UNSC/DARFUR: MEMBERS DISAPPOINTED WITH BASHIR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000227 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SU UNSC KPKO SUBJECT: UNSC/DARFUR: MEMBERS DISAPPOINTED WITH BASHIR RESPONSE BUT LITTLE APPETITE FOR SANCTIONS REF: SECSTATE 34477 USUN NEW Y 00000227 001.6 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. At March 19 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) consultations, Under-Secretary-General (U/SYG) for Peacekeeping Operations Guehenno stressed that the three-phase package of Darfur peacekeeping operations was "indivisible," with its proposals "interlinked and interdependent." The March 6 rejection by Sudanese President Bashir of the second phase of the plan, the Heavy Support Package (HSP) of assistance to the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS),threatened to prevent the UN from assuming any operational role in Darfur. Only USUN and the UK Mission (UKUN) raised the possibility of sanctions in response to stalling on the package; other Members - most notably Chinese Permanent Representative (PR) Wang, South African PR Kumalo and the Qatari and Indonesian delegates - opposed the imposition of any measures that could be applied at the expense of the ongoing political process spearheaded by UN Special Envoy Eliasson and AU Special Envoy Salim. As to next steps, Guehenno reported that while the UN and AU were drafting a response to Bashir's letter on the HSP, preparations for the third phase of the plan, the hybrid force, were nevertheless continuing, with a UN team currently on the ground in Addis Ababa to finalize arrangements. END SUMMARY. GUEHENNO: UN AND GNU HAVE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN DARFUR PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS ¶2. (SBU) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) U/SYG Guehenno reported to the UNSC at March 19 consultations on UN views of the March 6 letter from Sudanese President Bashir that rejected major elements of the second phase of the plan for Darfur peacekeeping operations. Calling Bashir's agreement on the importance of re-energizing the political process "common ground" between the GNU and the UN/AU, Guehenno was hard pressed to find any other areas of agreement. He highlighted major problem areas in Bashir's response, namely the inclusion of air assets, Level II and III hospitals, re-structuring from eight to three sectors (which he said had been an AU initiative) and a re-focus of the role of the Tripartite Mechanism from facilitating HSP implementation to defining the HSP's contents. ¶3. (SBU) Guehenno expressed mild exasperation at Bashir's response, given the fact that the UN's and AU's plans for support to AMIS, restoration of stability and protection of civilians in Darfur "had not come out of the blue," but were rather rooted in the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and represented months of intensive UN/AU collaboration, of which the GNU had been apprised at every step of the way and which had culminated in the November 16 Addis Ababa Agreement. Guehenno emphasized that the UN and the AU had worked closely to find credible approaches to sticking points like command and control of the hybrid force so that the package presented would be sufficiently credible to attract troop-contributing countries (TCCs). The Addis Ababa package, Guehenno emphasized, was "indivisible," with its proposals "interlinked and interdependent." Bashir's letter, he argued, threatened to prevent the UN from assuming any operational role in Darfur and implied a re-opening of negotiations on the whole package, which in turn would mean protracted negotiations with uncertain conclusions. Guehenno welcomed the opportunity to clarify with the GNU certain elements of the HSP but strongly recommended against re-negotiating the whole plan. ¶4. (SBU) Guehenno responded to accusations from the South African PR and current UNSC President Kumalo that the UN had not treated the GNU as a viable partner in the Darfur peacekeeping planning process by citing at least nine visits by high-ranking UN officials to Khartoum in the past 16 months as evidence of the UN commitment to transparency. Guehenno said the difficulty lay in coming to agreement with Khartoum in assessing the Darfur situation and what needed to be done in response. He said the GNU was in need of a "strategic shift" in its thinking vis-a-vis protection of civilians, which would require Khartoum's abandoning its USUN NEW Y 00000227 002.6 OF 003 proposition that Sudanese police could handle the task exclusively in favor of its accepting the international community's help in this regard. Absent this type of political shift, Guehenno warned that the UN would never have an operational role in Darfur and humanitarian operations there would collapse. ALL HOPE NOT LOST: ELIASSON MISSION, HYBRID PLANNING ¶5. (SBU) Guehenno was hopeful about the political mission of UN Special Envoy Eliasson, who will be in Khartoum the week of March 26. In response to questions from Ambassador Sanders as to the focus of Eliasson's mission, Guehenno responded that Eliasson would stress with Bashir that he should exploit the "unique window of opportunity" now facing him on Darfur and that he should show a willingness to address concretely rebel grievances; with the rebels that they should show good faith in negotiations with the GNU and that "forum shopping" was not a constructive means of negotiation; and with all parties that the political process should be consolidated but not mistaken for an alternative to peacekeeping. ¶6. (SBU) Also in response to Ambassador Sanders' query, Guehenno reported that despite the "stalemate," DPKO continued to engage potential TCCs for the Darfur operation and planned to convene a TCC meeting in early April. Guehenno reported that while the UN and AU were drafting a "respectful but clear" response to Bashir's HSP letter, preparations for the hybrid force continued, with a UN team currently on the ground in Addis Ababa to finalize arrangements. Still, given the current delay in planning, Guehenno said that no significant UN deployment in Darfur could realistically be expected until 2008. LITTLE SUPPORT FOR PROSPECT OF UNSC SANCTIONS ¶7. (SBU) Only UKUN PR Jones Parry and Ambassador Sanders raised the possibility of sanctions in response to Sudanese stalling on implementation of the three-phase package for Darfur, and there was no traction among other Members. Jones Parry argued that coercion was a necessary part of the overall package in order to maintain momentum on the three-phase plan, specifically the naming of individuals identified by the Panel of Experts, a broadening of the arms embargo and the monitoring of air space over Darfur. Ambassador Sanders recommended the Council consider additional and expanded sanctions and announced the USG's readiness to take unilateral measures. French PR de La Sabliere declared the time was not right for sanctions, putting his faith instead in the efforts of SYG Ban at the Arab League Summit in Riyadh beginning March 28 and in Eliasson's mission. Congolese PR Ikouebe echoed de La Sabliere's comments and announced that South African President Mbeki and Nigerian President Obasanjo would shortly travel to Khartoum to negotiate with Bashir. ¶8. (SBU) Chinese Political Coordinator Li told PolMinsCouns at a P5 Coordinators lunch before consultations that we should not bother to table a sanctions resolution, as Beijing had already decided it "could not be allowed to pass." Chinese PR Wang told the UNSC that Sudan's fundamental disagreement with the approach of UNSCR 1706 had to be taken into account in implementing the three-phase plan. Wang agreed that the HSP should not be re-opened for negotiation, but advised that DPKO and the UNSC honor the Sudanese demand for further clarification and explanation to secure GNU cooperation. Wang cited the "bedrock principle" that any peacekeeping operation needed the consent of the receiving country and explicitly rejected sanctions as a threat to the political process and further dialogue with Khartoum. (COMMENT: While the Chinese have likely not decided in advance on a veto of any sanctions measure, it is a prospect that has to be taken seriously, as is opposition from some of the elected members (Qatar, South Africa and Indonesia). Wang seemed less protective of Khartoum than he had been in earlier comments, at times clearly indicating his disagreement with what Bashir had said. END COMMENT.) USUN NEW Y 00000227 003.6 OF 003 ¶9. (SBU) The Qatari representative advised the international community to act "constructively" on Darfur and not to impose any measure that could jeopardize the political process. He announced Doha's plans to host a meeting between President Bashir and Eritrean President Isaias, and he hailed the Libyan and Eritrean mediation efforts on Darfur. The Indonesian PR suggested that the UNSC try to bridge the divide with Bashir over their respective understandings of the Darfur crisis by responding to Bashir's March 6 letter, not by imposing sanctions that would be counterproductive and would even further alienate the UN from the GNU. South African PR and current SC President Kumalo was dismissive of the potential efficacy of sanctions, quipping, "As if sanctions are going to save even one life in Darfur." ¶10. (SBU) Russia has been uncharacteristically quiet in recent days on the sanctions issue; formerly PermRep Churkin was one of the most outspoken critics of the prospect. Now the delegation seems resigned to sit back and watch others carry on the debate: the Russian Political Coordinator kept quiet during a March 19 P5 Coordinators lunch on the subject, and a Russian Political Officer told Poloff after consultations that with the Council so deadlocked on the issue, "What is there to say?" ¶11. (SBU) One new note among DPKO and some Members (including the UK, Ghana, China and Qatar) was a broader recognition that the Sudanese rebels were causing more problems in Darfur than was the GNU and a hope that the groups would unite as soon as possible to begin negotiations with the GNU. A representative of the Sudanese Mission informed Poloff after the meeting that Justice and Equality Movement leader Khalil Ibrahim was not cooperating at a rebel conference in Asmara and had walked out of a March 19 negotiating session. The Sudanese rep said Khartoum was nevertheless "optimistic" that the negotiations would continue and promised to update accordingly. He said President Isais' mediation was progressing. WOLFF