Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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07USUNNEWYORK370 | 2007-05-14 19:09:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | USUN New York |
VZCZCXRO4731 OO RUEHBZ RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV DE RUCNDT #0370/01 1341909 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 141909Z MAY 07 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1864 INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0833 RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0714 RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0280 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY |
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000370 |
1. U.S., U.K. and French ambassadors met with Under Secretary General Guehenno on Friday, May 4, to discuss benchmarks for Darfur. The three ambassadors conveyed the need to see quick progress on the political, security, and humanitarian fronts. They encouraged Guehenno to show results soon because patience is running out for more time. 2. Guehenno cautioned that turning benchmarks into a technical box-checking exercise would see us lose sight of the wider picture. In deciding whether to act, the Council should focus in particular on Sudan's actions, or lack of actions, on the ground. Khartoum liked to provide diplomatic overtures while at the same time stepping up its military campaign. It was too much focus by the international community on securing a deal on peacekeeping that allowed them to do this. 3. Guehenno and his staff then gave a PowerPoint presentation on recent developments. He identified four critical problems facing the UN on deployment of the Heavy Support Package and Hybrid. First, the UN had now twice drilled for water in Al Fasher but found none. It was seeking permission to drill further, but this hadn't been forthcoming. Second, the UN also hadn't been able to secure land for two (Nyala and El-Geneina) of the four camps required for the HSP. As with drilling, the local authority was looking to Khartoum, which was dragging its feet. Third, AMIS hadn't yet restructured, meaning those UN officers that had been deployed as part of the Light Support Package were underutilized. Fourth, before the two additional AMIS battalions (one Nigerian, one Rwandan), required to protect the HSP, could be deployed, they would need to be equipped. Egypt had promised 36 Armed Protection Carriers, but hadn't delivered. Guehenno asked if the P3 could press Cairo. The new battalions would also require new camps, which would take (at least) 60 days to build. Put together, this meant that we were looking at September/October at the earliest for the HSP to begin to deploy, with a January 2008 target date for the Hybrid to begin. But these timelines could slip further if countries refused to deploy during the rainy season and/or Sudan sought to hold things up. In the meantime, there would be continued pressure from Konare, and Bashir, for the UN to pay for AMIS. If the Council agreed to this, the UN would lose all leverage over securing the Hybrid. 4. Turing to the Hybrid specifically, Guehenno said DPKO had now finalized a proposal which Ban would send to the Council once the AU had signed off on it. Guehenno noted that AU acceptance wasn't a foregone conclusion. To be effective, DPKO was clear that the Hybrid would need to draw on non-African troop contributors. This would create problems with Addis. Both due to ignorance and pride, Konare still conceived of the Hybrid as an AU force with limited UN support. Bashir was hiding behind this position. The UN's "problem with Konare was a fundamental as that with Sudan." Libya was also lobbying against non-African troops. We were already starting to see this tension on the HSP where, so far, Egypt and Nigeria were the only firm African offers. Non-Africans might include Pakistan, China, India, Jordan and the Nordics. But the Sudanese PermRep had told DPKO he was reluctant to agree to these as the force should "be African in nature." 5. Ambassador Khalilzad asked if any visible pre-deployment activities could take place before the rainy season, and Guehenno was pessimistic, saying it was hard to get anyone to deploy assets into an environment where AMIS can't protect them, let alone protect themselves. He said the Chinese DPR called him that morning to pledge an engineering battalion, but not word on when it would take the field. Ambassador Khalilzad urged as much action as possible before the rainy season. 6. Ambassador Khalilzad and UK Ambassador Jones Parry closed the meeting by asking Guehenno for a list of action items on the Light and Heavy Support Packages and the UN/AU hybrid force that the P3 could help execute. Guehenno was glad for the offer and sent a list of HSP action items to USUN on May 7. USUN has requested and is awaiting action items from Guehenno on the Light Support Package and the hybrid operation. USUN NEW Y 00000370 002 OF 002 KHALILZAD |