HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL: BALLOTING CONSIDERATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000002

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2012
TAGS: AORC PHUM PREL UNGA KUNR
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL: BALLOTING CONSIDERATIONS

REF: GENEVA 3109(06)

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RICHARD T. MILLER FOR REASONS
1.4(b) AND (d)

1.(C) SUMMARY: USUN recommends that any considerations of a
possible candidacy for the Human Rights Council factor in
some technical and contextual issues unique to elections
within the UN, to the Human Rights Council in particular, and
to the General Assembly dynamics where the balloting would
occur. END SUMMARY.

2.(C) Pursuant to reftel, USUN offers a view from New York
based on UNGA electoral processes and the politics of a
potential race for the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) in May

2007. In sum, we believe a run for the HRC would be an
extremely difficult campaign with an uncertain outcome.

Customary Constraints on US Candidatures

3.(C) In general, US prospects in running for elected UN
bodies are more constrained than for those of any other
country at the UN. This is due to the fact that the US is
unique in its policy to not enter into reciprocal
(&vote-swap8) arrangements, nor to reveal for whom it
voted, and to avoid any hint of bloc membership that could
otherwise provide an automatic groundswell of electoral
support for a US candidature.

4.(C) Instead, the US must rely on only (1) the strength of
the merits of its candidacy, (2) the nearly-spent custom that
the US should be on any body it seeks as a matter of bringing
US "indispensable nation" attention to the issues and
workings of that body, and most importantly (3) aggressive
campaigning that generally entails trade-offs with other US
equities at the UN at that time.

5.(C) As for candidature announcements, timing is relevant.
The custom is that the earlier one announces, the more
serious is the candidature. The electorate penalizes
latecomers, particularly if their bid creates or adds to a
contested slate.

6.(C) Endorsement of US candidatures by our regional Western
European and Other States Group (WEOG) has become
increasingly problematic over time, with other candidates
less willing to step aside for us. When too many WEOG
candidates present themselves for a smaller number of
vacancies, WEOG endorsement is harder for the US to achieve
than ever before. A swelling EU cohort gives less and less
ground to us when one of its own is in the contest. Bidding
against the two WEOG vacancies for the May 2007 election to
the HRC so far are Netherlands, Italy, and Denmark.

7.(C) In elections to UN bodies, the great majority of
delegations exercise on-the-ground voting discretion, rather
than taking direction from their capitals. In this sense,
all elections are local.

The General Assembly Imperative

8.(C) Unlike elections to the previous Human Rights
Commission taken by the 54-member ECOSOC, elections to the
Human Rights Council are held in the 192-member General
Assembly. They come with a different and distinct political
context in which to contemplate and calibrate candidatures.
NAM (currently led by Cuba),G-77 (Pakistan is leading in
2007),and EU bloc and other dynamics are more fully
operational in the GA versus ECOSOC. This configuration
portends that broader US political equities would be brought
into the voting equation. For example, institutional
antagonism and envy from the GA corner toward Security
Council P-5 prerogatives have intensified in taking
decisions, particularly in conjunction with stalled Security
Council expansion initiatives, and could work against a US
candidacy.

9.(C) Regarding the WEOG slate for this May,s HRC race,
candidates are already oversubscribed with at least three
candidates for two vacancies: Netherlands, Italy, and
Denmark; USUN has not heard from any that they would step
aside should the US decide to run. We would have to broker
against other WEOG candidates, for better or worse, before
launching into the wider membership for support. WEOG
members (EU members) automatically enjoy bloc support; US has
no bloc support. Other candidates engage in vote-swapping
and other measures in which the US does not participate as a
matter of official policy, providing to them a tactical
advantage in any vote count.

10.(C) Because HRC elections do not call for endorsement by
regional groups, there is no opportunity for election by
acclamation. All candidates require an absolute majority of
the GA membership (97 votes),and not merely the usual simple
majority of those present and voting yes or no. It is not
clear that a majority of states would support us. Because
HRC membership is determined by a secret ballot, even WEOG
colleagues could hide behind the secret vote process. This
secrecy creates a wild card. For comparison sake, we note
that in the most recent US-related human rights vote (on the
anti-US resolution from UNGA,s Third Committee last autumn),
the US garnered only 114 out of a possible 192 votes in a
recorded (non-secret) ballot with no competition whatsoever.

11.(C) Term-limits must also be considered. HRC rules permit
only two consecutive terms and beyond that require one year
off before seeking yet another term. The 3-year terms are
staggered; elections are in May for terms to commence in
mid-June.

12.(C) If the US were to run, it might be advisable to time
it to be on the HRC during the five-year review of HRC
effectiveness slated for Autumn 2011 (as stipulated in
A/Res/60/251). If the US were to delay running until
Mid-June 2009 (for the term Mid-June 2009 ) Mid-June 2012)
and succeed, then it would be a member of the Council during
the Autumn 2011 review. Otherwise, if US ran in 2007, it
would serve Mid-June 2007 through Mid-June 2010, and it would
need to be re-elected in Mid-June 2010 in order to be on the
body during the scheduled effectiveness review of Autumn 2011.

13.(C) Finally, any perception that the United States intends
to seek a candidature for the purpose of infiltrating,
criticizing, or changing the Council would be marked for
failure. The votes simply would not come our way. Running
to get elected would instead require us to implicitly endorse
the Council,s programs, processes, and outputs. Our
candidature would in effect legitimate the body and imply to
some degree that it had somehow improved over the past year,
a fact that runs counter to our public statements.

WOLFF