TALKING WITH UN ABOUT FIXING UNAMI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000325

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2012
TAGS: PREL UNSC IZ
SUBJECT: TALKING WITH UN ABOUT FIXING UNAMI


Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro Wolff for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: During an April 26 meeting with UN Under
Secretary-General Lynn Pascoe, Ambassador Wolff raised U.S.

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concerns about UNAMI, including the human rights report on
Iraq released April 25 and the mission's credibility problem
with the government of Iraq. Pascoe admitted "we have a
problem" with UNAMI, and committed to working closely with
the USG to revise the mission's mandate and to identify a
suitable successor to current SRSG Ashraf Qazi -- one who can
work closely with Ambassador Crocker and the Iraqis. USUN
also met April 25 with deputy SRSG Michael von der
Schulenburg, who is visiting New York to participate in an
internal UN meeting April 27 to discuss Iraq policy.
Schulenburg said he warned Qazi that the human rights report
would antagonize "a paranoid Iraq government under siege,"
and argued that UNAMI lacks a proper vision of its role. He
recommended that UNAMI focus on national reconciliation
(which he defines as including continued support for
constitutional reform and elections),institutional
development, mediation on Kirkuk, and contact work in the
region. End Summary.


2. (C) Amb Wolff met privately with DPA USYG Pascoe April 26
to express USG concerns about UNAMI's handling of the
mission's most recent human rights report, released April 25.
(As a special political mission, UNAMI falls under the UN's
Department of Political Affairs.) Amb Wolff said important
sections of the report are factually inaccurate, and the
polemical tone is inconsistent with standard UN practice.
Moreover, UNAMI failed to engage seriously with the GOI and
the USG prior to the report's release. The UN did not
consult adequately and resisted efforts to address the
report's deficiencies. This episode would only worsen the
mission's credibility problem with the GOI, and make it more
difficult to address troubling GOI practices. Amb Wolff
advised that the UN must correct the perception of UNAMI's
pro-Sunni bias in order for the mission to play an effective
role in Iraq.


3. (C) Amb Wolff also shared with Pascoe USG concerns about
reports that UNAMI is prepared to recommend to UN management
that the mission involve itself in policy areas outside its
current mandate. Deputy SRSG Schulenberg told USUN April 25
that UNAMI would like to engage in dialogue with armed Sunni
Arab opposition groups based outside of Iraq. He said UNAMI
also wants to take on a role in resolving the status of
Kirkuk. Amb Wolff advised Pascoe that the GOI would not
welcome or support a UNAMI role in negotiating with Iraqi
Sunni Arabs. While a UNAMI role in Kirkuk might prove
helpful, key stakeholders such as the GOI, the Kurds, and
Turkey would first need to gain confidence in UNAMI. Amb
Wolff urged Pascoe to consult closely with the USG on changes
to UNAMI's mandate, reminding him that UNAMI should not
neglect its current tasks, including helping the Iraqis hold
provincial elections.


4. (C) Pascoe admitted "we have a problem" with UNAMI. He
agreed that the UN needed to identify a replacement for
Ashraf Qazi (whose contract expires in August),and reported
that the GOI had requested his successor not be a Muslim
because of sectarian sensitivities. Pascoe agreed that in
order for UNAMI to succeed it needed to have the confidence
of the GOI and Ambassador Crocker, and committed to working
closely with the USG to revise UNAMI's mandate and appoint
new personnel. Pascoe also said he intended to make related
personnel changes in his office in New York.


5. (C) Separately, USUN met April 25 with deputy SRSG
Michael von der Schulenburg, who was called to New York to
participate in an internal UN policy meeting on Iraq
scheduled for April 27. Schulenburg said UNAMI staffer
Haniyah Mutfti had drafted the human rights report. He said
Mufti is a Sunni Arab Jordanian national married to an Iraqi
and that she has a well-known political bias against the
Shia. He claimed he had warned Qazi that the report would be
rejected by the GOI, which he described as a paranoid
government under siege. He noted that UNAMI's mandate is to
support the GOI in the area of human rights, and argued the
report failed in that regard.


6. (C) Schulenburg said he was in an awkward position,
because he was supposed to represent UNAMI in the internal UN
policy meeting to discuss a proposal for UNAMI to engage
armed Sunni Arab groups outside Iraq, and to play a role in
resolving Kirkuk's status. But Schulenburg said the UN
lacked the capacity to play a role in negotiating with Iraq's
Sunni Arab community, noting that in order to negotiate you
needed leverage, which he said UNAMI did not have. He also
suggested that the GOI would rightfully oppose any UNAMI role
with Sunni Arabs, given the mission's perceived bias. He

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added that UNAMI must correct this perception before it can
engage successfully in Iraq. While he believes the UN could
play a helpful role in Kirkuk, the UNAMI proposal in this
area did not reflect his thinking, including the results of
his recent trip to Irbil. (Note: He shared several reports,
including one on Kirkuk, which USUN has e-mailed to Embassy
Baghdad. End Note.)


7. (C) Schulenburg argued UNAMI needed new leadership, a
revised role, and more logistical support (e.g., housing,
transport). In terms of a revised mandate, he believes UNAMI
should focus on national reconciliation, which he defines as
including constitutional reform and elections; institutional
development; mediation on Kirkuk; and a contact role in the
region. On the latter point, he suggested the UN could
provide the framework for contact among key countries.
WOLFF