UNSC/CHAD: NO AGREEMENT YET ON UN PEACEKEEPING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000433 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CD PGOV PHUM PREF PREL UNSC KPKO SUBJECT: UNSC/CHAD: NO AGREEMENT YET ON UN PEACEKEEPING USUN NEW Y 00000433 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. At May 31 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) consultations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Africa Director Titov updated on the security situation in eastern Chad and on prospects for UN peacekeeping in the region. Titov reported on conversations that the UN team (in N'Djamena since May 21) had with FM Allam-mi on May 28, in which Allam-mi warned a robust UN presence in eastern Chad could harm Chadian relations with its neighbors Sudan and Libya. Calling UNSCR 1706 - which provided for a UN multidimensional presence in eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic (CAR) - "obsolete," Allam-mi advocated a phased approach beginning with deployment of civilian police to protect refugees and humanitarian workers in eastern Chad, to be followed "if necessary" by a military deployment. Ambassador Sanders called for IDPs to be included in any such mandate. Titov said that the security situation in Chad necessitated protection elements beyond police but assured that the UN team would continue to engage with the GOC to narrow the gap in respective peacekeeping perceptions. Some Members suggested that DPKO pursue peacekeeping in CAR before moving into Chad to gain credibility. Indonesia, Qatar and Russia called for the UNSC to respect Chad's sovereignty in authorizing any peacekeeping operation deployment. France alluded to a plan to improve the humanitarian situation in the region. The UN team will report its findings to the UNSC when it returns next month. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) At May 31 UNSC consultations, DPKO Africa Director Titov updated on the "volatile and unpredictable" security situation on the ground in eastern Chad. Although the Government of Chad (GOC) had lifted state of emergency measures on May 26, anti-government rebel activity and criminality continued, especially in the regions of Dar Tama and Dar Sila, which now harbored 150,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a result of insecurity. Titov said that Chadian authorities were distributing weapons and ammunition to civilians to help ward off attacks and that the National Armed Forces (ANT) had itself received new equipment and was reinforcing its positions in the east. Titov noted that President Deby himself had spent a good deal of time in eastern Chad over past weeks. Despite this show of force, Titov doubted that the GOC could protect civilians and humanitarian workers caught in the middle. He cited an April 23 attack by unidentified gunmen on UNHCR security personnel and a May 25 attack near Iriba that led to the suspension of World Food Programme operations as evidence of persistent lawlessness and insufficient government control. ¶3. (SBU) Director Titov described the state of UN efforts to establish a UN peacekeeping operation in the region. In response to FM Allam-mi's March 23 suggestion that a small team of UN go to N'Djamena to confer with the GOC on eastern Chad peacekeeping, the UN dispatched such a mission on May 21 for at least 30 days. The team, headed by DPKO Situation Center Chief Francois Dureau (who had been on the two Technical Assessment Missions to Chad),had so far met with FM Allam-mi, members of the Chad Country Team, the African Union (AU) office and the Inter-Ministerial Committee established by the GOC to address the issue of the east. In a May 28 meeting with the team, FM Allam-mi called for any peacekeeping operation to focus on the security of the 232,000 Sudanese refugees and the humanitarian workers attending to them. Given the deterioration of the security situation over the past nine months, Allam-mi, according to Titov, declared that UNSCR 1706 - which provided for a UN multidimensional presence in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR - had been rendered "obsolete" as a peacekeeping model. He noted that GOC relations with Sudan had improved after bilateral agreements reached in Tripoli and Riyadh but argued that this process could be jeopardized by a UN military presence in eastern Chad, as could GOC relations with northern neighbor Libya. ¶4. (SBU) According to Titov, Allam-mi had advocated a phased approach to eastern Chad peacekeeping, beginning with deployment of civilian police to protect refugees and humanitarian workers, to be followed "if necessary" by a military deployment. Titov noted that this approach deviated from UN thinking in two main ways: first, its scope of protection focused only on refugees and humanitarian workers, whereas DPKO assessed that IDPs need the same level of USUN NEW Y 00000433 002.2 OF 002 protection; and second, it presupposed use of mobile units outside refugee camps, something DPKO assessed could be carried out only by military personnel, not/not gendarmes. Titov assured that the UN team would continue to engage with the GOC to narrow this gap in respective peacekeeping perceptions and would explore all configurations and stages of deployment. In response to comments by the Qatari delegate, Titov added that the UN would be flexible in taking on board regional agreements like those of Tripoli and Riyadh but with the understanding that their signatories would be equally forthcoming with the GOC. Titov commented that peacekeeping was not the only option in eastern Chad, adding that a strong political process would also be effective. ¶5. (SBU) On CAR, Titov acknowledged that President Bozize remained supportive of UN peacekeeping there and that the UN team would travel to CAR as part of its mission. Several Members - including Qatar, Slovakia, Belgium and Indonesia - advocated for the UN to begin a robust peacekeeping deployment in CAR before moving to eastern Chad as a way to create a stabilizing effect and to avoid holding CAR hostage to Chadian reticence. Titov explained that Chad and CAR peacekeeping were initially considered a package for reasons of logistics and command and control, but he made clear that the UN team would examine ways to delink deployment of a UN operation in one country from that in the other. He noted that the security problem in CAR was not limited to the area in and around Birao, and he also mentioned the latest flow of cross-border refugees into the country. ¶6. (SBU) In addition to Qatar, several other Members suggested that DPKO needed to consider regional efforts to calm the Chad situation. French PermRep de La Sabliere said the fact that the nascent implementation of the Tripoli Agreements between Chad and Sudan could not be ignored and could signal a "fragile improvement" in Khartoum-N'Djamena relations. De La Sabliere, like Ambassador Sanders and Russian Deputy PermRep Dolgov, stressed that any peacekeeping force should address the needs of IDPs and of local populations. De La Sabliere (who in the past has said that the Chad situation was not merely a by-product of Darfur violence but had its own independent issues meriting international attention) noted that the eastern Chad situation owed much to the Darfur crisis, and he alluded to a plan from Paris to improve the humanitarian situation in the region (COMMENT. Presumably de La Sabliere was referring to some variety of humanitarian corridor through Chad into Darfur. END COMMENT). ¶7. (SBU) Indonesia, Qatar and Russia reminded the UNSC to respect Chad's sovereignty in authorizing any deployment, but the Indonesian Deputy PermRep pointed out that at the same time, the GOC must be reminded of its responsibility to protect its own population. Russian Deputy PermRep Dolgov suggested another meeting with a GOC official in New York to address eastern Chad peacekeeping, stressing the importance of working with local and central authorities on the issue. KHALILZAD