very important to this point, their direct involvement in negotiations would spoil the positive dynamic that was beginning to build. On this point, the Algerians later specifically noted the statement issued by Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos after the talks as evidence that Spain's primary interest lay in grandstanding for the benefit of their public. Second, they asked that any U.S. statement on the talks not again characterize the Moroccan plan as "serious and credible" - everyone knew how the U.S. felt about the Moroccan plan from its repeated statements about it; it was now time to focus on the talks. WOLFF