UNSC/DARFUR: CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM AFTER APRIL 9

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000295 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CD PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU UNSC KPKO SUBJECT: UNSC/DARFUR: CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM AFTER APRIL 9 "SUCCESS" IN ADDIS REF: SECSTATE 48637 USUN NEW Y 00000295 001.4 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. At April 12 consultations, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Members welcomed news of the apparent "success" enjoyed by Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Africa Division Director Dmitry Titov at the April 9 UN/African Union (AU)/Sudanese Government of National Unity (GNU) High-Level Technical Consultations on the Heavy Support Package (HSP) in Addis Ababa. Titov reported "exemplary coordination" between the UN and AU at the meeting. According to Titov, the GNU delegation agreed to everything in the HSP but needed to consult with President Bashir on the inclusion of attack helicopters. Bashir's "positive response" was expected April 13, in time for the upcoming April 16 briefing to the UNSC by AU Commission Chair Konare. UK PR and current UNSC President Jones Parry announced his intention to circulate, once Bashir's response was received, a draft letter to the Secretary-General (provided by USUN to UKUN on April 11) authorizing funding for the HSP. Sanctions were discussed as both incentives for and obstacles to political progress in Darfur; French PR de La Sabliere was explicit that it was only because of the threat of sanctions that a modicum of success was achieved on April 9. Titov said the April 16 meeting with Konare would focus on possible timelines for HSP troop generation, results of AU-UN planning for the hybrid operation, and ways to give new impetus to the Darfur political process. END SUMMARY. DPKO REPORTED RELATIVE HSP SUCCESS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) At April 12 UNSC consultations, DPKO Africa Division Director Titov reported on the outcome of the April 9 UN/AU/GNU High-Level Technical Consultations on the HSP in Addis Ababa. Titov had led the UN delegation; AU Peace and Security Commissioner Djinnit had led the AU team; and GNU Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Mutrif Siddiq had led the GNU side. Titov reported "exemplary coordination" between the AU and UN both before and during the meeting, basing their explanations to the GNU on the November 16 Addis Ababa agreements, which were intended to assist the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) in fulfilling its mandate and supporting the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA); on the indivisibility of HSP elements; and on the transparency of HSP implementation. The UN and AU countered GNU arguments about the necessity of adding attack helicopters to AMIS' mandate but assuring that all military elements requested were intended for their own self-protection and for the protection of UN and AU forces. Titov added that AMIS Force Commander Aprezi made an appeal for such protective elements in the wake of the April 1 and 10 killings of AMIS troops, saying his troops were "outmanned, outgunned and outmaneuvered." Titov stressed the pressure from the AU for the UN to assume AMIS financing as soon as possible. ¶3. (SBU) According to Titov, the GNU delegation came to Addis "prepared to make major concessions." Its talking points had including cooperation between the HSP civilian component and Sudanese national institutions as appropriate and inclusion of the GNU as a partner in the implementation of AMIS' three-sector re-structuring. The delegation also insisted that African troop contributors be given first crack at HSP recruitment, but the UN warned that with no reliable TCC offers and only one "solid" African contributor, this may not be ultimately feasible (NOTE: The UN plans to convene a new TCC meeting following Konare's April 16 briefing. END NOTE). The GNU delegation also asserted its right to executive policing authority. On the issue of attack helicopters, al-Sadiq told Titov his justification was sufficient and that he would revert to President Bashir with a recommendation to accept this provision. On April 12 the Sudanese PR told Titov that this recommendation had been approved and that Bashir was expected to sign off by April 13 "with no conditions attached." al-Sadiq hoped the UNSC would issue a statement welcoming this acceptance and condemning the activity of "spoilers," which had resulted in the deaths of AMIS peacekeepers. USUN NEW Y 00000295 002.4 OF 003 ¶4. (SBU) Noting that the April 9 meeting did not address extending AMIS or finalizing the hybrid, Titov said the April 16 meeting with Konare would focus on possible timelines for HSP troop generation, results of AU-UN planning for the hybrid operation, and ways to give new impetus to the Darfur political process. On command and control of the hybrid, Titov said the UN was awaiting Bashir's response on the candidate proposed for Joint Special Representative with which the GNU "had difficulty." Titov admitted it would take "months" to generate troops for the hybrid. MOST MEMBERS WELCOME OUTCOME, OTHERS URGE CAUTION -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Chinese, Qatari and Indonesian representatives highlighted the effectiveness of engaging the GNU as a partner in Darfur peacekeeping decisions rather than as a bystander. The Chinese and South African delegates supported the idea of a UNSC statement welcoming the HSP consensus reached in Addis. However, Ambassador Sanders and PRs from France, Belgium and the UK advised the Council to be cautious before pronouncing itself, since the GNU had a history of broken promises on Darfur. Members were unanimous in urging DPKO to accelerate its preparations for HSP and agreement with the AU on the hybrid operation. Some Members, including Qatar and Ghana, spoke to the need to pressure "spoilers" and DPA non-signatories, who were destabilizing the situation on the ground and dissuading potential TCCs. CHAD SITUATION NOW AFFECTING SUDAN -------------- 6.(SBU) Titov updated Members on the deterioration of the Chad-Sudan border situation, noting that the likely cancellation of a planned visit by Chadian FM Allam-mi to Khartoum illustrated the failure of diplomatic efforts to reconcile the countries' differences, especially after the April 9 incident at Amdjirama and For Baranga. Russian PR Churkin recommended engaging AU interlocutors, and the French delegation, echoed by Ghana, made two interventions calling for the immediate dispatching of DPKO's advance mission to N'Djamena, something Titov said would be difficult at the moment, given that DPKO was "overstretched" (NOTE: PolMinsCouns got the same response from DPKO A/SYG Annabi when he made the same suggestion on April 4. French PR de La Sabliere planned to call DPKO U/SYG Guehenno on April 12 to reinforce the point. END NOTE). UK PR Jones Parry reminded that Central African Republic was still a willing recipient of UN peacekeepers. SANCTIONS DEBATE STILL LOOMS -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The Qatari representative credited intensified diplomacy with the positive outcome of the April 9 meeting and stated that the remaining problems could be resolved diplomatically, expressing his appreciation to the USG and the UK for respecting the political space sought by SYG Ban. He continued that it was important to safeguard the political achievements made, and that pressure on Khartoum would not bring further gains, arguing instead that pressure be directed at those rebels who did not sign the DPA. In contrast, French PR de La Sabliere, in a surprisingly strong statement, noted that pressure on Khartoum must be sustained and that it was the very threat of sanctions that was responsible for the recent progress. ¶8. (SBU) Chinese Political Coordinator Li Jun-hua told PolMinsCouns before consultations that China very much welcomed the April 9 agreement in Addis and that the UNSC needed to demonstrate progress on the "political front" to maintain Sudanese cooperation on the three-phase plan. He said this argument had been an important part of Beijing's dialogue with the GNU on the HSP. Li said that the agreement on the HSP needed to be implemented with "prudence," noting China's heavy diplomatic lifting to bring the Sudanese along and mentioning in particular "hard-hitting" conversations that Sudanese Presidential Assistant Nafie Ali Nafie had USUN NEW Y 00000295 003.4 OF 003 during his March visit to Beijing. Li suggested accommodating the Sudanese by approaching Africans for HSP troop contributions first and only turning to other countries if Africans could supply them. PolMinscouns argued that we needed to do whatever would most quickly facilitate HSP deployment, whatever nationality the troops may be, a statement with which Li concurred. He seemed surprised and almost dismayed to learn that DPKO estimated three months to deploy after HSP funding became available. ¶9. (SBU) Li was concerned that we not jeopardize this hard-won progress by too quickly reverting to discussion of sanctions. Li was skeptical about the UNSC's authorizing HSP deployment without a resolution, but seemed impressed by our plan, endorsed by DPKO, to seek such authorization in the form of a a letter from the UNSC President to the SYG. Li hoped the USG would use its "influence" to bring Darfur rebels to the table and work for a lasting ceasefire. Li stressed the importance of supporting the efforts of UN Special Envoy Eliasson and AU Special Envoy Salim. PolMinsCouns replied that we would continue to encourage the political process and take every opportunity to express support for the Darfur negotiators. WOLFF