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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USUNNEWYORK30
2007-01-17 22:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

DARFUR: P-3 AND DPKO FOCUS ON AU SUMMIT

Tags:   PGOV  PREL  PREF  KPKO  CD  SU 
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VZCZCXRO0699
OO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #0030/01 0172225
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 172225Z JAN 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1141
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 1091
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0513
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE 0221
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE
						C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000030 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF KPKO CD SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: P-3 AND DPKO FOCUS ON AU SUMMIT
DELIVERABLES

REF: (A) USUN 018 (B) USUN 028

USUN NEW Y 00000030 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Acting Permanent Representative Alex Wolff for Reasons 1
.4 b/d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000030

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF KPKO CD SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: P-3 AND DPKO FOCUS ON AU SUMMIT
DELIVERABLES

REF: (A) USUN 018 (B) USUN 028

USUN NEW Y 00000030 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Acting Permanent Representative Alex Wolff for Reasons 1
.4 b/d.


1. (C) SUMMARY. P-3 principals and DPKO chief Guehenno agreed
on January 15 that the January 29-30 African Union Summit
presents an important opportunity for achieving clarity on
the way forward in Darfur. USUN and UKUN principals pushed
Guehenno to use scheduled high-level UN-AU meetings on
January 18-19 in Khartoum to finalize the "heavy" UN support
package for AMIS and set the stage for Summit deliverables to
include confirmation of previous agreements on the "hybrid"
areas of force size, mandate (adding a protection of
civilians plank in particular), and command and control.
Meeting participants agreed that solid UN-AU agreement on
these heavy and hybrid aspects is essential to finalization
of funding and facilitation of force generation. Guehenno
and A/SYG Annabi suggested that UN member states, led by the
P-3, could usefully engage the AU in advance of both sets of
meetings to encourage AU leaders to get ready to take on
greater responsibility as the heavy phase builds and
eventually gives way to the hybrid phase. After the
theatrics of January 10 Council consultations, discussion on
Chad on January 15 was confined to consideration of whether
the humanitarian crisis there might be relieved by deployment
of a peacekeeping force even in the absence of a political
process. END SUMMARY.

Light Package Lighter Than Hoped; Heavy Package Resists
Closure
--------------
--------------

2, (C) In follow up to January 10 Security Council
consultations marked by unusually testy exchanges between A/S
Annabi and several Council members (ref A), P-3 UN principals
met on January 15 with UN Undersecretary for Peacekeeping
Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno, UN Africa Division A/SYG Hedi
Annabi, and other senior DPKO officials to more calmly

strategize. After the lengthy January 10 session devoted
primarily to Chad, discussion at the later meeting focused
primarily on Darfur. Guehenno reiterated that 36 staff have
been deployed in connection with the UN's "light" support
package for AMIS, several more are in the pipeline, and 31
positions have yet to be filled by donors.


3. (C) Regarding the "heavy" support package, Guehenno said a
senior DPKO team would meet with AU officials January 18-19
in Khartoum in an attempt to reach accommodation on three
items (attack helicopters, formed police units, and human
rights officers) that have become sticking points. (NOTE.
The AU and UN both want to deploy the helicopters, but they
haven't been procured; the AU is resisting the police units
(probably on behalf of the Sudanese Government), but the UN
insists on them to protect deployments; the AU wants human
rights officers to report in the AU chain of command, but
UNHCHR refuses to delegate its responsibility. END NOTE.)
Annabi said DPKO officials thought they had a final deal on
the heavy package after December 4-7 meetings, but "it has
been re-opened." If a deal can (again) be reached with the
AU, UN and AU officials would jointly present it to Sudan
President Al-Bashir in the tripartite context.


4. (C) Annabi said a final deal on the heavy package, when
realized, would be presented to potential troop contributing
countries (TCC's) in an effort to generate the 3,000 troops
envisaged. He added that a TCC meeting last week produced
only one expression of interest -- from Bangladesh -- and
that the AU (Chairman Konare in particular) has been
decidedly cool to the idea of bringing non-African troops
into the heavy force. A/SYG for Peacekeeping Operations Jane
Holl Lute said "self-sustainability capacity doesn't exist
among African forces," so that using them for the heavy force
would necessitate some manner of "sponsorship arrangements."

Engaging An Elusive AU on the Heavy-Hybrid Transition
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Annabi said there has been "lots of reluctance at
AU-AMIS" to engage in discussions with DPKO on the hybrid
force. A high-level meeting had been tentatively scheduled
for mid-January, but the AU has asked for a postponement
until mid-February in deference to the January 29-30 AU
Summit in Addis Ababa. DPKO countered with a suggestion that

USUN NEW Y 00000030 002 OF 002


hybrid force discussions follow immediately on the January
18-19 heavy package discussions in Khartoum. The AU has
tentatively agreed, provided the heavy package comes together
first.


6. (C) USUN Charge Wolff suggested that the AU Summit
provides an opportunity for achieving clarity and closure on
the elements of the heavy-hybrid transition, urging that
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon use the Summit to secure AU

SIPDIS
commitment to the specifics of the hybrid force. Arguing
that we have spent too much time trying to finesse with the
AU command and control, force generation, and other issues,
Charge Wolff suggested the time has come to reach closure.
Otherwise, he said, troops in the field transitioning from a
heavy to a hybrid configuration, theoretically next July 1,
will suddenly have to shoulder much greater responsibilities,
especially regarding protection of civilians. He suggested
that we instead impress on the AU that its mandate needs
beefing up and its troops in the field need to steadily
increase functional capacities because we need a force that
can be ready to handle all this by July 1.


7. (C) To Lute's plea that "we can't give AMIS a mandate
beyond its capacity," Guehenno said that building AMIS
capacity is essential to a successful heavy deployment and a
successful heavy-hybrid transition. Reminding all that the
heavy package is itself a transition phase, he added that
"the heavy package makes sense only if the hybrid package is
on its way -- otherwise the high visibility heavy deployment
will become a high visibility failure." Backtracking, Lute
said, "our view has always been to beef up AMIS to allow a
smooth heavy-hybrid transition." Annabi appealed for help in
getting the AU to accept a growing AMIS mandate, suggesting
that the P-3 "do the political heavy lifting" by asking the
AU to accept a broader mandate. Ambassador Wolff wrapped up
this portion of the discussion by urging that the UN and P-3
together and separately focus on "using the Summit to get the
agreement we want," particularly by attempting to persuade
Chairman Konare that the Summit is a major opportunity for
the AU and him.

Heavy Package Money: It's Not In Place
--------------


8. (C) Lute said that the DPKO has paid for the light package
by borrowing from UNMIS. This she said has not been a major
burden ($2 million to date) but has perhaps set a bad
precedent in that there has been insufficient realization
that the UN funding process for the heavy package must be
respected. She said DPKO cannot go the Fifth Committee to
ask for a minimum $180 million in assessed funds for the
heavy package until we have clarity on what is in the
package. The UK PermRep reminded participants that the UK
had paid $15 million early this month against ongoing AMIS
expenses but had not committed to pay more. (NOTE. DPKO
estimates AMIS operation expenses at $360 million for the
first six months of 2007. END NOTE.)

Chad: Clarification Of Conditions In Camps
--------------


9. (C) Guehenno and Annabi summarized the state of play in
Chad regarding the return of the technical assessment mission
and the deployment of an advance team (reftels). Following
on the testy exchanges of the January 10 Council
consultations, the UK PermRep raised only one follow-on
matter -- the protection of civilians in refugee camps. He
argued that this protection should not depend on the
establishment of a political process, one of the primary aims
of the advance team. Guehenno argued that lives have not
been lost in Chad camps (unlike the situation in Darfur) but
"in places where people are moving." UNHCR, he said,
"doesn't want us in the camps because the rebels are leaving
the camps alone." He said the need for protection of
civilians in Chad is greatest among the 100,000 IDP's, who
are not in camps, implying that protection of such a large
mobile population could only be part of a comprehensive
deployment. UKUN PermRep rejoined that individual attacks,
especially against women, are taking place in the camps and
that the 190 gendarmes dedicated to the issue are
insufficient. DPKO did not dispute the point.

WOLFF