NEW YORK UPDATE ON BURMA UNSCR

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000017 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2012 TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM SUBJECT: NEW YORK UPDATE ON BURMA UNSCR REF: A. STATE 3591 ¶B. USUN 08 ¶C. BEIJING 267 ¶D. DOHA 35 ¶E. JAKARTA 98 ¶F. PARIS 126 ¶G. PRETORIA 129 Classified By: USUN Deputy Political Counselor Molly Phee, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) USUN placed the revised text of the draft Burma UNSCR (ref A) "in blue" the afternoon of January 11. The Russian delegation, which currently holds the Council presidency, has scheduled a vote for 3:30 p.m. on January 12. Veto Threats -------------- ¶2. (C) Amb Wolff met with Chinese PR Wang for lunch January ¶11. Wang said he was not/not yet instructed how to vote by Beijing (expecting to receive instructions the evening of January 11 or the morning of January 12 EST),but he fully expected to be told to vote against the resolution. Amb Wolff recalled a conversation the two held in December 2006 on this subject, when Amb Wolff asked if there were any changes in language or form (i.e., a Presidential Statement vice an UNSCR) the U.S. could consider that would respond to Chinese concerns. Wang confirmed that his negative reply then was still accurate now, and repeated the Chinese view that the Security Council is not the appropriate venue to deal with the issue of Burma and that Burma is not a threat to peace and security. Amb Wolff made clear that U.S. efforts to address the situation in Burma are directly informed by our concerns about Burma; this initiative is not intended to embarrass China. Wang replied that from China's perspective, this matter had no/no implications for our bilateral relationship. The vote would occur and we would move on. ¶3. (C) Russian PR Churkin and Russian DPR Dolgov confirmed to Ambs Wolff and Sanders respectively that Russia intended to follow China's lead and veto the resolution, echoing the view that the subject of Burma is not an appropriate matter for the Security Council and that Burma is not a threat. Ongoing Negotiations -------------- ¶4. (C) Amb Wolff has also spoken repeatedly with Indonesian PR Jenie, who had asked the United States to delay the vote until this weekend's ASEAN meeting in Cebu was concluded. Amb Wolff told Jenie that if a delay in the vote would result in Indonesia's abstention or better, the request for delay would be seriously reviewed in Washington. Jenie said he would check with Jakarta. ¶5. (C) Once the text was put into blue Thursday afternoon, Amb Wolff reached out to Chinese PR Wang and separately to Indonesian PR Jenie to ask if any additional changes to the text would affect their positions. In particular, he offered to modify PP13 (reftel) to read as follows: "Underlining the need for tangible progress in the overall situation in Myanmar in order to enhance peace and stability in the region." (Explanatory Note: This revised formulation replaces "security" with "stability" and eliminates the word "risk" to address the concerns of opponents.) With Jenie, Amb Wolff also intended to suggest that, if China vetoed, there would be no need for Indonesia to vote against the resolution. ¶6. (C) Qatari PR Nasser told Amb Wolff January 11 that he was as yet uninstructed. The South African expert told poloff January 11 that UN U/SYG (and Burma "good offices" envoy) Ibrahim Gambari had followed through on the U.S. request and pressed South African PR Kumalo to support the resolution. Kumalo, however, is reportedly awaiting Pretoria's guidance. The expert also noted that Kumalo had informed visiting MFA officials of his conversation with Gambari. ¶7. (C) Panamanian PR Arias confirmed January 11 Panama's support for the resolution. Ghana, Peru, and all five European delegations remain supportive. The French delegation independently asked the Chinese delegation January 11 if Beijing could support a PRST vice an UNSCR, and the Chinese said no. The French delegation did not/not suggest a delay in the vote because of ASEAN to USUN on January 11. WOLFF