MOUSSA DISCUSSES IRAQ WITH AMB KHALILZAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000378 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC IZ SUBJECT: MOUSSA DISCUSSES IRAQ WITH AMB KHALILZAD Classified By: Amb. Zalmay Khalilzad. E.O 12958. Reasons 1.4 (B&D) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a May 11 meeting with Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa that focused exclusively on SIPDIS Iraq, Ambassador Khalilzad urged Arab League involvement that would reassure the Iraqi Shia and comfort the Iraqi Sunni and help create an Iraqi identity based not on sectarianism but on nationalism, thereby contributing to the stabilization of Iraq and the region. Amr Moussa recounted early Arab League involvement in Iraq, questioned why there has been no mention of Shia militias in connection with the U.S. "surge," asked whether Maliki was "the right horse to deliver," and, with regard to the Arab League involvement requested by the U.S. asked, "What is the plan, where are we going?" End Summary. ¶2. (C) In a May 11 meeting with Ambassador Khalilzad at the Security Council Presidency, Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa, accompanied by Arab League UN Permanent Observer Yahya Mahmassani, began by saying he wanted to talk about Iraq and about the Middle East. Amr Moussa was in New York to brief the P-5 delegations on the Arab Peace Initiative, but the entire 30-minute bilateral with Ambassador Khalilzad focused on Iraq. Ambassador Khalilzad on Iraq -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad said that Iraq is a key issue in the Middle East, yet the level of effort of the Arab states has not been proportional to the stakes involved. On the complex nature of Iraqi politics, Ambassador Khalilzad recalled that following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iranian-based groups had entered the Iraqi political arena and, as a consequence, Iran became very influential and pro-Iranian Shia religious groups became very strong. The Sunni groups, on the other hand, made the mistake of not becoming involved in Iraqi politics. Ambassador Khalilzad said that he had worked to redress the balance when he was in Iraq, but the religious Shia factions are very strong and the solution is not a simple matter of replacing one leader with another. ¶4. (C) The key to stabilizing the Iraqi domestic situation, Ambassador Khalilzad said, is for all Iraqis to reach an agreement on what it means to be an Iraqi. In this respect, the Arab states could help by fostering an Arab agenda in Iraq that is not sectarian. The engagement of Arab states in Iraq is important, but the (Sunni-dominated) Arab League must not be perceived as being against the Shia. They must win the confidence of Iraqi Shia. In short, if what the Arabs have to offer the Shia is more than what Iran can offer the Shia, we can reduce Iraqi Shia dependence on Iran. Thus, Ambassador Khalilzad said, the Arab policy of isolating the Shia plays into Iranian hands; the key Arab states need a new strategy. Amr Moussa on Iraq -------------- ¶5. (C) Amr Moussa replied that "we are talking, but we are not orchestrating." Since (Coalition Provisional Authority head) Paul Bremer had been in Iraq, he said, the U.S. has made mistakes that have given the Iranians a free ride. Moussa noted that three important points of Arab involvement in Iraq: the Arab League's acceptance of the transitional government; the Arab League proposals that led to the conciliation process; and the Arab states' willingness to respond to the call for armed forces. In the latter case, however, the Arab states had stipulated three conditions: that the call for Arab forces be by invitation of the Iraqis; that such forces be under Arab, vice coalition, command; and that such forces be assigned a clear task, such as that of a stabilization force working with the coalition. The main point was that there had to be a separate command. ¶6. (C) On the Iraqi Shia, Amr Moussa said that the Arab League was a regional organization that had relations with Arab Shia. The problem was with the extremists on both sides. That said, Amr Moussa asked why there has been no mention of the problem of Shia militias in U.S. statements regarding the "surge." Ambassador Khalilzad said that under Bremer's law they have been integrated and that is what has happened: thousands of them are now integrated into the police forces. The problem, Ambassador Khalilzad said, was in the ministries. Efforts to cleanse the ministries of the militias are now under way. The militias are complex groups that included criminal elements and former regime elements as well as religiously affiliated elements. The militia problem went beyond groups loyal to Badr Organization and Muqtada al-Sadr, Ambassador Khalilzad said. ¶7. (C) Moussa asked whether Prime Minister Maliki was "the right horse to deliver." Moussa said that the U.S. had USUN NEW Y 00000378 002 OF 002 created a myth and now appeared to be believing it. "Was this (election) a democracy?" Amr Moussa asked. "You cannot have a democracy based on sectarianism," Moussa continued. Ambassador Khalilzad said there had been an election, Maliki's unity government had been supported by blocs which controlled 89 percent of seats in parliament, that Maliki had come a long way, and if not Maliki, who would be the alternative who could get through the Iraqi political process? What was more important, Ambassador Khalilzad reiterated, was that there needed to be a stabilization process and a reduction in violence -- efforts which merited contributions and support from the Arab states. We need to work together. The Arab states can help both sides by reassuring the Shia and comforting the Sunni, Ambassador Khalilzad said. ¶8. (C) Amr Moussa said that the Arab states think of themselves as on a train, the first stop of which the U.S. will exit, but on which the Arab states must stay to the end. He said that the U.S. should not try to leave Iraq at any price, giving it to Iran. It could leave on two conditions: that it is honorable for you and it is honorable for Iraqis. Amr Moussa said the Arab states can do a great deal, they need not restrict their role to just an observer. Arab states are willing to help, but "What is the plan?" and "Where are we going," Amr Moussa concluded. KHALILZAD