Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USUNNEWYORK282
2007-04-11 21:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

UN/SUDAN SANCTIONS: COMMITTEE MEETS WITH EXPERTS

Tags:  PREL UNSC ETTC SU PGOV 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1682
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RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0812
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0657
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0261
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000282 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2017
TAGS: PREL UNSC ETTC SU PGOV
SUBJECT: UN/SUDAN SANCTIONS: COMMITTEE MEETS WITH EXPERTS
PANEL TO DISCUSS EMBARGO VIOLATIONS


USUN NEW Y 00000282 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: MINISTER COUNSELOR WILLIAM BRENCICK, FOR REASONS: 1.4(B)
AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000282 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2017 TAGS: PREL UNSC ETTC SU PGOV SUBJECT: UN/SUDAN SANCTIONS: COMMITTEE MEETS WITH EXPERTS PANEL TO DISCUSS EMBARGO VIOLATIONS USUN NEW Y 00000282 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: MINISTER COUNSELOR WILLIAM BRENCICK, FOR REASONS: 1.4(B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Sudan Panel of Experts briefed the Sudan Sanctions Committee on April 10 on its interim report, which highlighted ongoing violations of the arms embargo by the rebels and the GOS, and GOS offensive overflights in Darfur and use of white aircraft bearing the UN logo, all of which contravened resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1591 (2005). Given the continued embargo violations, the Panel recommended expanding the embargo to all of Sudan and imposing further sanctions on individuals impeding the peace process. The Panel expressed privately to USUN its frustration that the Committee has taken no action on the information it has provided over the past year. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: The UK, supported by USUN, argued that the Panel's findings were further evidence of GOS and rebel disregard for the will of the international community. Slovakia and Peru stated their support for new sanctions, and Belgium expressed support for sanctions that would complement the political process. France argued that Committee action should not impede broader discussions taking place on Darfur, but that this position did not preclude French support for new sanctions on individuals. Without explicitly opposing further sanctions, China argued that Committee action must further the goal of finding a solution in Darfur, and credited the international community's intensive diplomatic engagement for the recent progress on the Heavy Support Package. Russia argued that increasing sanctions pressure against Khartoum at this time would be "counterproductive," and Indonesia stated that sanctions would complicate the delicate political process. South Africa indicated that their overriding concern was to not take action that would worsen the situation in Darfur. END SUMMARY. VIOLATIONS OF THE EMBARGO UNABATED ¶3. (C) The Sudan Sanctions Committee, established pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1591 (2005),was briefed on April 10 by the Sudan Panel of Experts on their March 2007 interim report, which found that violations of the arms embargo continued unabated by all parties to the conflict during the January to March reporting period. The Pan
el asserted that weapons are entering Darfur both from other countries and from Sudan. It stated that since September 2006 the main impediments to the peace process and threats to stability in the region had been ongoing hostilities in Darfur; the lack of progress in disarmament of non-governmental armed groups in Darfur; the increased factionalization among select armed groups; impediments to the work of the African Union (AU) and UN operations in Darfur; and armed incursions across the Chad-Sudan border. ¶4. (C) One particularly egregious impediment to the work of the AU and UN was the Government of Sudan's use of white aircraft, one of which, an Antonov AN-26 with GOS registration number 7705 observed by the Panel on March 7, also bore a UN logo. The Panel believed that the GOS was deliberately attempting to disguise its aircraft to resemble UN or AMIS aircraft, an act that constituted a violation of the DPA and of customary international humanitarian rights law (IHL). The Panel had confirmed with UN representatives in Sudan that the UN did not operate the aircraft in question, and underlined that the use of white aircraft increased the risk to UN or AU personnel of being targeted. The Panel was also continuing to investigate instances of aerial bombardment by the GOS and attacks on civilians that may constitute violations of IHL. PANEL ENDORSES FURTHER SANCTIONS ¶5. (C) The Panel encouraged the Committee to reconsider its previous recommendations in light of the continued embargo violations, namely: expanding the arms embargo to all of Sudan, requiring end-use certification for arms sold to Sudan, and placing restrictions on the import of dual-use items. It also recommended that the Committee formally consider the candidates in the confidential annex to the September 2006 report for targeted sanctions, which they pointed out included both rebels and GOS officials. USUN NEW Y 00000282 002.2 OF 003 UK, US, FRANCE, SLOVAKIA, BELGIUM, AND PERU SUPPORT SANCTIONS ¶6. (C) In contrast with previous Committee meetings with the Panel, the meeting was relatively collegial, and all delegations acknowledged the high quality of the report. Most delegations registered grave concern over the use of white aircraft. Taking the floor first, the UK pointed to the Panel's findings as further evidence of GOS and rebel disregard for the will of the international community and stressed that the Committee had more than enough information in front of it to act. USUN echoed UK comments and supported a UK proposal that the Committee meet regularly to consider the many cases of violations before it. ¶7. (C) Slovakia emphasized that the Committee and Security Council's failure to take action on the repeated violations of the embargo undermined the Council's credibility. Slovakia stated that it was ready to support an expansion of the arms embargo and further targeted sanctions, as did Belgium, which added that sanctions should complement the political process. The French stated that the Committee should avoid impeding the ongoing discussions and create "political space" for further political progress, but underlined that this position did not mean that France would not support additional individual sanctions. Peru noted that it preferred "dialogue at all times," but had concluded that GOS had done little to pursue dialogue and advised that the Committee take the Panel's recommendations very seriously. CHINA AND QATAR LESS STRIDENT THAN IN PAST ¶8. (C) Mostly abandoning the ad hominem attacks that had characterized their criticism of the Panel in the past, the Chinese and Qatari statements were relatively light in their criticism of the report (comment: perhaps thanks to the report's overwhelming factual evidence of embargo violations. End comment.). Qatar stated that the report could be read as an indictment of the GOS, and asked why the Panel had not referenced the positive actions the GOS or explored GOS's reasons or motivations for its embargo violations. Qatar also stated that it was gravely concerned over use of white aircraft by the GOS, provided that the photographs had not been doctored. (The Panel assured the Committee that they had not be altered and were taken by Panel members themselves.) Qatar warned the Panel, and was later supported by China, that it was inappropriate to "prod" the Committee to impose targeted sanctions. The UK subsequently reminded the Committee that it was fully within the Panel's mandate to recommend action. ¶9. (C) China stated that the Committee's work was not conducted in a vacuum and must further the goal of finding a solution in Darfur. China pointed to positive movement from Khartoum on the Heavy-Support Package and the recent reduction of violence in Darfur, crediting the international community's intensive diplomatic efforts, and noted DepSec Negroponte's upcoming visit to the region. China also asserted that the report was skewed toward GOS's violations of the embargo. ¶10. (C) Russia argued that increasing sanctions pressure against Khartoum at this time would be "counterproductive" and that the Committee's task should focus on full implementation of the current resolutions. Russia would not support expanding the arms embargo and noted the need for a balanced approach to a crisis for which all parties bear responsibility. ¶11. (C) Indonesia stated that the political process was the key to resolving the conflict in Darfur, and neither a peacekeeping operation nor additional sanctions could substitute for that process. Further sanctions would instead complicate a delicate process. South Africa stated that their overriding concern was to not take action that worsened the situation in Darfur and asked how previous targeted sanctions had impacted the crisis, noting that such information would help it better understand the Panel's recommendations. The Panel responded that it believed sanctions to have a deterrent effect, and stressed that in their conversations with parties to the conflict, the latter USUN NEW Y 00000282 003.2 OF 003 exhibited noticeable nervousness about the potential to be subject to sanctions. PANEL FRUSTRATED WITH COUNCIL INACTION ¶12. (C) In a private meeting with the Panel earlier during the day (attended by IO/PSC Sanctions Chief John Sandage, USUN Sanctions Unit Head Brian Hook, USUN PolOff Anna Morris, and UK PolOff David Whineray),the Panel expressed its frustration over the Committee's perceived lack of action on any of the information the Panel has provided over the past year, including suggested targets for individual sanctions in the September 2006 confidential annex to the Panel's report and the information on the white aircraft, first transmitted to the Committee on March 9, 2007. ¶13. (C) USUN assured the Panel that Washington shared its frustration with Committee inaction. Noting that the Committee was constrained by the consensus rule for sanctioning individuals, the Panel urged USUN and the UK to force a vote in the Council on new names and sanctions measures. The Panel was also willing to bypass the Committee by sending a copy of their interim report directly to the Council to force discussion of the numerous embargo violations among ambassadors. (Comment: Since the report is an interim report and not a final one, the Committee has no obligation to forward the report to the Council for consideration. Any proposals to do so in the Committee would likely be blocked by China, Qatar, Russia, or Indonesia.). USUN indicated that Washington might support such a move. The Panel stated its readiness to "go for it" in order to shine light on its findings, but opined that the Council needed to go for it with new action on Sudan as well. WOLFF

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