SE NATSIOS' MEETING WITH JAN ELIASSON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000015 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, IO A/S SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC SU KPKO SUBJECT: SE NATSIOS' MEETING WITH JAN ELIASSON REF: KHARTOUM 00015 Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, per 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a January 5 meeting with Presidential Special Envoy Andrew Natsios, UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson said his immediate priorities for addressing the Darfur crisis were reducing the ongoing violence and finding a way to restart the political process. Natsios listed actions by the Government of Sudan (GOS) that would trigger coercive measures by the U.S.: any attempt to obstruct implementation of the Addis/Abuja framework, blocking humanitarian assistance, or any attempt to derail the political process. Natsios noted that the recent Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) attack on non-signatory rebel groups, after the rebels decided to join the cease-fire process, warranted a strong condemnation by the UN, U.S. and the UN. Eliasson promised to consider putting out a UN statement. Eliasson agreed that Sudan should not be allowed to assume the AU presidency. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) UN Participants: UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson, DPKO U/SYG Jean Marie Guehenno, DPKO Deputy Hedi Annabi, DPKO Africa Director Dimitri Titov, UN notetaker. USG Participants: Special Envoy Andrew Natsios, Chief of Staff Envoy Andrew Steinfeld, USUN Ambassador Jackie Sanders, AF/SPG Lauren Landis, USUN Poloff (notetaker). -------------- Eliasson Focused on Reducing Violence, Restarting Political Process -------------- ¶3. (C) Eliasson admitted that progress following agreement on the Addis/Abuja framework had been "disappointing." Eliasson said his immediate priority is finding a way to reduce the level of violence in Darfur to allow an opening for the political process. To that end, Eliasson planned to engage President Bashir and the non-signatory rebel groups. In Eliasson's view, the primary problems are President Bashir's continued pursuit of a military solution and the lack of a unified rebel leadership. Eliasson commented that perhaps a conference of the non-signatory groups would be one way of jump-starting the political process. ¶4. (C) Natsios agreed on the preeminence of the political process, but added that President Bashir appeared intent on pursuing a military solution to the Darfur crisis. Notably, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) had responded to a pledge by non-signatory rebel groups to re-engage in the second chamber of the Cease Fire Commission by bombing a rebel meeting site (reftel). Natsios commented that these actions were "unhelpful" and indicative of President Bashir's "lack of seriousness" about pursuing peace. Natsios noted that the AU had already condemned the SAF bombings and the U.S. intended to do the same. Eliasson promised to look into to putting out a similar UN statement. -------------- U.S. Tripwires For Coercive Action -------------- ¶5. (C) Natsios commented that the U.S. would not continue an unproductive diplomatic process while security conditions on the ground in Darfur and throughout the region continued to deteriorate. The U.S. has put together a set of aggressive, non-military "coercive measures" that will be implemented should the GOS attempt to obstruct implementation of the Addis/Abuja framework, block humanitarian assistance, or disrupt the political process. ¶6. (C) Natsios added that the U.S. had received indications that some officials in the GOS are intent on using government-affiliated militias to empty IDP camps. Such action would result in an aggressive response from the U.S. Eliasson responded that this was an important message and he would make sure the GOS takes it seriously, "Everyone needs to send the same message to the Sudanese that they must return to the political process." -------------- AU Presidency -------------- ¶6. (C) Natsios raised the possibility that Sudan may assume the presidency of the AU. A Sudanese presidency of the AU would make it impossible for the U.S. to provide support to USUN NEW Y 00000015 002 OF 002 AMIS. Eliasson agreed that it would be a "complete disaster" for Sudan to assume leadership of the AU at this time, but added that he believed this was unlikely because of opposition from West African countries. Eliasson promised to "continue tracking this issue" with AU member countries and encourage donor countries to make clear that a Sudanese AU presidency would be unacceptable. ¶7. (U) AF/SPG Lauren Landis cleared this message. WOLFF