UNSC MOVING CAUTIOUSLY ON UN PEACEKEEPING IN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000161 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CD ET PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU UNSC KPKO SUBJECT: UNSC MOVING CAUTIOUSLY ON UN PEACEKEEPING IN CHAD/CAR REF: A. SECSTATE 23989 ¶B. NDJAMENA 00171 ¶C. NDJAMENA 00176 ¶D. USUN NEW YORK USUN NEW Y 00000161 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. At February 27 consultations, a majority of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members advocated a go-slow approach toward UN peacekeeping in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR),mindful of Chadian President Deby's attitude toward deployment, which so far has been equivocal at best (ref B). No draft resolution on the mandate of a force was tabled, although a coalition emerged between the French, Ghanaian, Congolese and South African delegations on the crafting of an eventual text, something the USG might consider joining (see para 9). While all delegates agreed the Darfur crisis was spilling into eastern Chad and northeastern CAR, no delegation openly endorsed either of the two options for deployment articulated in the Secretary-General's February 23 Report (S/2007/97). Possible SIPDIS steps raised for keeping Deby engaged in peacekeeping discussions included an invitation to the GOC to come to New York to meet with the UNSC and an engagement with Libyan COL Qadhafi, who has mediated recent bilateral agreements between the GOC and the Sudanese Government of National Unity. On Darfur, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Assistant SYG Annabi reported receipt on February 26 of a letter from the Sudanese PermRep that expressed hope for the normalization of Chad-Sudan relations in the wake of the latest Tripoli Agreement and that alluded to the arrival "at any moment" of President Bashir's response to the UN and African Union's January 24 letter on the Heavy Support Package (HSP) assistance to the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS). END SUMMARY. EASTERN CHAD: "NOT A CONVENTIONAL PEACEKEEPING ENVIRONMENT" -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) DPKO A/SYG Annabi followed up on his January 16 briefing (ref D) and reported the recommendations of the second Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) to Chad and CAR, which visited the region from January 21 to February 6. He noted that the number of internally displaced persons in eastern Chad had increased to 120,000 as of early February, due in large part to militia attacks in Dar Sila and heightened tensions between populations over scarce natural resources. Annabi reported that the 12 refugee camps in eastern Chad remained "easy targets" for recruitment by Sudanese rebels and added that IDP sites had reportedly also been experiencing similar recruitment. ¶3. (SBU) Annabi emphasized that eastern Chad was "not a conventional peacekeeping environment" and would create significant logisitical and operational challenges for any UN peacekeeping force that was to be deployed there. Although noting the possible perception of the UN force by Chadian rebels as partial to the GOC given the requisite coordination it would maintain with the Chadian Armed Forces (ANT),Annabi dismissed any need for permission or "guarantees" from these rebels assuring the safety of peacekeepers, and made reference to a tacit arrangement the French military in Abeche have come to with the rebels as a viable precedent. He said that in the French case, the rebels obviously realized that French forces would not initiate hostilities with them but would respond with deadly force if provoked. Annabi insisted that in order to be credible, the force must focus on protecting civilians and deterring cross-border attacks; he was firm that the force should not be mandated to interdict or undertake "hot pursuit" operations across the border into Sudan, nor should it take on border control responsibilities. Annabi highlighted the standing sovereign responsibilities of both the GOC and the GCAR to protect their own populations against violence along their borders. ¶4. (SBU) Annabi spoke at length about his February 5 meeting with President Deby, in which Annabi outlined the TAM findings, discussed a concept of operations for a UN force, and stressed any such force's mandate to protect civilians and serve as a deterrent for cross-border attacks. Deby, however, remained unconvinced, as he had in his December 2006 meeting with Annabi. Deby had reiterated his preference for a civilian-only force (gendarmes and police) without UN military peacekeepers and remarked that the only reason the USUN NEW Y 00000161 002.2 OF 003 UN was seeking an operation in Chad was because it was unable to deploy one on the Sudan side of the border. Annabi said that Deby felt slighted by the UNSC, which had never responded to his repeated appeals for support against "acts of Sudanese aggression" (ref C). In response to Deby's request that the TAM's recommendations be submitted to him in writing for approval, Annabi had sent an Aide Memoire to the Acting FM on February 6 and to the Chadian PermRep upon the TAM's return to New York. The Chadian PR informed Annabi on February 26 that he had received an "oral message" from FM Allam-mi, which stated the GOC needed more time to study the TAM report, reiterated Deby's February 5 position and warned against precipitous UNSC action without first conferring with the GOC. Annabi was receptive, as were representatives of the Department of Political Affairs, to the idea of inviting a GOC official to New York to discuss these issues with the UNSC directly. ¶5. (SBU) Despite Deby's ambivalent stance, Annabi said that preparations were underway for a UN force, as well as for the advance mission authorized by the January 16 UNSC Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2007/2). Pre-mandate authority for the advance mission was expected by the end of February, and Annabi confirmed the mission would deploy as soon as funding was authorized by the ACABQ. Annabi projected these costs to be $46.9 million for the period from March 1 to June 30. Annabi described the SYG's recommendation for a force under "Option B" of his report (10,900 troops) as having a lower risk vis-a-vis protection of civilians and as being less susceptible to logistic and environmental constraints presented by the theater of operations. With regard to Option A, Annabi pointed out the traditional difficulties the UN faced in identifying the necessary air assets. Annabi was firm that the police concept envisaged for the UN force would depend entirely on the existence of a military component for support; without this component, Annabi insisted that the force would have no dissuasive capacity in the hostile environment along Chad's eastern border. ¶6. (SBU) Annabi put little faith in the bilateral agreements between Chad and Sudan, including the latest signed in Tripoli on February 22, noting that there had been six such accords in the past 12 months, not one of which had been implemented. Annabi reported receipt on February 26 of a letter from the Sudanese PermRep that expressed hope for the normalization of Chad-Sudan relations in the wake of the latest Tripoli agreement and that alluded to the arrival "at any moment" of President Bashir's response to the UN and African Union's January 24 letter on the HSP assistance to AMIS. Ambassador Sanders mentioned Special Envoy Natsios' planned travel to Darfur and Tripoli and asked about UN plans to engage Libyan COL Qadhafi, who could not be discounted as a player in the Chad crisis (ref B). Annabi acknowledged that there would be merit to the notion of the UN and SC Members involving Qadhafi, despite rumors he was not "sanguine" about UN deployment in Chad, adding that the GOC was very sensitive to Libyan concerns. MEMBERS TREAD CAREFULLY ON FORCE OPTIONS -------------- ¶7. (SBU) While all delegates agreed the Darfur crisis was spilling into eastern Chad and northeastern CAR, no delegation openly endorsed either of the two options for deployment articulated in the SYG's Report. French PR de La Sabliere echoed French comments reported ref B by saying that more work remained to be done with President Deby before a draft resolution could be circulated, and by calling for the need for "transparency" in the drafting process. De La Sabliere hoped for a consensus text and announced plans to work closely with the Ghanaian, Congolese and South African delegations on a resolution text, inviting any other interested Members to join the effort (NOTE: Ghanaian rep told Poloff privately after the consultations that the French PR had already had a one-on-one discussion with the Ghanaian PR on this point and that Ghana would be more than happy if we were interested in collaborating on a text. END NOTE). De La Sabliere spoke for most Members when he declared that the UN force must be robust enough to have an impact on the ground but that the choice of force options was not necessarily A or B. Ghanaian PR Effah-Apenteng, Congolese PR USUN NEW Y 00000161 003.2 OF 003 Ikouebe and South African PR Kumalo were all in agreement with this approach, with Kumalo making clear that neither Option A nor Option B would be viable if political obstacles presented by Deby's and rebel groups' perceptions of the UN force could not be overcome. ¶8. (SBU) Among the other P-5 members, UK PR Jones Parry made clear linkages between the Darfur and Chad situations, insisting the UNSC focus on improving the humanitarian situation in Darfur, seek a report from UN Special Envoy Eliasson and AU Special Envoy Salim (NOTE: This report is expected during the week of March 12. END NOTE),and get a definitive answer from the AU and the UN on modalities for the hybrid operation. Jones Parry noted that "tougher measures" would become "inevitable" if the Sudanese Government continued to stall on the HSP and violate UNSCR 1591 (2005). Russian Deputy PR Dolgov said his delegation had no problem with either Option A or Option B for Chad/CAR deployment and was open to discussions on force numbers for both. He, like the Chinese delegate, agreed strongly that deployment of any force should be subject to GOC consent and that dialogue with Deby is essential. In response to an argument by the Qatari PR that Sudanese consent was required for UN deployment in Chad and CAR (consent which Annabi replied was not technically required),Dolgov said a "positive message" from the Government of National Unity (GNU) could go a long way in facilitating the deployment. Dolgov hoped that the GNU's response to the SYG's January 24 letter on the HSP would be positive and that the GNU would shoulder its responsibility to its Darfur population. The Chinese rep reported that Beijing was still studying both options for Chad/CAR deployment. Drawing from ref A points, Ambassador Sanders said the Department was studying operations for deployment, noting that the air assets under Option A seemed to lend themselves to the terrain. She also confirmed that the USG stood prepared to assist DPKO with recruitment for force generation for the Chad/CAR operation. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (SBU) It was clear from the tenor of discussions that Members favored a cautious approach toward determining a mandate for an eventual UN peacekeeping force in Chad/CAR, in large part because the Council does not want to repeat the "mistakes" of Darfur deployment by proceeding in the absence of host country consent. All agreed that more work remained to be done with Deby, and the idea of inviting him or FM Allam-mi had considerable traction. Similarly, the idea of proceeding cautiously on the drafting of a resolution for the force was popular, and it would make good sense to join the fledgling alliance that emerged among France and the African UNSC Members in order to have a hand in crafting the mandate of the force; USUN would recommend such an approach. END COMMENT. WOLFF