MOUSSA DISCUSSES IRAQ WITH AMB KHALILZAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000378

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC IZ
SUBJECT: MOUSSA DISCUSSES IRAQ WITH AMB KHALILZAD

Classified By: Amb. Zalmay Khalilzad. E.O 12958. Reasons 1.4 (B&D)


1. (C) Summary: In a May 11 meeting with Arab League
Secretary-General Amr Moussa that focused exclusively on

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Iraq, Ambassador Khalilzad urged Arab League involvement that
would reassure the Iraqi Shia and comfort the Iraqi Sunni and
help create an Iraqi identity based not on sectarianism but
on nationalism, thereby contributing to the stabilization of
Iraq and the region. Amr Moussa recounted early Arab League
involvement in Iraq, questioned why there has been no mention
of Shia militias in connection with the U.S. "surge," asked
whether Maliki was "the right horse to deliver," and, with
regard to the Arab League involvement requested by the U.S.
asked, "What is the plan, where are we going?" End Summary.


2. (C) In a May 11 meeting with Ambassador Khalilzad at the
Security Council Presidency, Arab League Secretary-General
Amr Moussa, accompanied by Arab League UN Permanent Observer
Yahya Mahmassani, began by saying he wanted to talk about
Iraq and about the Middle East. Amr Moussa was in New York
to brief the P-5 delegations on the Arab Peace Initiative,
but the entire 30-minute bilateral with Ambassador Khalilzad
focused on Iraq.

Ambassador Khalilzad on Iraq
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3. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad said that Iraq is a key issue in
the Middle East, yet the level of effort of the Arab states
has not been proportional to the stakes involved. On the
complex nature of Iraqi politics, Ambassador Khalilzad
recalled that following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein,
Iranian-based groups had entered the Iraqi political arena
and, as a consequence, Iran became very influential and
pro-Iranian Shia religious groups became very strong. The
Sunni groups, on the other hand, made the mistake of not
becoming involved in Iraqi politics. Ambassador Khalilzad
said that he had worked to redress the balance when he was in
Iraq, but the religious Shia factions are very strong and the
solution is not a simple matter of replacing one leader with
another.


4. (C) The key to stabilizing the Iraqi domestic situation,
Ambassador Khalilzad said, is for all Iraqis to reach an
agreement on what it means to be an Iraqi. In this respect,
the Arab states could help by fostering an Arab agenda in
Iraq that is not sectarian. The engagement of Arab states in
Iraq is important, but the (Sunni-dominated) Arab League must
not be perceived as being against the Shia. They must win
the confidence of Iraqi Shia. In short, if what the Arabs
have to offer the Shia is more than what Iran can offer the
Shia, we can reduce Iraqi Shia dependence on Iran. Thus,
Ambassador Khalilzad said, the Arab policy of isolating the
Shia plays into Iranian hands; the key Arab states need a new
strategy.

Amr Moussa on Iraq
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5. (C) Amr Moussa replied that "we are talking, but we are
not orchestrating." Since (Coalition Provisional Authority
head) Paul Bremer had been in Iraq, he said, the U.S. has
made mistakes that have given the Iranians a free ride.
Moussa noted that three important points of Arab involvement
in Iraq: the Arab League's acceptance of the transitional
government; the Arab League proposals that led to the
conciliation process; and the Arab states' willingness to
respond to the call for armed forces. In the latter case,
however, the Arab states had stipulated three conditions:
that the call for Arab forces be by invitation of the Iraqis;
that such forces be under Arab, vice coalition, command; and
that such forces be assigned a clear task, such as that of a
stabilization force working with the coalition. The main
point was that there had to be a separate command.


6. (C) On the Iraqi Shia, Amr Moussa said that the Arab
League was a regional organization that had relations with
Arab Shia. The problem was with the extremists on both
sides. That said, Amr Moussa asked why there has been no
mention of the problem of Shia militias in U.S. statements
regarding the "surge." Ambassador Khalilzad said that under
Bremer's law they have been integrated and that is what has
happened: thousands of them are now integrated into the
police forces. The problem, Ambassador Khalilzad said, was
in the ministries. Efforts to cleanse the ministries of the
militias are now under way. The militias are complex groups
that included criminal elements and former regime elements as
well as religiously affiliated elements. The militia problem
went beyond groups loyal to Badr Organization and Muqtada
al-Sadr, Ambassador Khalilzad said.


7. (C) Moussa asked whether Prime Minister Maliki was "the
right horse to deliver." Moussa said that the U.S. had

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created a myth and now appeared to be believing it. "Was
this (election) a democracy?" Amr Moussa asked. "You cannot
have a democracy based on sectarianism," Moussa continued.
Ambassador Khalilzad said there had been an election,
Maliki's unity government had been supported by blocs which
controlled 89 percent of seats in parliament, that Maliki had
come a long way, and if not Maliki, who would be the
alternative who could get through the Iraqi political
process? What was more important, Ambassador Khalilzad
reiterated, was that there needed to be a stabilization
process and a reduction in violence -- efforts which merited
contributions and support from the Arab states. We need to
work together. The Arab states can help both sides by
reassuring the Shia and comforting the Sunni, Ambassador
Khalilzad said.


8. (C) Amr Moussa said that the Arab states think of
themselves as on a train, the first stop of which the U.S.
will exit, but on which the Arab states must stay to the end.
He said that the U.S. should not try to leave Iraq at any
price, giving it to Iran. It could leave on two conditions:
that it is honorable for you and it is honorable for Iraqis.
Amr Moussa said the Arab states can do a great deal, they
need not restrict their role to just an observer. Arab
states are willing to help, but "What is the plan?" and
"Where are we going," Amr Moussa concluded.
KHALILZAD