UNSC/DARFUR: DPKO DISCUSSES HYBRID COMMAND AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000320 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO SUBJECT: UNSC/DARFUR: DPKO DISCUSSES HYBRID COMMAND AND CONTROL REF: USUN NEW YORK 00272 USUN NEW Y 00000320 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Jackie Sanders for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In an April 16 meeting with United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Under-Secretary-General (U/SYG) Jean-Marie Guehenno, the USG pushed for clarity on issues of command and control of the third stage of the three-phase Darfur peacekeeping plan outlined in the November 16 Addis Ababa Agreement and in the March 6 letters from the UN and African Union (AU) to the Sudanese Government. Guehenno admitted that the plan for the hybrid as envisaged by the UN and AU had inherent risks but insisted that ensuring strong leadership at the theater level, maintaining strong support for the future Joint Special Representative, establishing a UN-AU coordination cell and exploiting capacity asymmetry between the UN and AU headquarters would mitigate any difficulties with the plan. ¶2. (C) Participants in the April 16 meeting were DPKO U/SYG Guehenno, DPKO Africa Division Director Dmitry Titov, DPKO Darfur Planning Team Officer Laura Sitea, Special Envoy Natsios (by phone),Chief of Staff Steinfeld (by phone),A/S Silverberg, Ambassador Sanders, Sanctionsoff and Poloff. ¶3. (C) DPKO U/SYG Guehenno summarized a meeting just concluded with SYG Ban Ki-moon, AU Commission Chairperson Konare, UN Special Envoy Eliasson and AU Special Envoy Salim. Konare had just confirmed full Sudanese support for the Heavy Support Package (HSP) after having spoken with Sudanese FM Lam Akol on April 15. Konare had told the meeting that listening to President Bashir and building trust with the Government of National Unity (GNU) pays but had reprimanded the GNU for employing "divide and conquer" tactics with the international community. The SYG had expanded on Special Eliasson's call for all parties to return to the negotiating table, saying that given the political atmosphere created, the time was not right to pressure the GNU. Guehenno admitted that the SYG had a "different reading (than DPKO) on the merits of trust versus sanctions" (reftel). ¶4. (C) On the HSP, Guehenno urged the immediate deployment of two additional battalions (Rwandan and Nigerian) to the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS),since AMIS enablers were unable to provide for their own security, as the attacks since April 1 illustrated (NOTE: The two battalions are also part of a reorganization of AMIS from eight sectors to three. AMIS Force Commander Aprezi has stalled on the re-sectoring of the Darfur region, claiming a need for the two battalions in order to carry this out. END NOTE). Guehenno added that deployment of these battalions was linked to the provision of 36 armored personnel carriers (APCs) by Egypt, which had not yet firmed up its commitment. A/S Silverberg said that when the USG approached Egypt on this point, the GOE had responded that DPKO would not accept its offer of personnel. Guehenno acknowledged the perception by Sudanese rebels that Egyptian forces would be sympathetic to the GNU and said DPKO would accordingly be cautious in utilizing them. Guehenno was hopeful that an April 19 troop and police contributing meeting would lead to HSP contributions, and A/S Silverberg offered USG assistance in shoring up TCC support. ¶5. (C) SE Natsios made the point that the prospect of uncertain UN command and control made potential troop contributors wary of committing to the Darfur operation. Clarity on the hybrid could be useful in this regard, but Natsios commented that the system outlined in the March 6 letters from the UN and AU to the Sudanese Government was extremely convoluted. Guehenno agreed that the plan "on paper" was flawed, but he outlined steps that he believed would alleviate key difficulties. One such step would be ensuring the leadership and key staff at the theater level in El-Fasher were people who understood UN systems and operations and who could work with the UN. Guehenno's preferred candidate for Force Commander (FC) was GEN Agwai (Nigeria). Guehenno reported that SYG Ban believed President Obasanjo had approved Agwai's release from the Nigerian Armed Forces, but Konare disputed Obasanjo's response, pushing instead for his preferred Rwandan candidate. Guehenno suggested that a Rwandan could serve as Deputy FC and potentially replace Agwai at a later stage. Guehenno said it USUN NEW Y 00000320 002.2 OF 002 was not certain whether Bashir or Konare would approve Agwai, calling Konare "wobbly" on the appointment. He also mentioned that Konare would likely remain in his current position as AU Commission Chair, since the deadline for nominating a new candidate had passed without takers. Guehenno said this strategy of placing trusted people in key positions applied to the Joint Special Representative (JSR) structure as well, namely in the person of DPKO-proposed Deputy JSR Anyidoho. ¶6. (C) Guehenno was also optimistic about the pre-emptive capability of a joint AU-UN planning and coordination cell in Addis Ababa to act as an "alarm system" for potentially problematic decisions sent down from AU headquarters to the field. Although this cell would not be able to vet any such decisions, UN Staff could flag issues that needed to be resolved at higher levels. Finally, Guehenno suggested that the fundamental asymmetry of capacity between AU and UN headquarters in favor of New York would cede the initiative on key documents and policies (e.g. rules of engagement) to the UN. In response to a question from A/S Silverberg, Guehenno assured the AU lacked the capacity to do much more than revise these documents around the edges and could not fundamentally alter policy in an unfavorable way. ¶7. (C) SE Natsios pointed out that this strategy was based on finding and keeping the right individuals in key positions. He stressed that the Libyans and others were opposed to UN forces in Sudan and could easily strengthen the capacity of the AU if it were in their interests to do so. Natsios asked what would happen if GEN Agwai were unable to assume the FC position and someone less favorable to the UN took over. Guehenno acknowledged that this was a real risk and added that potential problems also lay in the vetting of troops between the AU and the UN. However, he did not outline any plan for redressing the weaknesses of the current framework. Guehenno did mention that the existing agreement was a "framework" document still subject to suggestions and comments. Given all the room for error, compounded by the outstanding issue of GNU consent, A/S Silverberg said the USG had not changed its mind on the need for further measures as inducements for progress. KHALILZAD