DPKO SAYS NO PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN CHAD/CAR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000018 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CD PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU UNSC KPKO SUBJECT: DPKO SAYS NO PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN CHAD/CAR CAN SUBSTITUTE FOR POLITICAL PROCESS USUN NEW Y 00000018 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. After unusually testy exchanges with some Security Council Members at January 10 consultations over accusations that the United Nations was dragging its feet on deployment of forces to eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic (CAR),the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) declared that it could not dispatch a peacekeeping operation in the absence of credible political processes in both countries. Despite the heated exchanges, middle ground was ultimately found when the Council and DPKO agreed to reinvigorate the work of the UN Technical Assessment Mission (TAM),which had been curtailed due to November instability in Chad; the TAM will return to Chad during the week of January 15. The Council also agreed to a DPKO suggestion to quickly dispatch an advance team to N'Djamena to begin laying the political groundwork for the eventual deployment of a peacekeeping mission to Chad and CAR. END SUMMARY. SECURITY SITUATION WORRISOME -------------- ¶2. (SBU) DPKO Assistant Secretary-General (SYG) Hedi Annabi, who had led the TAM to Chad and CAR in November/December 2006, reported to the Council at January 10 consultations that the security situation in both countries showed "significant deterioration." He noted that during the week of January 1, Chadian national forces (ANT) had moved from Abeche to Adre to battle rebel forces coming from El Geneina. He expressed concern over escalating violence between ANT and anti-government forces in Chad. He cited clashes between the ANT and rebels of the UFDD and RAFD in mid-December, during which the ANT exercised their 'right to pursuit' in following the rebels into Sudanese territory. Annabi was not optimistic about the prospects for inclusion of other rebels groups into the December 24 agreement signed between the GOC and the FUC rebel group, pointing out that the coalition of the rebel groups UFDD, the RAFD and the SCUD had dismissed the reconciliation as 'propaganda.' Annabi added that this coalition of rebel forces, with a combined strength of 6000 troops and 500 vehicles, posed a viable threat to the GOC. ¶3. (SBU) Annabi reported that recent cross-border attacks near Borota and renewed inter-ethnic fighting in Goz Beida in eastern Chad had led to at least 20,000 new displacements, forcing the total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) there close to 100,000 over the past two months. Annabi was equally concerned about the plight of the 232,000 refugees in Chad and the 20,000 refugees in CAR. UN CONCERNS OVER PKO DEPLOYMENT -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Notwithstanding the deployment options outlined in the December 22 SYG Report (S/2006/1019; forwarded to IO and AF),Annabi argued that the time was not right for a UN peacekeeping operation to Chad and CAR, given the lack of genuine dialogue and reconciliation among senior Chadian and CAR leadership to address the political dimensions of the crises in those countries. Annabi reiterated the wording of the SYG Report by declaring that "unless and until all parties agree to a ceasefire and to dialogue, a peacekeeping mission would have no political process to support and no exit strategy." No troop-contributing country would commit to an operation under such circumstances, Annabi contended, adding that DPKO had "cast a wide net" for contributors but had not received even enough offers for one single battalion. ¶5. (SBU) Annabi also outlined the logistical constraints confronting a UN deployment, including poor infrastructure, absence of airfields, vast travel distances and severe weather conditions. He warned that Members must be ready to make the necessary military and police resources available in light of these challenges. Annabi also made mention of the absence of genuine consent from the GOC to a UN deployment in Chad, noting that Chad President Deby had agreed in principle only and had not engaged in their December discussion on a technical level about the arrival of UN forces. Summing up his view of deployment options, Annabi said, "If consent of the parties, a political process and access are still basic principles, conditions for a successful peacekeeping operation are not in place. It breaks our heart because there is a real humanitarian crisis . . . but the Secretariat needs to tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear." USUN NEW Y 00000018 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (SBU) Referring to Paragraph 88 of the SYG Report, Annabi suggested the Council dispatch an advance team that would establish a permanent presence in N'Djamena to begin laying the political groundwork for the eventual deployment of a peacekeeping mission to Chad and CAR by "exploring the possibilities for a political agreement between the Governments concerned in the region, and between the Governments and their respective opposition groups" (NOTE: DPKO corrected privately that Annabi re-named the team an "advance mission" after his briefing. END NOTE). Annabi referred to a January 5 letter from UN High Commissioner for Refugees Gutierres which endorsed the immediate deployment of such a team. The advance team, like UNAMIS in Sudan and UNAMIC in Cambodia, would be the precursor to an eventual multidimensional peacekeeping operation charged with liaising, monitoring and protecting (Option B in SYG Report). MEMBERS DEEM DPKO RESPONSE 'UNACCEPTABLE' -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The majority of Members expressed frustration with what they considered further stall tactics by DPKO to deploy a force to eastern Chad and CAR. UK PermRep Jones Parry was the most vocal, launching into a series of vitriolic attacks against Annabi, calling his briefing "mealy-mouthed" and an "unacceptable response" to the Council, given the plight of the civilians on the ground in the region (NOTE: UKUN Sudan Expert told Poloff privately that Jones Parry's outburst was unscripted and presumably came as a result of his 'impassioned' stance on Chad. DPKO, however, speculated that the diatribe was directed personally at Annabi. END NOTE). ¶8. (SBU) Members, including Ambassador Sanders, called for the TAM to return to the region as soon as possible to resume its work. Annabi conceded that this would be possible, given that no new Council authorization would be required for its departure. DPKO told Poloff after consultations that the team planned to return to Chad on January 17 or 18. ADVANCE TEAM SEEN AS MIDDLE GROUND -------------- ¶9. (SBU) There was widespread Council support for the SYG's recommendation to dispatch an advance team to N'Djamena. The French delegation offered to begin work on an initial draft Presidential Statement that, according to Annabi, would be required for planning to begin. NOTE: Poloff raised the issue of President Deby's consent for this mission separately with DPKO, which agreed that Deby must be engaged in and in support of the process of ultimately deploying UN forces in his territory. END NOTE. CALL FOR MORE DARFUR MOMENTUM BEFORE AU SUMMIT -------------- - ¶10. (SBU) Members were universally frustrated with the pace of progress on addressing the Darfur crisis, in particular with Sudan President Bashir's prevarication regarding the eventual hybrid UN-African Union (AU) peacekeeping force. Congolese PermRep Ikouebe suggested that the issue be highlighted at the upcoming AU Summit on January 30, adding the Summit might be the appropriate forum to create a "clear text" laying out the specifics of the three-phase deployment. Ikouebe also recommended that Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, who will attend the Summit, take an active role in approaching African states there to support such a message. Such momentum was necessary, Ikouebe declared, since, the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) would withdraw from Darfur come June. Annabi added that funding from traditional partners would be needed for AMIS until that time. ¶11. (SBU) Most Members expressed support for the appointment of Jan Eliasson as UN Envoy to Sudan; Annabi confirmed that Eliasson would meet with President Bashir in the next 24 hours. Annabi lauded the success New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson had enjoyed in brokering a ceasefire among parties in Darfur. WOLFF