Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07USUNNEWYORK168
2007-03-02 22:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
USUN New York
Cable title:  

AU PEACE AND SECURITY COMMISSIONER DJINNIT CALLS

Tags:  CD ET PGOV PREL SO SU UNSC KPKO 
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VZCZCXRO8190
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUCNDT #0168/01 0612231
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZUI YR SVC #0716
P 022231Z MAR 07 ZDK
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1437
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1176
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0967
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0591
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0583
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0236
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000168 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017
TAGS: CD ET PGOV PREL SO SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: AU PEACE AND SECURITY COMMISSIONER DJINNIT CALLS
AMIS EXTENSION "UNTENABLE"

REF: USUN NEW YORK 00107

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000168 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017 TAGS: CD ET PGOV PREL SO SU UNSC KPKO SUBJECT: AU PEACE AND SECURITY COMMISSIONER DJINNIT CALLS AMIS EXTENSION "UNTENABLE" REF: USUN NEW YORK 00107 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. African Union (AU) Commissioner for Peace and Security Said Djinnit told the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in an informal meeting on February 28 that he was in New York to finalize modalities with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) on all three phases of Darfur peacekeeping as agreed on November 16 in Addis Ababa. He identified the clarification of funding arrangements under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter as the primary area of concern for the AU so that Phase III (hybrid AU-UN force) might be implemented. Djinnit affirmed that the AU could not sustain AMIS based on ad hoc funding and that it would simply not leave the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) in an indefinite Phase II (a reinforced AMIS). The sooner the hybrid could be put in place, the better. Djinnit confirmed that a coordination meeting between the AU and the UN to determine funding arrangements for Darfur peacekeeping would take place in Addis Ababa in late March, and he assured members that AU Commission Chair Konare intended to come to New York as the earliest possible opportunity. On Somalia, Djinnit acknowledged the "golden opportunity" deployment there presented for the AU in support of the political process and expressed hope such deployment could take place as soon as possible. END SUMMARY. HOPING FOR DARFUR BREAKTHROUGH IN MARCH -------------- ¶2. (C) AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Djinnit reported to UNSC Members on February 28 that he had been working with DPKO since his February 27 arrival in New York to finalize modalities for the Darfur peacekeeping operation and the corresponding political process. Djinnit had met with Secretary-General (SYG) Ban Ki-moon, who had urged that both the hybrid track and the political track (as led by AU Special Envoy Salim and UN Special Envoy Eliasson) be expedited so that a "breakthrough" could be achieved by March. ¶3. (C) Djinnit had been in Khartoum prior to his New York arrival and said he had been assured by Government of National Unity (GNU) authorities that a response from President Bashir to the January 24 letter from the SYG and Konare was signed, cleared by GNU leadership and on its way to New York (NOTE: As of midday March 2, nothing has been received. In a March 1 follow up meeting with PolMinCouns, DPKO Assistant SYG Annabi said he had heard rumors that the letter would recommend only an additional 300-500 troops for Darfur and would reference agreements pre-dating the Addis Ababa accord. END NOTE). Djinnit characterized Bashir's response as an important indication of the level of GNU cooperation with the AU and the UN, but advised the UNSC to prepare for the worst. Djinnit anticipated that Bashir's response would be "forthcoming but fraught with reservations," despite Bashir's having already ascribed to the Addis Ababa Agreement. The AU would be firm with Bashir, but if the GNU continued to resist, Djinnit said high-level "re-assessment" by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) would be necessary. Djinnit opined that Bashir would continue to oppose deployment of UN forces in Darfur and would continue to insist on African leadership of the hybrid operation, a role, Djinnit emphasized, the AU had neither the resources nor the financial management capacity to assume: "How can you lead an operation if you have no resources to do so?" ¶4. (C) Djinnit identified the clarification of funding arrangements under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter as the primary area of concern for the AU so that the hybrid force might be implemented. Djinnit said in no uncertain terms that the AU could not sustain AMIS based on ad hoc funding and warned that leaving AMIS in an "indefinite Phase II" (a reinforced AMIS) would be "untenable." Djinnit confirmed that a coordination meeting between the AU and the UN to determine funding arrangements for Darfur peacekeeping would take place in Addis Ababa in late March (possibly March 26 or 28),and he assured members that AU Commission Chair Konare intended to come to New York as the earliest possible opportunity (NOTE: AU PermRep later told Ambassador Sanders Konare would visit at the end of March with Djinnit. END NOTE). To Djinnit, the sooner the hybrid could deploy, the *********************** * Missing Section 002 * *********************** *********************** * Missing Section 003 * ***********************

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