Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USUNNEWYORK370
2007-05-14 19:09:00
UNCLASSIFIED
USUN New York
Cable title:
SUDAN: BENCHMARKS FOR DARFUR - P3 AMBASSADORS MEET
how-toVZCZCXRO4731 OO RUEHBZ RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV DE RUCNDT #0370/01 1341909 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 141909Z MAY 07 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1864 INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0833 RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0714 RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0280 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000370
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL UNSC ETTC SU PGOV
SUBJECT: SUDAN: BENCHMARKS FOR DARFUR - P3 AMBASSADORS MEET
WITH USG GUEHENNO
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000370
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL UNSC ETTC SU PGOV
SUBJECT: SUDAN: BENCHMARKS FOR DARFUR - P3 AMBASSADORS MEET
WITH USG GUEHENNO
1. U.S., U.K. and French ambassadors met with Under Secretary
General Guehenno on Friday, May 4, to discuss benchmarks for
Darfur. The three ambassadors conveyed the need to see quick
progress on the political, security, and humanitarian fronts.
They encouraged Guehenno to show results soon because
patience is running out for more time.
2. Guehenno cautioned that turning benchmarks into a
technical box-checking exercise would see us lose sight of
the wider picture. In deciding whether to act, the Council
should focus in particular on Sudan's actions, or lack of
actions, on the ground. Khartoum liked to provide diplomatic
overtures while at the same time stepping up its military
campaign. It was too much focus by the international
community on securing a deal on peacekeeping that allowed
them to do this.
3. Guehenno and his staff then gave a PowerPoint
presentation on recent developments. He identified four
critical problems facing the UN on deployment of the Heavy
Support Package and Hybrid. First, the UN had now twice
drilled for water in Al Fasher but found none. It was
seeking permission to drill further, but this hadn't been
forthcoming. Second, the UN also hadn't been able to secure
land for two (Nyala and El-Geneina) of the four camps
required for the HSP. As with drilling, the local authority
was looking to Khartoum, which was dragging its feet. Third,
AMIS hadn't yet restructured, meaning those UN officers that
had been deployed as part of the Light Support Package were
underutilized. Fourth, before the two additional AMIS
battalions (one Nigerian, one Rwandan),required to protect
the HSP, could be deployed, they would need to be equipped.
Egypt had promised 36 Armed Protection Carriers, but hadn't
delivered. Guehenno asked if the P3 could press Cairo. The
new battalions would also require new camps, which would take
(at least) 60 days to build. Put together, this meant that
we were looking at September/October at the earliest for the
HSP to begin to deploy, with a January 2008 target date for
the Hybrid to begin. But these timelines could slip further
if countries refused to deploy during the rainy season and/or
Sudan sought to hold things up. In the meantime, there would
be continued pressure from Konare, and Bashir, for the UN to
pay for AMIS. If the Council agreed to this, the UN would
lose all leverage over securing the Hybrid.
4. Turing to the Hybrid specifically, Guehenno said DPKO had
now finalized a proposal which Ban would send to the Council
once the AU had signed off on it. Guehenno noted that AU
acceptance wasn't a foregone conclusion. To be effective,
DPKO was clear that the Hybrid would need to draw on
non-African troop contributors. This would create problems
with Addis. Both due to ignorance and pride, Konare still
conceived of the Hybrid as an AU force with limited UN
support. Bashir was hiding behind this position. The UN's
"problem with Konare was a fundamental as that with Sudan."
Libya was also lobbying against non-African troops. We were
already starting to see this tension on the HSP where, so
far, Egypt and Nigeria were the only firm African offers.
Non-Africans might include Pakistan, China, India, Jordan and
the Nordics. But the Sudanese PermRep had told DPKO he was
reluctant to agree to these as the force should "be African
in nature."
5. Ambassador Khalilzad asked if any visible pre-deployment
activities could take place before the rainy season, and
Guehenno was pessimistic, saying it was hard to get anyone to
deploy assets into an environment where AMIS can't protect
them, let alone protect themselves. He said the Chinese DPR
called him that morning to pledge an engineering battalion,
but not word on when it would take the field. Ambassador
Khalilzad urged as much action as possible before the rainy
season.
6. Ambassador Khalilzad and UK Ambassador Jones Parry closed
the meeting by asking Guehenno for a list of action items on
the Light and Heavy Support Packages and the UN/AU hybrid
force that the P3 could help execute. Guehenno was glad for
the offer and sent a list of HSP action items to USUN on May
7. USUN has requested and is awaiting action items from
Guehenno on the Light Support Package and the hybrid
operation.
USUN NEW Y 00000370 002 OF 002
KHALILZAD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL UNSC ETTC SU PGOV
SUBJECT: SUDAN: BENCHMARKS FOR DARFUR - P3 AMBASSADORS MEET
WITH USG GUEHENNO
1. U.S., U.K. and French ambassadors met with Under Secretary
General Guehenno on Friday, May 4, to discuss benchmarks for
Darfur. The three ambassadors conveyed the need to see quick
progress on the political, security, and humanitarian fronts.
They encouraged Guehenno to show results soon because
patience is running out for more time.
2. Guehenno cautioned that turning benchmarks into a
technical box-checking exercise would see us lose sight of
the wider picture. In deciding whether to act, the Council
should focus in particular on Sudan's actions, or lack of
actions, on the ground. Khartoum liked to provide diplomatic
overtures while at the same time stepping up its military
campaign. It was too much focus by the international
community on securing a deal on peacekeeping that allowed
them to do this.
3. Guehenno and his staff then gave a PowerPoint
presentation on recent developments. He identified four
critical problems facing the UN on deployment of the Heavy
Support Package and Hybrid. First, the UN had now twice
drilled for water in Al Fasher but found none. It was
seeking permission to drill further, but this hadn't been
forthcoming. Second, the UN also hadn't been able to secure
land for two (Nyala and El-Geneina) of the four camps
required for the HSP. As with drilling, the local authority
was looking to Khartoum, which was dragging its feet. Third,
AMIS hadn't yet restructured, meaning those UN officers that
had been deployed as part of the Light Support Package were
underutilized. Fourth, before the two additional AMIS
battalions (one Nigerian, one Rwandan),required to protect
the HSP, could be deployed, they would need to be equipped.
Egypt had promised 36 Armed Protection Carriers, but hadn't
delivered. Guehenno asked if the P3 could press Cairo. The
new battalions would also require new camps, which would take
(at least) 60 days to build. Put together, this meant that
we were looking at September/October at the earliest for the
HSP to begin to deploy, with a January 2008 target date for
the Hybrid to begin. But these timelines could slip further
if countries refused to deploy during the rainy season and/or
Sudan sought to hold things up. In the meantime, there would
be continued pressure from Konare, and Bashir, for the UN to
pay for AMIS. If the Council agreed to this, the UN would
lose all leverage over securing the Hybrid.
4. Turing to the Hybrid specifically, Guehenno said DPKO had
now finalized a proposal which Ban would send to the Council
once the AU had signed off on it. Guehenno noted that AU
acceptance wasn't a foregone conclusion. To be effective,
DPKO was clear that the Hybrid would need to draw on
non-African troop contributors. This would create problems
with Addis. Both due to ignorance and pride, Konare still
conceived of the Hybrid as an AU force with limited UN
support. Bashir was hiding behind this position. The UN's
"problem with Konare was a fundamental as that with Sudan."
Libya was also lobbying against non-African troops. We were
already starting to see this tension on the HSP where, so
far, Egypt and Nigeria were the only firm African offers.
Non-Africans might include Pakistan, China, India, Jordan and
the Nordics. But the Sudanese PermRep had told DPKO he was
reluctant to agree to these as the force should "be African
in nature."
5. Ambassador Khalilzad asked if any visible pre-deployment
activities could take place before the rainy season, and
Guehenno was pessimistic, saying it was hard to get anyone to
deploy assets into an environment where AMIS can't protect
them, let alone protect themselves. He said the Chinese DPR
called him that morning to pledge an engineering battalion,
but not word on when it would take the field. Ambassador
Khalilzad urged as much action as possible before the rainy
season.
6. Ambassador Khalilzad and UK Ambassador Jones Parry closed
the meeting by asking Guehenno for a list of action items on
the Light and Heavy Support Packages and the UN/AU hybrid
force that the P3 could help execute. Guehenno was glad for
the offer and sent a list of HSP action items to USUN on May
7. USUN has requested and is awaiting action items from
Guehenno on the Light Support Package and the hybrid
operation.
USUN NEW Y 00000370 002 OF 002
KHALILZAD