UN/SUDAN SANCTIONS: INITIAL MARKERS ON POSSIBLE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000197 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2017 TAGS: PREL UNSC ETTC SU SUBJECT: UN/SUDAN SANCTIONS: INITIAL MARKERS ON POSSIBLE SANCTIONS LAID DOWN IN COMMITTEE MEETING, UK READY TO TABLE NAMES REF: A. STATE 24349 ¶B. USUN 00166 ¶C. USUN 00194 Classified By: MINISTER COUNSELOR WILLIAM BRENCICK, FOR REASONS: 1.4(B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: During the March 8 informal meeting of the Sudan Sanctions Committee delegations gave early indications of their positions on new sanctions in Sudan. The UK, supported by USUN, argued that the strategy of constructively engaging the Government of Sudan (GOS) had not been successful. Given the situation on the ground in Darfur and the repeated violations of resolution 1591 (2005),the UK was preparing a list of names for targeted sanctions. France, Belgium, Ghana, Slovakia, and Peru supported possible sanctions, but China, Russia, and Qatar argued against them, citing recent progress in the political process. Indonesia and South Africa expressed concern that the Committee not take action that would undermine the political process. ¶2. (C) Summary continued and action request: On March 10 the UK indicated its willingness to table names for sanctions by March 23 following the uncooperative response from the GOS to the Secretary General's letter on the Heavy Support Package (HSP) for the AU's Darfur operations, though the UK did not indicate specifically which names it will propose. Senior-level USG-HMG consultations may still be needed to secure UK support on the three US-proposed names for sanctions. Please see action request in paragraph 9. End Summary. DELEGATIONS, EARLY POSITIONS ON SANCTIONS ¶3. (C) The Sudan Sanctions Committee met on March 8 to discuss the Group of Experts' February 20 report, which documents the presence of GOS offensive aircraft in Darfur in violation of resolution 1591. Prior to the meeting the Committee had agreed to send a letter to the Sudanese Mission seeking an explanation of why the materiel in question had been moved into Darfur without the authorization of the Committee, as required by paragraph 7 of resolution 1591. Earlier that day, the Sudanese PermRep had told Committee Chairman Italian PermRep Marcello Spatafora, that the aircraft were part of a "routine, logistical transfer of aircraft" within Darfur, and that the Committee could expect a speedy response to its letter from the GOS. ¶4. (C) The UK, USUN, and Ghana argued that incident documented in the report represented only one of many violations of 1591 and demonstrated GOS defiance of the will of the international community. The UK representative, taking the floor first, stated that the GOS and the rebels had demonstrated a pattern of violating of resolution 1591 and that the Committee and Council had expended every effort to work constructively with Khartoum. The criteria for sanctions set out in resolution 1591 had clearly been met, and failure of the Committee to enforce 1591 undermined the credibility of the Committee and the Council. The UK is now preparing a list of names for sanctions, and considering an expanded arms embargo and no-fly zone as additional measures. ¶5. (C) USUN and Ghana supported the UK proposal to consider names for sanctions. Ghana added that the Committee could not allow the GOS to buy more time while it simultaneously pursued policies of aerial bombardment, displacement of civilians, and violations of human rights. Slovakia supported the UK proposal for sanctions. France argued that confidence-building measures should not exclude targeted measures and that sanctions should not be postponed forever. Belgium stated that it supported a phased approach to sanctions. Peru recalled that the Committee is mandated to consider the facts on the ground. ¶6. (C) China, Russia, and Qatar argued that the GOS was entitled to defend itself from the accusations in the report before the Committee considered taking action, and that any action should be weighed against any negative impact on the political process. Russia argued that sanctioning the GOS USUN NEW Y 00000197 002 OF 002 would send the signal that non-signatories to the DPA were being rewarded, while signatories were being punished. Qatar stated that sanctions were aimed at "distorting" the political process. China, Russia, Qatar, and Indonesia referred to UN Special Envoy to Sudan Jan Eliasson's presentation to the Security Council on March 6 and his expressed view that there was progress in the political process. Indonesia further stated that 1591 does not "undermine" GOS's right to protect its sovereignty. The South African representative agreed that the Committee should wait for a response from the GOS to the Group's report, and indicated that she was "not convinced" that sanctions would help the situation ¶7. (C) Congo agreed that the GOS was flouting the will of the international community, but did not explicitly support sanctions. In his capacity as Committee Chairman, Ambassador Spatafora suggested that the Committee must keep in mind the larger picture of supporting the political process. (Comment: Spatafora's comments that the Committee be mindful of the political situation were unhelpful--particularly given the Chairman's role as the neutral steward of a technical Committee--as they bolster the arguments of China, Russi, and Qatar, which would allow Khartoum to continue to block progress in order to maintain the status quo. End comment.) UKUN READY TO TABLE NAMES FOR SANCTIONS ¶8. (S) In a private discussion with UK PolOff David Whineray prior to the meeting, Whineray suggested that USG-HMG consultations at senior levels would be needed to build UK support for the three names proposed by the US for sanctions. Whineray also indicated that intelligence sharing in Khartoum might make HMG more amenable to supporting proposed sanctions on Awad Ibn Auf. (London fears that sanctioning Auf will endanger HMG-GOS counterterrorism cooperation.) However, after receiving the GOS response to the Secretary General's letter regarding the Heavy Support package, which UKUN interpreted as further stalling on the part of the GOS, UKUN indicated to USUN on March 10 that they were ready to table names for sanctions. (N.B. the UK did not specify which names, ours our theirs (refs a and b),they will seek to move forward.) The UK will also seek to finalize a decision with the USG on expanding the arms embargo. ¶9. (C) Action request: USUN seeks Department guidance regarding USG policy on an expansion of the arms embargo from Darfur to all of Sudan, per UKUN request. USUN suggests that the Department consult with HMG at a senior level to build support for USG proposed names for sanctions. WOLFF