FRENCH VIEWS ON UNIIIC EXTENSION, CHAPTER VII FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000231

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2017
TAGS: PREL UNSC SY LE
SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEWS ON UNIIIC EXTENSION, CHAPTER VII FOR
TRIBUNAL, AND LEBANON CONTACT GROUP

REF: A. STATE 34691

B. REINEMEYER-KUMAR TELCON

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Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, per 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. During a meeting with French PR de la
Sabliere on March 19, Ambassador Wolff sought French views on
timing/strategy for a possible Chapter VII resolution to
establish the Special Lebanon Tribunal and underscored the
need to convene a meeting of the Lebanon Contact Group before
Security Council consultations on the latest UNSCR 1701
report on April 5 (per ref A). He also said the U.S. would
support an extension of UNIIIC's mandate until 15 June 2008,
but raised the possibility of adding language recognizing
that the Commission could complete its mandate earlier. De
la Sabliere said France's policy is that a Chapter VII
resolution should be "last resort, because everything must be
done to encourage a Lebanese solution, but we should
re-assess our options at the end of March." Privately,
however, he was skeptical that Russia would abandon a threat
to veto such a resolution unless the tribunal agreement and
statute are amended to exclude high-ranking Syrian officials
from the court's jurisdiction. On the Contact Group, de la
Sabliere expressed French reluctance to allow such a meeting
to "interfere" with UNSCR 1701 deliberations, but promised to
convey U.S. views to Paris again. After initially arguing
that the draft resolution extending UNIIIC's mandate should
be "totally technical," the French PR agreed to support U.S.
edits if Brammertz does not object to the language. End
Summary.

UNIIIC Extension
--------------


2. (C) Per ref A, Ambassador Wolff confirmed U.S. support for
a resolution extending UNIIIC's mandate, but raised the
possibility of including language to ensure a smooth
transition between the Commission and the tribunal and to
encourage UNIIIC to complete its work as soon as possible.
Ambassador de la Sabliere initially argued that the
resolution should be "totally technical" in order to avoid
provoking Russian opposition, but after Poloff conveyed to
the French Department edits to the resolution per ref B (OP
2: Decides to extend the mandate of the Commission until 15
June 2008 (and declares its readiness to terminate the
mandate earlier if the Commission reports that it has
completed the implementation of its mandate)),de la Sabliere
told Ambassador Wolff on March 21 that he would advise Paris
to accept the U.S. edits if/if Brammertz did not believe they
would cause the Commission any problems. The French
undertook to check Brammertz's views through UN Legal Counsel
Nicolas Michel on March 22 and revert (Note: Brammertz left
for Beirut on March 21. End Note.).

Chapter VII for Tribunal?
--------------


3. (C) De la Sabliere said official French policy is, as
conveyed by French diplomatic adviser Maurice
Gourdault-Montagne to NSA Hadley, that using Chapter VII to
establish the Special Tribunal for Lebanon should be a "last
resort, because everything must be done to encourage a
Lebanese solution, but we should re-assess our options at the
end of March." Privately, however, de la Sabliere was
skeptical about the prospects to secure such a resolution.
Discounting rumors that the Russians will not block such a
resolution, he argued that Russia has no reason to telegraph
its position now. By maintaining ambiguity about its stance,
Russia could maintain pressure on the Lebanese to reach a
solution themselves. Ultimately, De la Sabliere opined,
Russia would only consent to a Chapter VII resolution if the
tribunal agreement and statute are amended to exclude
high-ranking Syrian officials from its jurisdiction. The
French Mission has therefore advised Paris that it should
support a Chapter VII resolution only if an agreement has
been worked out with the Russians beforehand. Otherwise,
there is a good chance the resolution would fail in the
Council and prospects for the tribunal would be dashed
completely.


4. (C) Noting that Washington had yet to adopt a position on
a Chapter VII resolution and would also wait to see how
events unfold in Lebanon, Ambassador Wolff said he was
privately less concerned about possible Russian opposition.
He suggested it would be important to secure three elements
before taking such a step. First, PM Siniora should send the
Security Council a petition signed by 70 members of
parliament, proving that majority support for ratification of
the tribunal agreement is being blocked by anti-democratic

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means. Second, the Lebanese should secure regional (Saudi
and Egyptian) support for the invocation of Chapter VII
authority. Third, Brammertz must make compelling, objective
arguments in favor of establishing the tribunal. If we have
all three elements, Ambassador Wolff suggested, the Russians
would be hard-pressed to veto such a resolution and oppose PM
Siniora, other Arab states, and Brammertz. Ambassador Wolff
also noted that since the Council would have to adopt a
Chapter VII resolution to compel cooperation with the court
in any case, we should combine the two objectives if the
Lebanese fail to ratify the tribunal agreement. He
emphasized, however, that securing Lebanese parliamentary
ratification of the tribunal agreement remains the best
solution.

Lebanon Contact Group
--------------


5. (C) Per ref A, Ambassador Wolff emphasized U.S. interest
in convening a meeting of the Lebanon Contact Group before
the April 5 UNSC consultations on resolution 1701. The U.S.,
France, and other countries had talked about convening the
Contact Group since January 2007, and it was important that
the group now meet to discuss ways to follow up to the arms
embargo in UNSCR 1701. De la Sabliere expressed Paris's
concern that the discussions not interfere with UNSCR 1701
deliberations and that non-members of the Council (e.g.
Germany and Spain) not be given an opportunity to influence
the Council's debate, but he took note of U.S. interest and
agreed to check with Paris.


6. (C) Subsequently, French Mission Poloff Ludovic Pouille
told Poloff on March 21 that Paris was "totally confused"
about its approach to the Contact Group meeting and had not
answered the Mission's request for clear guidance. Pouille
said the Mission had therefore recommended that Paris and
Washington engage directly to decide on a way forward. When
Pouille later promised to share a draft PRST on UNSCR 1701
with USUN, Poloff told him that Washington had not yet
decided whether it would support any Council reaction and
that it was important for the Contact Group to meet to decide
how to follow up to the arms embargo in UNSCR 1701. Pouille
insisted that the Council "must react" to the latest 1701
report, but said he would again convey U.S. concerns about
the timing of the Contact Group to Paris.
WOLFF